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This thesis handles a fundamental problem in retail: given an enormous variety of
products which does the retailer display to its customers? This is the assortment
planning problem. We solve this problem by developing algorithms that, given
input parameters for products, can efficiently return the set of products that should
be displayed. To develop these algorithms we use a mathematical model of how
customers react to displayed items, a customer choice model. Below we consider
two classic customer choice models, the Multinomial Logit model and Nested Logit
model. Under each of these customer choice models we develop algorithms that
solve the assortment planning problem. Additionally, we consider the constrained
assortment planning problem where the retailer must display products to customers
but must also satisfy operational constraints.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
While retailers make decisions about managing inventory or fulfilling orders they
must carefully consider what to display to customers. The assortment of products a
retailer chooses shapes demand and, as a result, affects the other business decisions.
At a physical retailer the assortment decision is strategic. What products do we
put on the shelves this week? In e-commerce the decision can be strategic, but can
also be real time and, potentially, personalized. What products do I show to this
customer right now in order to maximize revenue and grow market share?
This is the assortment planning problem and is the primary driver of my thesis
research. Which products does a retailer display to its customers? I answer it
within the framework of Operations Research, using mathematical models and
data driven techniques. Of special importance is the model of how customers
purchase products, the customer choice model. Formally, the retailer has a stock of
products, N , and for every S ⊆ N the customer choice model gives the probability
product j ∈ S is purchased, Pj(S). The critical feature of a choice model is that
the probability a product is purchased depends on which assortment the retailer
offers to customers.
To understand our approach, and the place of a customer choice model, we
can put the assortment planning decision in a larger context. We can divide the
decision making into two separate stages: estimation and optimization. The link
between these two stages is the customer choice model. In the estimation stage
we are presented with raw transaction data and use statistical methods to fit the
customer choice model to the data. In the second stage we assume the parameters
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of the model are given and use them as input to an optimization routine. We focus
on the second, optimization stage.
We would like to optimize the assortment of products a retailer displays to
its customers. In what follows we will be most interested in optimizing expected
revenue. We incorporate revenues by assigning each product j a fixed revenue rj;
if selling a unit of product j involves a constant cost for each unit sold, then we
assume that rj is the profit from the sale, given by the difference between revenue
and cost. Given the revenues rj and the function Pj(S) the assortment planning
problem is to find the set S∗ such that:
S∗ = argmaxS
∑
j∈S
rjPj(S).
In addition to the pure assortment planning problem we will be interested in
variations. These variations can include additional constraints on the assortments
that can be offered. For example, an online retailer must display products on
a web page with limited space; there may only be enough room to display k
products. This introduces an operational constraint: the retailer can not display
an assortment with more than k products. This constraint induces a collection of
feasible assortments F = {S : |S| ≤ k} and the retailer must offer some S ∈ F .
The retailer is then interested in finding a set S∗ such that
S∗ = argmaxS∈F
∑
j∈S
rjPj(S).
This is the constrained assortment planning problem. Different constraints will
result in different F .
We will also be interested in variations of the assortment planning problem
that include additional problem dynamics. Notably we will be interested in pricing
problems, where in addition to selecting an assortment to display the retailer must
also post prices for products. The probability a product is purchased depends
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on the assortment offered and the posted prices. We will also be interested in
location based effects, where the probability a product is purchased depends on
the offered assortment and the locations of the offered products. Including these,
and other problem dynamics will consist of reducing the dynamics to a constrained
assortment planning problem of a special variety.
1.2 Constrained Assortment Planning Under the Multino-
mial Logit Model
The starting point for of our work considers constrained assortment planning prob-
lems assuming customers choose according to the multinomial logit model (MNL).
The set of available products is N . The per-unit revenue associated with prod-
uct j is rj. The key feature of the MNL is the introduction of a preference vj
for each product j. The preference weight captures the relative attractiveness
of the product. To capture the product offer decisions we introduce the de-
cision variable xj ∈ {0, 1} such that xj = 1 if we offer product j; otherwise
xj = 0. Under the MNL, if the product offer decisions are given by the vector
x = {xj : j ∈ N} = {0, 1}|N |, then a customer purchases product j with prob-
ability Pj(x) = vj xj/(v0 +
∑
k∈N vk xk). Therefore, if the products that we offer
correspond to the vector x, then the expected revenue obtained from a customer
can be written as
R(x) =
∑
j∈N
rj Pj(x) =
∑
j∈N rj vj xj
1 +
∑
j∈N vj xj
.
For a constraint matrix A = [aij]i∈M,j∈N with dimensions |M |×|N |, the feasible
set of product offer decisions are given by F = {x ∈ {0, 1}|N | : ∑j∈N aij xj ≤
bi ∀ i ∈M}. Our goal is to find a set of feasible products to offer so as to maximize
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the expected revenue obtained from each customer, yielding the problem
z∗ = max
x∈F
R(x). (1.1)
1.2.1 Motivation and Literature Review
The MNL has a strong presence in the literature. There are known methods to
estimate the MNL parameters very quickly; see [59]. These methods run very
quickly, making the MNL a very attractive option in practice. Additionally, the
MNL has been included in many treatments of network revenue management prob-
lems, where an airline must make decisions about offering itineraries based on the
capacity of individual flight legs in the underlying network; see [18], [31], [36], and
[42]. And, perhaps most importantly, the MNL is used considerably in practice.
These considerations make the MNL a natural choice model to study; extensions
of the MNL can easily be incorporated in existing revenue management systems.
The unconstrained assortment planning problem under the MNL has been stud-
ied by [57]. They show that the optimal assortment can be obtained by greedily
adding products into the offered assortment in the order of decreasing revenues.
[22] give a linear programming formulation for the unconstrained assortment plan-
ning problem under the MNL. Our main result will introduce a linear program
that can be viewed as a considerable extension of the linear program in [22].
The advances in the unconstrained assortment planning problem offer limited
options to practitioners. In practical retail settings constraints on the offered
assortment are essential; retailers are not able to offer an unlimited number of
products, for example. [50] consider assortment problems with a limit on the
total number of offered products. The algorithms they develop are special purpose
combinatorial algorithms. By contrast we will give a direct linear programming
formulation that is considerably easier to implement. Our approach also extends
4
to more general cardinality constraints.
In addition to constrained assortment planning problems we also use our frame-
work to incorporate additional problem dynamics. We will consider location based
effects, where the preference weight of a product depends on where it is offered.
Additionally, we introduce joint assortment and pricing problems, where the pref-
erence weight of a product depends on its posted price. In Section 4 we consider a
more general framework for joint assortment and pricing problems. In this section
we only give a sketch of how our techniques apply to pricing problems.
1.2.2 Main Results
Problem 1.1 has a nonlinear objective function and integrality requirements on
its decision variables. Hence it is intractable. To overcome this intractability we
introduce a linear program
max
∑
j∈N
rj wj (1.2)
st
∑
j∈N
wj + w0 = 1
∑
j∈N
aij
wj
vj
≤ bi w0
v0
∀ i ∈M
0 ≤ wj
vj
≤ w0
v0
∀ j ∈ N,
where the decision variables are {wj : j ∈ N ∪ {0}}. In this linear program we
interpret the decision variable wj as the probability that a customer purchases
product j and w0 as the probability that a customer leaves without making a
purchase. The first constraint ensures that a customer either purchases a product
or leaves without purchasing. Interestingly, the second set of constraints are enough
to ensure that the product offer decisions are chosen within the feasible set F .
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The third set of constraints ensure the connection between the probability that a
customer purchases a product and leaves without purchasing anything. Our main
result is that when A is a totally unimodular (TU) matrix then the LP captures
the constrained assortment planning problem exactly.
Theorem 1.2.1. When the constraint matrix A is TU problems (1.1) and (2.3)
have the same optimal objective value and we can construct an optimal solution to
one of these problems by using an optimal solution to the other.
We give a number of specific cases where we can use Theorem 2.4.1 to obtain
the optimal solutions to certain constrained assortment planning problems under
the MNL. For a majority of these cases our results provide the first tractable algo-
rithms to obtain optimal solutions. Additionally, we reduce problems that incor-
porate additional problem dynamics to constrained assortment planning problems
for which Theorem 2.4.1 applies.
Cardinality Constraints: Consider the case where the total number of prod-
ucts that can be offered is limited to b. So, the feasible set of product offer decisions
can be written as F = {x ∈ {0, 1}|N | : ∑j∈N xj ≤ b}. These constraints are TU.
[50] give an efficient algorithm for finding the optimal set of products to offer un-
der MNL with a cardinality constraint but our use of Theorem 2.4.1 allows us to
solve this problem directly by using a linear program. Furthermore, by building
on this theorem, we can find the optimal solution under more general cardinality
constraints. We give two examples of more general cardinality constraints below.
Consider the case where there are K nested subsets of products such that
S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ SK ⊂ N and there are integers b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ bK associated
with each one of these subsets. The total number of products that we can offer
in subset Sk is limited to bk. Thus, the feasible set of product offer decisions can
be written as F = {x ∈ {0, 1}|N | : ∑j∈Sk xj ≤ bk ∀ k = 1, . . . , K}. This structure
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can arise when a more specialized set of products, S1, is allocated less space than
a more general set S2.
As another example, consider the case where the products are partitioned into
K disjoint subsets S1, S2, . . . , SK . Without loss of generality, we assume that the
products are indexed by the integers {1, . . . , n} and we have Sk = {ik, . . . , ik+1−1}
with i1 = 1 and iK+1 = n + 1. The total number of products we can offer in
subset Sk is limited to bk. In this case, the feasible set of product offer decisions
is F = {x ∈ {0, 1}|N | : ∑ik+1−1j=ik xj ≤ bk ∀ k = 1, . . . , K} and this constraint
matrix still corresponds to an interval matrix. This structure can arise when
S1 and S2 correspond to different product categories that we would like to limit
independently.
Product Precedence Constraints: We consider assortment planning prob-
lems where a particular product cannot be offered to customers unless a certain set
of related products are also offered. For example, it may not be possible to offer
the brand name version of a drug unless the generic version is offered. To model
such product precedence constraints, we use Sj ⊂ N to denote the set of products
that we need to offer to be able to offer product j. So, the feasible set of product
offer decisions is given by F = {x ∈ {0, 1}|N | : xj − xi ≤ 0 ∀ j ∈ N, i ∈ Sj}, indi-
cating that we can have xj = 1 only when xi = 1 for all i ∈ Sj. In this constraint
matrix, each row includes only a +1 and a −1. Such matrices are known to be
TU. We observe that the subsets {Sj : j ∈ N} in product precedence constraints
can be completely arbitrary. In particular, they can be overlapping and products
can have circular dependencies on each other.
Pricing with a Finite Price Menu: Consider the case where the price of a
product is a decision variable, rather than being fixed, and the preference weight
of a product depends on its price. Increasing the price of a product is expected to
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make it less desirable to customers, effectively decreasing its preference weight, but
we make no assumptions on the correlation between prices and preference weights.
The goal is to choose the prices of the products so as to maximize the expected
revenue. We outline how to use Theorem 2.4.1 to solve this pricing problem.
To simplify exposition and notation we consider maximizing expected profit
rather than expected revenue. We let K be the set of possible price levels for a
product. The price corresponding to price level k for a product is given by rk.
Therefore, {rk : k ∈ K} becomes the possible prices for a product. If we use the
price level k for product j, then its preference weight is vjk. Our notation indicates
that the set of possible prices for each product is the same; it is straightforward
to relax this. To capture our pricing decisions, we use x = {xjk : j ∈ N, k ∈
K} ∈ {0, 1}|N |×|K|, where xjk = 1 if we set the price of product j at price level k,
otherwise xjk = 0. Thus, we want to solve the problem
max
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈K rk vjk xjk
1 +
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈K vjk xjk
st
∑
k∈K
xjk = 1 ∀ j ∈ N
xjk ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j ∈ N, k ∈ K,
where the constraints ensure that each product is offered at one price level.
Display Location Effects: Consider the case where the preference weight of a
product depends on where it is displayed. For example, in online retail customers
may be more likely to choose products that are displayed at the top of search
results, which can be captured by using preference weights that depend on the
display order of the product. It turns out we can build on Theorem 2.4.1 to find
the optimal set of products to offer when the preference weights depend on the
display location.
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We use vjl to denote the preference weight of product j when this product
is displayed at location l. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are
as many possible locations as the number of products so that we can offer all
products at once. In this case, we can index both the products and the locations
by N ; this restriction is easily relaxed. To capture the product offer decisions, we
use x = {xjl : j, l ∈ N} ∈ {0, 1}|N |×|N |, where xjl = 1 if we offer product j in
location l, otherwise xjl = 0. If the product offer decisions are given by x, then we
obtain an expected revenue of
∑
j,l∈N rj vjl xjl/(1 +
∑
j,l∈N vjlxjl). Therefore, we
are interested in solving the problem
max
∑
j,l∈N rj vjl xjl
1 +
∑
j,l∈N vjl xjl
st
∑
l∈N
xjl ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈ N
∑
j∈N
xjl ≤ 1 ∀ l ∈ N
xjl ∈ {0, 1} ∀j, l ∈ N,
where the first set of constraints ensure that each product is offered at most in one
location and the second set of constraints ensure that each location is used by at
most one product.
General Constraints: When the constraint matrix A is not TU then Theorem
2.4.1 no longer applies and problems (1.1) and (2.3) are not equivalent. However,
we can still use (2.3) to generate useful solutions.
Theorem 1.2.2. When the constraint matrix A is arbitrary then the objective value
of (2.3) is an upper bound on the objective value of (1.1). Further, an optimal
solution x¯∗ to (2.3) can expressed as a convex combination x¯∗ = α1x¯∗1 + . . .+ αlx¯
∗
l
where each x¯∗i corresponds to an assortment.
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Theorem 1.2.2 is useful in two ways. First, because (2.3) provides an upper
bound we can use it to test heuristics for (1.1); by comparing the solution value of a
heuristic with the computed upper bound we can judge the quality of the heuristic
algorithm. Second, the convex combination of assortments can be used in settings
where the offered assortment changes quickly, in online retail for example. We
can interpret αi as the proportion of time to offer assortment x¯
∗
i and, provided
assortments change rapidly, can offer each assortment the appropriate amount of
time.
1.3 Assortment Planning Under the Nested Logit Model
The MNL is simple, easy to estimate, and, with the above results, flexible in
modeling practical business problems. However, due in part to its simplicity it has
some undesirable features. Notable among these is the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) property, which refers to the fact that if a product is added to the
offered assortment, then the market share of all other offered products decreases
by the same relative amount. Clearly, this property should not hold when products
cannibalize each other to different extents; see [2]. The Nested Logit model (NL),
introduced by [64], was designed to overcome the IIA property. Justifications and
extensions for the nested logit model are provided in [39] and [4].
In the NL the set of products is decomposed into nests, or groups of correlated
products. Given these nests customers make a two stage decision process: first a
customer chooses a nest and then chooses a product within the selected nest. There
are m nests indexed by M = {1, . . . ,m}. Each nest contains n products indexed by
N = {1, . . . , n}; we can relax the assumption that each nest includes n products.
Product ij refers to product j in nest i. Every product ij has a preference weight
vij. We introduce two types of no purchase products: an “outer” no purchase
10
product, indexed by 0, that customers select when leaving in the nest selection
stage and an “inner” no purchase product, indexed by i0, that customers select
when leaving nest i.
We denote an assortment by a vector S = (S1, . . . , Sm) where Si ⊆ N . We let
Vi(S) = vi0 +
∑
j∈Si vij. If a customer selects nest i in the nest selection stage then
the probability a customer purchases product j ∈ Si is given by
Pij(Si) =
vij
vi0 +
∑
k∈Si vik
=
vij
Vi(Si)
In addition to preference weights there is also a nest dissimilarity parameter γi
associated with every nest i. In our nested logit model, the dissimilarity parameters
(γ1, . . . , γm) are assumed to be constants, as described in [40]. The probability a
customer chooses nest i when (S1, . . . , Sm) is offered is given by
Qi(S1, . . . , Sm) =
Vi(Si)
γ
i
v0 +
∑
l∈M Vl(Sl)
γl
Note that higher values of γi magnify the total preference weight of products
available in Si.
The standard NL model studied in [39] restricts γi ≤ 1 and vi0 = 0 for all
i ∈ M . In what follows we focus on the standard NL model but also consider
non-standard variants that relax these restrictions.
If we offer the assortment Si in nest i, then we can write the expected revenue
we obtain from this nest as
Ri(Si) =
∑
j∈Si
rij Pij(Si) =
∑
j∈Si rij vij
Vi(Si)
,
with the interpretation that Ri(∅) = 0. Therefore, if we offer the assortment
(S1, . . . , Sm) over all nests with Si ⊂ N for all i ∈M , then we obtain an expected
revenue of
Π(S1, . . . , Sm) =
∑
i∈M
Qi(S1, . . . , Sm)Ri(Si).
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Our goal is to choose an assortment (S1, . . . , Sm) that maximizes the expected
revenue over all nests, yielding the assortment planning problem
Z∗ = max
(S1,...,Sm):Si⊂N, i∈M
Π(S1, . . . , Sm). (1.3)
1.3.1 Motivation and Literature Review
Like the MNL, the NL is well studied in the literature. There are known meth-
ods to quickly estimate NL parameters; see [59]. Furthermore, it is possible to
show that the nested logit model is compatible with a random utility-based choice
model. This feature gives some behavioral justification to the NL; see [4]. Finally,
the nested logit model allows correlations between the utilities of the products,
capturing the fact that the way a customer evaluates a certain product may help
us predict how this customer would evaluate other similar products.
This makes the NL an attractive model, especially for behavioral descriptions
where only estimating model parameters is a concern. However, there is limited
work on optimization routines involving the NL; this prevents it from being part
of operational decision making systems. [30] consider joint assortment planning
and pricing problems under the NL. [11] study assortment problems under the NL
without any constraints, and [49] consider constraints under the NL. Most of this
work, however, considers NL models with a small number of nests.
In what follows we fill this gap. We give tractable algorithms that, given
the parameters of the NL, provide assortments that give high revenue. These
algorithms scale polynomially in the number of nests. Chief among these results
is that under the standard NL model we can find an assortment that achieves the
optimal revenue.
The standard NL model can be limiting in many ways, though. Using dissimi-
larity parameters that take on values larger than one allows us to model synergistic
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effects among products within the same nest. In particular if we offer the assort-
ment (S1, . . . , Sm), then the probability that a customer purchases product j ∈ Si
in nest i is given by
Qi(S1, . . . , Sm)Pij(Si) =
Vi(Si)
γi−1
v0 +
∑
l∈M Vl(Sl)
γl
vij.
From the expression above, we observe that when γi ≤ 1, adding a product k /∈ Si
to nest i always decreases the purchase probability of product j ∈ Si. In practice,
this is not always the case. We observe that if γi > 1 and we add a new product to
nest i, then both Vi(Si)
γi−1 and
∑
l∈M Vl(Sl)
γl increase in the expression above. As
a result, the probability that a customer purchases product j may increase or
decrease. This feature allows us to model synergies between different products in
a nest. These synergies may provide justification for including loss leaders in a
nest in order to attract traffic.
There are a number of empirical studies that fit the NL to customer choice
data and estimate the nest dissimilarity parameters as exceeding one; see [61], [32],
[58] and [66]. [4] revisits the compatibility of the NL with utility maximization
principle and shows that even if we do have γi > 1 for some i ∈ M the NL can
still be compatible with a random utility-based choice model. [61] interpret a nest
dissimilarity parameter exceeding one as a signal that substitution across nests
happens more readily than substitution within a nest.
Additionally, in many settings relaxing the constraint that vi0 = 0 for all i ∈M
is practically important. When vi0 = 0 this corresponds to a situation where if a
customer decides to make a purchase within a particular nest, then the customer
always makes a purchase within the selected nest; the nests are fully-captured nests.
On the other hand, if the preference weight of the no purchase option within a nest
is strictly positive, then a customer may leave without purchasing anything in the
selected nest; the nests are partially-captured nests. There are a number of reasons
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to consider the case with partially-captured nests. Allowing vi0 > 0 gives the
retailer freedom to model competition: vi0 can be interpreted as the preference
weight of products offered by the retailers competition. Our use of the partially-
captured nests is closely related to more general version of the NL, the cross nested
logit model; see [13].
1.3.2 Main Results
We classify the instances of the assortment planning problem in (3.2) along two
dimensions. The first dimension is based on the values of the dissimilarity param-
eters (γ1, . . . , γm) of the nests. Along this dimension, we separately consider the
two cases where (i) we have γi ≤ 1 for all i ∈M , and (ii) there are no restrictions
on the dissimilarity parameters. The second dimension of classification is based
on the values of the preference weights (v10, . . . , vm0) of the no purchase options
within the nests. Along this dimension, we separately consider the two cases where
(i) we have vi0 = 0 for all i ∈ M , and (ii) there are no restrictions on the prefer-
ence weights of the no purchase options. Since there are two cases to consider along
each one of the two dimensions, we study the assortment planning problem in (3.2)
under four cases. The standard version of the NL model, studied in [38] and [40],
has γi ≤ 1 and vi0 = 0 for all i ∈M . In these papers, the author notes that having
γi ≤ 1 for all i ∈M implies that the nested logit model is always compatible with
a random utility-based choice model, irrespective of the values of the preference
weights of the products and the preference weights of the no purchase options
All of the results we present depend on a linear program that can recover
optimal solutions to (3.2).
Theorem 1.3.1. Suppose that there is some collection T1, . . . Tm such that for an
optimal solution S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m) to (3.2) we have S
∗
i ∈ Ti for all i. Then Z∗ is
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the optimal objective value to
min x (1.4)
s.t. v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
yi
yi ≥ Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)− x) ∀ i ∈M,Si ∈ Ti.
Further, the optimal solution S∗ can be recovered from a solution to (3.4).
The decision variable x in (3.4) is the total expected revenue and yi is the
expected revenue we receive given a customer selects nest i. The program has
a total of 1 + m variables but 1 +
∑
i |Ti| constraints. In order to recover an
optimal solution in a tractable fashion we need to find Ti that are both small and
guaranteed to contain S∗i .
Standard NL: One of our main results is that the assortment problem under
the standard version of the NL admits a tractable algorithm. To achieve this result
we use (3.4) and a characterization of optimal solutions:
Theorem 1.3.2. Suppose we are under the standard NL. If S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m) is
an optimal solution to (3.2) then each S∗i is revenue ordered. That is, if ij ∈ S∗i
and rij′ > rij then ij
′ ∈ S∗i .
This theorem lets us construct the Ti necessary in (3.4): we let Ti consist of all
revenue ordered sets of products in nest i. By Theorem 1.3.2 the resulting Ti will
contain S∗i and, because of the structure, |Ti| ≤ n + 1 allowing (3.4) to be solved
in polynomial time.
Non-Standard Variants of NL: While the assortment planning problem in
(3.2) is polynomially solvable when γi ≤ 1 and vi0 = 0 for all i ∈ M , we show
lifting any one of these restrictions renders the problem NP-hard and we resort to
approximation methods. For these cases we take a two pronged approach.
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For each of the NP-hard cases we develop tractable algorithms that run very
quickly and return a solution with a provable worst-case guarantee. If an algorithm
has a worst case guarantee of α then, on all problem instances, it is guaranteed to
return a solution with objective value at least 1/α of the optimal solution. These
algorithms make use of a more general version of Theorem 1.3.1. This more general
version shows that if the Ti of Theorem 1.3.1 are guaranteed to contain a solution
with a worst-case guarantee of α to problem (3.2) then (3.4) will recover a solution
with worst case guarantee at least α. We summarize these worst-case guarantees
in Figure 3.1.
In addition to these worst case guarantee algorithms we also develop three
alternative algorithmic approaches that apply to the most general forms of the
NL that we consider. First, we develop a psuedopolynomial time algorithm, an
algorithm in which the running time depends polynomially on a unary encoding of
the values of the input parameters. Second, we develop an approximation scheme
that can find solutions of arbitrary accuracy at the expense of expending more
computation time. Finally, we develop an easily computed upper bound on the
optimal revenue.
The upper bound is of special practical importance. It can be used to bench-
mark the quality of heuristic solution approaches; by computing the quality of
the solution returned by the heuristic and comparing it with our upper bound a
practitioner can determine the quality of their algorithms. This is especially im-
portant as the size of the problem grows and heuristics become more appealing for
practical revenue management systems.
The upper bound also allows us to test the quality of our worst-cause guarantee
algorithms experimentally. There are two values that drive problem difficulty: the
ratio between smallest and largest preference weight, κ, and the magnitude of the
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min{ρ, 2κ} approximation scheme,
upper bound
Table 1.1: Summary of results. ρ is the ratio of largest to smallest revenue. κ is
the ratio of largest to smallest preference weight.
largest γi, γˆ. In the hardest instances, where κ and γˆ are very high, the average
gap between our upper bound and solution is only 0.29% and the maximum gap is
3.26%. In easier instances, where κ is high but γ¯ is low, the average gap is 0.19%
and the maximum gap is 2.42%. When both κ and γ¯ are low the performance is
very good; our algorithms achieve an average gap of 0.01% and a maximum gap of
0.20%. These experiments give strong evidence that our algorithms will perform
very well in practice.
1.4 Quality Consistent Pricing Under the Nested Logit
Model
In this section, we consider pricing problems when there is a quality consistency
constraint and customers choose according to the NL. In the quality consistency
constraint there is an intrinsic ordering of the products according to quality and
the retailer is constrained to offer higher prices for higher quality products. The
goal is to find the prices to charge that maximize the expected revenue, while
making sure that the prices satisfy the quality consistency constraint.
Recalling the variations of the NL model introduced previously, in this section
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we work exclusivly under the standard version of the NL model where γi ≤ 1 and
vi0 = 0 for all i ∈ M . We index the nests by M = {1, . . . ,m} and in each nest
there are n products indexed by N = {1, . . . , n}. For each product, there are q
possible prices given by Θ = {θ1, . . . , θq}. Without loss of generality, we index the
possible prices so that 0 < θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θq. We use pij ∈ Θ to denote the price
that we charge for product j in nest i. If we charge price pij then the preference
weight of this product is given by vij(pij). We impose the mild assumption that if
we charge a larger price for a product, then its preference weight becomes smaller,
implying that vij(θ
1) > vij(θ
2) > . . . > vij(θ
q) > 0. Although our notation implies
that the number of products in each nest is the same and the set of possible prices
that we can charge for each product is the same this assumption is easily relaxed.
We use pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) ∈ Θn to capture the price vector charged in nest
i. As a function of pi we use Vi(pi) to denote the total preference weight of the
products in nest i, so that Vi(pi) =
∑
j∈N vij(pij). Under the NL, if we charge pi
in nest i, then a customer that has already decided to make a purchase in nest
i chooses product j in this nest with probability vij(pij)/Vi(pi). In this case, if a
customer has already decided to make a purchase in this nest, then the expected
revenue obtained from this customer is given by
Ri(pi) =
∑
j∈N
pij
vij(pij)
Vi(pi)
=
∑
j∈N pij vij(pij)
Vi(pi)
.
If we charge the price vectors (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Θm×n over all nests, then a cus-
tomer decides to make a purchase in nest i with probability Qi(p1, . . . , pm) =
Vi(pi)
γi/(v0 +
∑
l∈M Vl(pl)
γl). If the customer decides to make a purchase in nest
i, then the expected revenue obtained from this customer is Ri(pi). Thus, if we
charge the price vectors (p1, . . . , pm) over all nests, then the expected revenue from
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a customer is given by
Π(p1, . . . , pm) =
∑
i∈M
Qi(p1, . . . , pm)Ri(pi) =
∑
i∈M Vi(pi)
γi Ri(pi)
v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(pi)
γi
.
Our goal is to find the price vectors (p1, . . . , pm) to charge over all nests to maximize
the expected revenue above subject to the constraint that the price vector charged
in each nest satisfies a quality consistency constraint.
We consider two types of quality consistency constraints. In price ladders inside
nests there is an intrinsic ordering between the qualities of the products in each
nest. There is no dictated ordering between the qualities or prices of the products in
different nest. This type of quality consistency constraint becomes relevant when,
for example, nests correspond to products offered by different brands. There is a
natural quality ordering among products a particular brand offers but it is difficult
to compare the products across brands.
In price ladders between nests there is an intrinsic ordering between the qualities
of the nests, but there is no clear ordering between the qualities of the products in
the same nest. This type of quality consistency constraint becomes relevant when
the nests correspond to different quality levels and the products within a particular
nest correspond to products that differ in cosmetic or personal features.
Each type of constraint induces a set of feasible prices F that can be offered.
Thus, we are interested in solving
z∗ = max
(p1,...,pm)∈F
{
Π(p1, . . . , pm)
}
. (1.5)
In the problem above, the price of each product takes values in the discrete set
Θ. Furthermore, the objective function depends on the prices of the products in
a nonlinear fashion. Thus, this problem is a nonlinear combinatorial optimization
problem.
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1.4.1 Motivation and Literature Review
There is a significant amount of work on solving pricing problems under variants
of the MNL and NL. Most of this work assumes a parametric relationship between
preference weights and prices. Under the MNL there is considerable literature of
this flavor. [25], [55], and [12] consider pricing problem under the MNL where
preference weights are a parametric function of price. [8] and [63] give tractable
solution methods for joint assortment planning and pricing problems under the
MNL, again where preference weights depend perimetrically on price. The litera-
ture on solving pricing problems under the NL has recently started growing. [34]
study pricing problems under the assumption that the products in the same nest
have the same price sensitivity; [21] relax this assumption and [47] develop further
algorithms. [35] and [33] consider pricing problems under the NL where the choice
process proceeds in more than two stages.
Our work on pricing diverges from the majority of these results. We do not
assume a parametric relationship between preference weight and price. Rather, we
work within a discrete pricing framework where there is a finite set of discrete price
levels a retailer can post for each product. There is some precedent for this in the
literature. Under the MNL [29] study pricing problems, where the attractiveness
of a product depends on its price in a general fashion and there are constraints on
the expected number of sales for the products. Under the NL model [20] consider
the joint discrete pricing and assortment problem.
The discrete pricing approach provides two advantages. First, preference weights
can depend on price in an arbitrary way. This is especially important in settings
where pricing competition is a dominating consideration: the preference weight of
a product should, intuitively, increase sharply when a retailer offers a price lower
than one of its competitors. Such sharp increases are not captured in the para-
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metric models that are studied. Additionally, by introducing discrete price levels
the retailer is implicitly constrained to offer natural, attractive prices, like those
ending in .99. In parametric models the retailer has a continuum of prices available
to them.
The pure pricing problem is not immediately useful in practice. There are
frequently pricing controls in place that limit the range of prices that can be posted
for a product. In the literature these pricing controls are usually modeled with
price bounds, upper and lower bounds on the prices for a product; see [21] and
[47]. While price bounds are very useful they are often not enough. We augment
price bounds with a quality consistency constraint.
In many settings the quality consistency constraint is essential. When prices fail
to be quality consistent customers lose confidence in the retailer. Such prices also
convey a sense of fairness to customers; see [19]. Quality consistency constraints
have been introduced by [48]; their work is motivated by a pricing problem in
the automobile industry, where the prices of the automobiles with richer features
should be larger.
We work with quality consistent pricing problems under both the MNL and NL
models. Under the MNL model our approach leverages Theorem 2.4.1. Applying
this theorem to the quality consistent pricing problem follows the same ideas as the
joint assortment and pricing problem outlined in Section 2. Since the NL model
is a strict generalization of the MNL model we focus on that in the remainder of
the section. It is important to note, however, that while we place mild restrictions
on the relationship between price and preference weight in the NL model, this
relationship can be completely arbitrary in the MNL model.
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1.4.2 Main Results
As mentioned above we can use Theorem 2.4.1 to solve the quality consistent
pricing problem under the MNL. This gives a linear programming approach that is
easily implemented and allows us to capture arbitrary relationships between price
and preference weight. Below we outline the results related to the NL.
Quality Consistent Pricing Within Nests: Our strategy for solving quality
consistent pricing problems under the NL closely follows the strategy implied by
Theorem 1.3.1. In this context, however, we use a variation of Theorem 1.3.1:
Theorem 1.4.1. Suppose that there is some collection P1, . . .Pm such that for
some optimal price vector p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) for (1.5) we have p
∗
i ∈ Pi for all i.
Then the optimal objective value to (1.5) is achieved by
min
{
x : v0x ≥
∑
i∈M
yi, yi ≥ Vi(pi)γi(Ri(pi)− x) ∀pi ∈ Pi, i ∈M
}
, (1.6)
In the quality consistent pricing within nests the constraints naturally decom-
pose across nests and so finding the Pi of Theorem 1.4.1 is a natural approach.
Our strategy is to find Pi that are both small and guaranteed to contain p∗i , so
that (1.6) can be solved efficiently.
To generate Pi for a nest i ∈M we expand on a theorem of [20]
Theorem 1.4.2. p∗i is the optimal solution to
max
pi∈Pi
{Vi(pi)(Ri(pi)− u∗i )}
where u∗ is a function of the optimal solution z∗.
Because u∗ is a function of z∗ we do not know u∗ a priori and can not imme-
diately use Theorem 1.4.2. However, we make two observations that allow us to
leverage it. First, we observe that for fixed u∗ we can find the optimal quality
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consistent prices by solving a longest path problem in a specific network. Second,
we note that over all values of u∗ there are a small number of unique longest paths
in this network. We identify the set of longest paths over all values of u∗ as the
Pi of Theorem 1.4.1; the set of longest paths over all values of u∗ is small and
guaranteed to contain the optimal price vector p∗i . We can solve the longest path
problem with a linear program and, because over all values of u∗ there are a small
number of unique longest paths, the parametric simplex method will find all such
paths in a tractable fashion.
Ultimately these techniques lead to tractable algorithms that involve using the
parametric simplex method to generate candidate price vectors Pi and then solving
the linear program of Theorem 1.4.1. This algorithm is easily implemented and
runs very quickly in practice: with 6 nests, 30 products, and 30 price levels the
algorithm takes only a few seconds on laptop hardware.
Quality Consistent Pricing Across Nests: Quality consistent pricing across
nests is significantly harder than quality consistent pricing within nests. This is
because the quality consistency constraint does not decompose by nests and, as a
result, Theorem 1.4.1 is not applicable.
Instead, we use a different solution approach based on a dynamic program.
In this dynamic program the decision epochs are the nests. When making the
decision for nest i there are two state variables: the largest price charged in nest
i − 1 and the largest price charged in nest i. These state variables determine the
range of prices that can be charged in nest i; the largest price charged in nest i−1
and largest price charged in nest i are, respectively, a lower and upper bound on
the prices that can be charged in nest i. The dynamic program glues together
the prices across nests in such a way that the total price vector will be quality
consistent.
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This dynamic program decomposes the quality consistent pricing problem across
nests into a new type of subproblem: given an upper and lower bound on the prices
that can be offered within a nest, which prices are optimal? We must solve the
problem for each nest, and for each upper and lower bound; this is a polynomial
number of subproblems.
To find the optimal prices in nest i for an upper and lower bound we take much
the same approach as we did for quality consistency within nests. We use Theorem
1.4.2 to generate a set of candidate price vectors and, among these prices, choose
the optimal one. Now, however, the candidate price vectors satisfy an upper and
lower bound instead of a quality consistency constraint.
This approach yields tractable algorithms for quality consistent pricing across
nests. Though it is somewhat more complicated than our algorithms for quality
consistent pricing within nests this algorithm is still easily implemented and runs
very quickly in practice: with 6 nests, 30 products, and 30 price levels the algorithm
takes only a few minutes on laptop hardware.
1.5 Assortment Planning Over Time
In this chapter we introduce the problem of assortment planning over time. In
contrast to the results above, in this chapter we do not focus on a specific choice
model. Instead we are interested in the impact of introducing a new dynamic into
an arbitrary choice model. Specifically, we are interested in introducing a notion of
time. We have a sequence of time periods and can only introduce one new product
per time step. We are not allowed to remove products from our assortment that
have already been introduced. In each time period the customers choose among
the currently offered products according to a specified choice model. The goal is
to determine which products to introduce, and in what order, so as to maximize
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the total revenue realized over all the time steps under some choice model.
Recalling the notation from the assortment planning problem we let N be the
set of products that can be offered for sale, and let n = |N |. We let rj be the
revenue of product j and let Pj(S) be the probability that product j is purchased
if S ⊆ N is offered for sale; then Pj(S) = 0 if j /∈ S. We do not consider any
specific choice model. Instead we consider choice models where the following two
properties hold. First,
Pj(S) ≥ Pj(T ) ∀T ∀j ∈ S ⊂ T ;
that is, the probability of purchasing product j cannot increase if we offer a larger
set of products. This holds for the MNL and NL model, for example, as well as
any choice model based on utility maximization. Second,
∑
j∈S Pj(S) ≤ 1 for any
non-empty set of products S. If an assortment S is offered for sale, then with
probability 1−∑j∈S Pj(S), no product is purchased. The expected revenue for a
set S of products is R(S) =
∑
j∈S rjPj(S). For lack of a better term, let us call
such choice models monotone choice models.
Additionally, we consider the case in which we only know that the revenue
function R(S) is monotone (that is, R(S) ≤ R(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N) and
submodular (that is, for any j /∈ S ⊆ T ⊆ N , then R(S ∪ {j}) − R(S) ≥ R(T ∪
{j})−R(T )), without knowing anything about the underlying choice model.
We wish to study the assortment planning problem over time. Intuitively, we
would like to find a sequence of products in which we can offer at most one new
product for sale at each of T time steps that maximizes the overall expected revenue
achieved over the given time horizon. Once a product is offered for sale, it remains
available to purchase for the remainder of the time horizon. More precisely, we
would like to find sets S1, S2, . . . , ST such that |St| ≤ t for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and
S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ ST that maximizes
∑T
t=1R(St).
25
1.5.1 Motivation and Literature Review
The assortment planning over time problem arises naturally in a setting where
products must be incrementally introduced. For example, when a firm introduces
a product line they often introduce individual products months apart from one
another.
There is substantial literature related to building and adjusting assortments
of products over time. In dynamic assortment problems, the offered assortment
is adjusted over time, possibly due to depleted product inventories, better under-
standing of customer choice processes or changes in customer tastes. [28] and [37]
study the problem of finding an assortment to offer and the corresponding stocking
quantities with the understanding that customers choose only among the products
that are still in stock. [3] and [24] consider the problem of dynamically customizing
the assortment offerings based on the preferences of each customer and remaining
product inventories. [6] and [9] study assortment problems where the attractive-
ness of the products diminishes over time and they seek optimal policies to replace
such products. [7] and [62] develop models where the assortment offering needs to
be adjusted over time in response to a better understanding of the customer choice
process.
There is also a less direct relationship between assortment planning over time
and online retail. Often in online retail settings products are displayed to customers
as a list of products on a web page. A customer will view the list of products but,
because of limited patience, the customer may not view all of the products in the
list. Instead the customer will view the the list up to some point and then not
view the rest. In this way we can consider a customer building the assortment
they view incrementally: they continue to view products in the list until they
run out of patience. After they exhaust their patience they choose a product
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from the assortment they have seen according to a choice model. The problem
introduced above corresponds to precisely this scenario when customers have a
uniform patience level from 1 to T .
1.5.2 Main Results
We provide two main results for the incremental problem. First, for monotone
choice models we relate the incremental assortment planning problem to the ca-
pacitated assortment planning problem. In the capacitated assortment planning
problem there is a capacity c on the number of products that can be offered for sale
and we wish to find the set S∗ = argmaxS∈FrjPj(S), where F = {S : |S| ≤ c}.
Given an algorithm for the capacitated assortment problem we can provide an
algorithm for the assortment over time problem that achieves at least 1/2 of the
optimal revenue. This result extends to the case when we only have an algorithm
that achieves an approximate solution for the capacitated problem.
Second, for choice models where the revenue function is monotone we show
that the assortment problem over time is NP-hard. This NP-hardness result also
applies to the case when we have a monotone choice model. In addition to the
NP-hardness result we also provide a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for the
assortment problem over time when we know the revenue function is monotone an
submodular. This algorithm uses a well-known greedy (1 − 1/e)-approximation
algorithm for finding a maximum valued set S with |S| ≤ c for any monotone,
submodular set function due to [45].
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CHAPTER 2
CONSTRAINED ASSORTMENT OPTIMZATION UNDER THE
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider constrained assortment optimization problems assum-
ing customers choose according to the multinomial logit model (MNL). The ob-
jective is to maximize the expected revenue obtained from each customer and the
constraints on the offered assortment can be captured by a totally unimodular con-
straint matrix. We formulate this constrained assortment problem as a fractional
program with binary decision variables to model the inclusion of products in the
assortment. Our main result shows that we can transform this fractional program
into a linear program where the integrality constraints can be relaxed because of
the totally unimodular nature of the constraints. This result allows us to formulate
and solve a variety of practical assortment and pricing problems, the majority of
which were not known to be tractable in the literature.
Let N be the product consideration set from which we want to select an as-
sortment S ⊂ N to offer to customers. To facilitate the discussion we identify
an assortment with an incidence vector x = {xj : j ∈ N} ∈ {0, 1}|N |, where
xj = 1 if j ∈ S and xj = 0 if j /∈ S. The set of feasible assortments is given by
F = {x ∈ {0, 1}|N | : ∑j∈N aij xj ≤ bi ∀ i ∈ M} for a totally unimodular matrix
[aij]i∈M,j∈N . Given feasible product offer decisions x ∈ F , each customer chooses
among the offered products according to MNL. The objective is to choose x ∈ F ,
a feasible set of products to offer, to maximize the expected revenue obtained from
each customer. Although this assortment problem is a fractional program with
binary decision variables, our main result shows that it can directly be solved as a
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linear program.
Building on our main result, we show how to solve five classes of practical as-
sortment and pricing problems. First, we work with assortment problems under
MNL where there are cardinality constraints on the assortment. [50] consider as-
sortment problems with a limit on the total number of offered products. Their
approach generates candidate assortments and checks the performance of the can-
didates, whereas we give a direct linear programming formulation. Our approach
also extends to more general cardinality constraints. In particular, our results ap-
ply when the set of products are partitioned into a number of subsets and we limit
the number of products offered in each subset. Such constraints occur when, for
example, television sets are partitioned as small, medium and large and we limit
the number of offered television sets of each size. We can also handle overlaps be-
tween successive subsets. That is, if some television sets can be considered as both
small and medium and some can be considered as both medium and large, then
we can limit the numbers of offered small, medium and large television sets. We
can deal with nested cardinality constraints as well, which occur when products
are categorized into subsets such that one subset includes another one and we
limit the number of products offered in each subset. For example, some products
may be specialty products and we may want to offer at most k specialty products,
while limiting the number of all offered products to `. Such overlapping or nested
cardinality constraints are not studied in the earlier work.
Second, we consider assortment problems with display location effects, where
the attractiveness of a product depends not only on its own attributes but also
on the location at which it is displayed. Such problems arise when products are
displayed in a window or a shelf and the products with prime locations may have
a better chance of attracting attention, which can be modeled by a higher attrac-
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tiveness parameter in MNL. Another relevant setting is online retail, where the
propensity of a customer to choose a product depends not only on the attributes
of the product, but also on where the product is shown within search results or
web site. We show that the assortment optimization problem with display specific
attractiveness parameters can be formulated as a linear program. To our knowl-
edge, tractability of the assortment problem with display location effects was not
previously known.
Third, we consider pricing problems under MNL, when there are a finite number
of possible price levels for the products and the attractiveness of a product depends
on its price. The objective is to choose the product prices to maximize the expected
revenue from each customer. We show how to obtain an optimal solution to this
problem by using a linear program. Earlier pricing formulations assume that the
attractiveness parameter of product j is a parametric function eαj−βj p of the price
p of this product, where αj and βj are fixed coefficients, in which case, the pricing
problem can be formulated as a continuous optimization problem involving the
product prices. In our approach, the attractiveness of a product depends on its
price arbitrarily, not limited to the parametric form eαj−βj p. Also, since we work
with a finite number of possible price levels, we can put explicit restrictions on
the product prices. For example, we can limit ourselves to prices in increments of
a dollar or make sure that the prices of the products are chosen within specific
intervals.
Fourth, we consider quality consistent pricing problems. In such pricing prob-
lems, there is an inherent ordering between the products, where some products are
considered lower in quality than others. The prices should be chosen to be qual-
ity consistent, so that lower quality products are priced lower than higher quality
products. We show how to obtain the optimal solution to such quality consistent
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pricing problems. The quality consistent pricing terminology is introduced by [19]
in the context of MNL, but to our knowledge, there is no work on finding optimal
prices under quality consistency constraints when customers choose according to
MNL. Quality consistency constraints are especially important when there is ex-
cessive demand for lower quality products, in which case, one might price lower
quality products higher than higher quality products when quality consistency
constraints are ignored.
Finally, we consider assortment problems with product precedence constraints
where a product cannot be offered unless a certain set of related products are
offered. We give a linear programming formulation of the assortment problem under
such precedence constraints.
2.2 Literature Review
As mentioned in the introduction the MNL model possesses the independence of
irrelevant alternatives property, which refers to the fact that if a product is added
to the offered assortment, then the market share of all other offered products de-
creases by the same relative amount. Clearly, this property should not hold when
products cannibalize each other to different extents; see [2]. Our linear program-
ming formulation under MNL extends to a more general attraction model that
mitigates some of the shortcomings of MNL. Unlike MNL, the purchase proba-
bilities in the general attraction model depend on all of the products, both those
offered and those not offered. This model was proposed by [22] and involves a
shadow attraction value for each product that impinges on the choice probabilities
when the products are not offered. It turns out that a simple transformation of our
formulation for MNL allows for the assortment problem to be solved under this
more general attraction model.
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Assortment problems under variants of MNL is closely related to our work. [57]
study assortment problems under MNL without any constraints and show that the
optimal assortment can be obtained by greedily adding products into the offered
assortment in the order of decreasing revenues. [50] consider cardinality constraints
on the offered assortment, whereas [49] assume that each product has a space re-
quirement and they limit the total space requirement of the offered assortment.
[22] give a linear programming formulation for the assortment problem under MNL
without considering constraints on feasible assortments and extend their formu-
lation to the general attraction model described in the previous paragraph. [5],
[43] and [52] consider the case where there are multiple customer types and cus-
tomers of each type choose according to a different MNL. They provide heuristics,
integer programming formulations and approximation methods. [11] study assort-
ment problems under the nested logit model without any constraints, whereas [49]
and [20] consider constraints under the nested logit model. [18], [36], [31], [67],
[56], [41] and [42] use assortment problems to make extensions to network revenue
management, where itinerary products consume the capacities on flight legs in
bundles.
For pricing problems, [25] observe that the expected revenue is not a concave
function of prices when customers choose according to MNL, but [55] and [12] are
able to recover a concave objective function by using the market share of each
product as the decision variable. [34] solve pricing problems under the nested
logit model. They also use market shares as decision variables, but work under the
assumption that the products in the same nest share the same price sensitivity. [21]
study the same problem, but they relax the assumption that the price sensitivities
in a nest are the same. [8] and [63] study joint assortment and pricing problems,
where one chooses the products to offer and their corresponding prices.
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2.3 Problem Formulation
The set of products is N . The revenue and the preference weight associated with
product j are respectively rj and vj. To capture the product offer decisions, we
define the decision variable xj ∈ {0, 1} such that xj = 1 if we offer product j,
otherwise xj = 0. Under MNL, if the product offer decisions are given by the
vector x = {xj : j ∈ N} = {0, 1}|N |, then a customer purchases product j with
probability Pj(x) = vj xj/(1 +
∑
k∈N vk xk), where we normalize the preference
weight of the no purchase option to one. Therefore, if the products that we offer
correspond to the vector x, then the expected revenue obtained from a customer
can be written as
R(x) =
∑
j∈N
rj Pj(x) =
∑
j∈N rj vj xj
1 +
∑
j∈N vj xj
. (2.1)
Without loss of generality, if selling a unit of product j involves a constant cost
for each unit sold, then we assume that rj is the profit from the sale, given by
the difference between revenue and cost. For a totally unimodular matrix A =
[aij]i∈M,j∈N with dimensions |M | × |N |, the feasible set of product offer decisions
are given by F = {x ∈ {0, 1}|N | : ∑j∈N aij xj ≤ bi ∀ i ∈ M}. For the moment, we
do not go into the specific structure of the matrix A, but we give specific examples
for A in the next section. Our goal is to find a set of feasible products to offer so
as to maximize the expected revenue obtained from each customer, yielding the
problem
z∗ = max
x∈F
R(x). (2.2)
Our use of “less than” constraints to capture the feasible set of product offer de-
cisions is without loss of generality. A “greater than” constraint can be multiplied
by −1 to get a “less than” constraint and an equality constraint can be replaced
a pair of “less than” and “greater than” constraints. Recalling that multiplying
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a row of a matrix by −1 or duplicating a row of a matrix does not change its
total unimodularity properties, we end up with “less than” constraints and a to-
tally unimodular constraint matrix after transforming equality and “greater than”
constraints to “less than” constraints; see Proposition 2.1 in Chapter III.1 of [44].
2.4 Main Result
Problem (2.2) has a nonlinear objective function and integrality requirements on
its decision variables. Our main result shows that problem (2.2) is equivalent to
the problem
max
∑
j∈N
rj wj (2.3)
st
∑
j∈N
wj + w0 = 1
∑
j∈N
aij
wj
vj
≤ biw0 ∀ i ∈M
0 ≤ wj
vj
≤ w0 ∀ j ∈ N,
where the decision variables are {wj : j ∈ N ∪{0}}. The problem above is a linear
program. In this problem, we interpret the decision variable wj as the probability
that a customer purchases product j and w0 as the probability that a customer
leaves without making a purchase. The first constraint ensures that a customer
either purchases a product or leaves without purchasing. Interestingly, the second
set of constraints are enough to ensure that the product offer decisions are chosen
within the feasible set F . The third set of constraints ensure the connection
between the probability that a customer purchases a product and leaves without
purchasing anything. In the next theorem, we show that problems (2.2) and (2.3)
are equivalent to each other.
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Theorem 2.4.1. Problems (2.2) and (2.3) have the same optimal objective value
and we can construct an optimal solution to one of these problems by using an
optimal solution to the other.
Proof. Using the decision variables y = {yj : j ∈ N} ∈ {0, 1}|N |, we claim that
problem (2.2) is equivalent to the problem
max
∑
j∈N
(rj − z∗) vj yj (2.4)
st
∑
j∈N
aij yj ≤ bi ∀ i ∈M
0 ≤ yj ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈ N,
which is a linear program. To see this equivalence, let x∗ and y∗ respectively be op-
timal solutions to problems (2.2) and (2.4). Since z∗ = R(x∗) =
∑
j∈N rj vj x
∗
j/(1+∑
j∈N vj x
∗
j), we get
∑
j∈N rj vj x
∗
j = z
∗ (1 +
∑
j∈N vj x
∗
j). In this case, evaluat-
ing the objective value of problem (2.4) at the feasible solution x∗, we obtain∑
j∈N(rj − z∗) vj x∗j = z∗ (1 +
∑
j∈N vj x
∗
j) − z∗
∑
j∈N vj x
∗
j = z
∗, which implies
that the optimal objective value of problem (2.4) is at least as large as the op-
timal objective value of problem (2.2). On the other hand, since A is totally
unimodular and the objective function of problem (2.4) is linear, we can as-
sume that y∗ ∈ {0, 1}|N | without loss of generality. Thus, y∗ ∈ F . In this case,
evaluating the objective value of problem (2.2) at the feasible solution y∗, we
have z∗ ≥ R(y∗) = ∑j∈N rj vj y∗j/(1 + ∑j∈N vj y∗j ). Focusing on the first and
last expressions in the last chain of inequalities and arranging the terms, we get
z∗ ≥∑j∈N(rj−z∗) vj y∗j , which implies that the optimal objective value of problem
(2.4) is at most as large as the optimal objective value of problem (2.2). Thus,
problems (2.2) and (2.4) are equivalent to each other, sharing the same optimal
objective value, establishing the claim. So, it is enough to show that problems
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(2.3) and (2.4) are equivalent to each other, which is what we do in the rest of the
proof.
We let w∗ = {w∗j : j ∈ N ∪ {0}} be an optimal solution to problem (2.3) with
objective value ζ∗ and y∗ be an optimal solution to problem (2.4). The discussion
above shows that y∗ provides the objective value z∗ for problem (2.4). We construct
the solution wˆ = {wˆj : j ∈ N ∪ {0}} to problem (2.3) as wˆj = Pj(y∗) = vj y∗j/(1 +∑
i∈N vi y
∗
i ) for all j ∈ N and wˆ0 = 1−
∑
j∈N Pj(y
∗) = 1/(1+
∑
i∈N vi y
∗
i ). Since y
∗
is feasible to problem (2.4), it is simple to check that wˆ is feasible to problem (2.3).
In particular, wˆ clearly satisfies the first constraint in problem (2.3). Furthermore,
noting that wˆj/(vj wˆ0) = y
∗
j , we have bi ≥
∑
j∈N aij y
∗
j =
∑
j∈N aij wˆj/(vj wˆ0)
showing that wˆ satisfies the second set of constraints in problem (2.3). Finally,
noting that 1 ≥ y∗j = wˆj/(vj wˆ0), wˆ satisfies the third set of constraints in problem
(2.3). In this case, the objective value provided by the feasible solution wˆ to
problem (2.3) satisfies ζ∗ ≥ ∑j∈N rj wˆj = ∑j∈N rj Pj(y∗j ) = R(y∗) = z∗. So, we
have ζ∗ ≥ z∗. On the other hand, we construct the solution yˆ = {yˆj : j ∈ N} to
problem (2.3) as yˆj = w
∗
j/(vj w
∗
0) for all j ∈ N . By using an argument similar to the
one we just used, it is possible to show that yˆ is a feasible solution to problem (2.4).
In this case, the objective value provided by the feasible solution yˆ to problem (2.4)
satisfies z∗ ≥∑j∈N rj vj yˆj − z∗∑j∈N vj yˆj = ∑j∈N rj w∗j/w∗0 − z∗∑j∈N w∗j/w∗0 ≥∑
j∈N rj w
∗
j/w
∗
0 − ζ∗
∑
j∈N w
∗
j/w
∗
0 = (ζ
∗ − ζ∗(1 − w∗0))/w∗0 = ζ∗, where the second
inequality uses the fact that ζ∗ ≥ z∗ shown above and the second equality uses
the fact that ζ∗ =
∑
j∈N rj w
∗
j and
∑
j∈N w
∗
j = 1 − w∗0 by the first constraint in
problem (2.3). So, we have z∗ ≥ ζ∗, establishing that the solutions w∗, y∗, wˆ and
yˆ all provide the objective value z∗ for their respective problems. Given w∗, the
solution yˆ constructed through w∗ is optimal to problem (2.4) and given y∗, the
solution wˆ constructed through y∗ is optimal to problem (2.3).
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Theorem 2.4.1 shows that problems (2.2) and (2.3) are equivalent and we can
obtain an optimal solution to the former problem simply by solving the latter.
This result is quite useful in practice since problem (2.3) is a linear program.
2.5 Applications
In this section, we give a number of specific cases where we can use Theorem 2.4.1
to obtain the optimal solutions to certain assortment optimization and pricing
problems under MNL with a variety of constraints. For majority of these cases,
efficient algorithms for obtaining the optimal solution do not exist in the earlier
literature. Our results appear to provide the first tractable algorithms to obtain
the optimal solution.
2.5.1 Cardinality Constraints
Consider the case where the total number of products that can be offered is limited
to b. So, the feasible set of product offer decisions can be written as F = {x ∈
{0, 1}|N | : ∑j∈N xj ≤ b}, in which case, A is given by (1, . . . , 1) with dimensions
1 × |N |. This matrix is clearly totally unimodular, which implies that we can
find the optimal set of products to offer under a cardinality constraint directly
by solving problem (2.3) with A = (1, . . . , 1). [50] give an efficient algorithm
for finding the optimal set of products to offer under MNL with a cardinality
constraint, but our use of Theorem 2.4.1 allows us to solve this problem directly
by using a linear program. Furthermore, by building on this theorem, we can find
the optimal solution under more general cardinality constraints. We proceed to
giving two examples of such more general cardinality constraints below.
Consider the case where there are K nested subsets of products such that
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S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ SK ⊂ N and there are integers b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ bK associated with
each one of these subsets. The total number of products that we can offer in subset
Sk is limited to bk. These constraints may arise when, for example, S1 corresponds
to the specialty products, whereas S2 corresponds to the set of all products and we
do not want to offer more than a total of b2 products, while limiting the number
of offered specialty products to b1. Thus, the feasible set of product offer decisions
can be written as F = {x ∈ {0, 1}|N | : ∑j∈Sk xj ≤ bk ∀ k = 1, . . . , K}. Since
S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ SK , this constraint matrix includes consecutive ones in each
row. Such matrices are called interval matrices and they are known to be totally
unimodular; see Corollary 2.10 in Chapter III.1 of [44]. Thus, we can solve a
linear program to find the optimal assortment to offer under nested cardinality
constraints.
As another example, consider the case where the products are partitioned into
K disjoint subsets S1, S2, . . . , SK . Without loss of generality, we assume that the
products are indexed by the integers {1, . . . , n} and we have Sk = {ik, . . . , ik+1−1}
with i1 = 1 and iK+1 = n + 1. The total number of products we can offer in
subset Sk is limited to bk. In this case, the feasible set of product offer decisions
is F = {x ∈ {0, 1}|N | : ∑ik+1−1j=ik xj ≤ bk ∀ k = 1, . . . , K} and this constraint
matrix still corresponds to an interval matrix. Such constraints may arise when,
for example, S1 corresponds to the specialty products, whereas S2 corresponds
to the general interest products and we separately want to limit the numbers of
offered specialty and general interest products. Furthermore, if Sk overlaps with
only Sk−1 and Sk+1, then the constraint matrix is still an interval matrix. So, even
if some products may count both as specialty and general interest products, we
can still limit the numbers of offered specialty and general interest products. To
our knowledge, it is difficult to capture such overlapping cardinality constraints
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with earlier frameworks.
2.5.2 Display Location Effects
Consider the case where the preference weight of a product depends on where it is
displayed. For example, if the products are displayed in a store window or a shelf,
then customers may tend to overlook a product when it is displayed at the back
of the window or the shelf, which can be captured by a smaller preference weight
when the product is displayed at the back. In online retail, customers may be more
likely to choose products that are displayed at the top of search results, which can
be captured by using preference weights that depend on the display order of the
product. It turns out we can build on Theorem 2.4.1 to find the optimal set of
products to offer when the preference weights depend on the display location.
We use vjl to denote the preference weight of item j when this item is displayed
at location l. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are as many possible
locations as the number of items so that we can offer all items at once. In this
case, we can index both the items and the locations by N . If the number of
possible locations is smaller than the number of items, then we can define additional
locations with vjl = 0 for all j ∈ N , for each additional location l, in which case,
using one of these additional locations for an item is equivalent to not displaying
the item at all. To capture the product offer decisions, we use x = {xjl : j, l ∈
N} ∈ {0, 1}|N |×|N |, where xjl = 1 if we offer item j in location l, otherwise xjl = 0.
If the product offer decisions are given by x, then we obtain an expected revenue
of
∑
j,l∈N rj vjl xjl/(1 +
∑
j,l∈N vjlxjl). Therefore, we are interested in solving the
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problem
max
∑
j,l∈N rj vjl xjl
1 +
∑
j,l∈N vjl xjl
st
∑
l∈N
xjl ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈ N
∑
j∈N
xjl ≤ 1 ∀ l ∈ N
xjl ∈ {0, 1} ∀j, l ∈ N,
where the first set of constraints ensure that each item is offered at most in one
location and the second set of constraints ensure that each location is used by
at most one item. The problem above is a special case of problem (2.2) where
each product is indexed by (j, l) ∈ N ×N . Its constraint matrix is the constraint
matrix of an assignment problem, which is totally unimodular; see Corollary 2.9
in Chapter III.1 of [44]. So, by Theorem 2.4.1, we can use a linear program to find
the optimal set of items to offer under display location effects.
2.5.3 Pricing with a Finite Price Menu
Consider the case where the price of a product is a decision variable, rather than
being fixed. The preference weight of a product depends on its price. Increasing
the price of a product is expected to make it less desirable to customers, effectively
decreasing its preference weight, but we are not strictly tied to the assumption that
higher prices result in lower preference weights. The goal is to choose the prices
of the products so as to maximize the expected revenue from each customer. We
show how to solve this pricing problem as a linear program as long as the prices
are chosen within a finite set of possible price levels.
We let K be the set of possible price levels for an item. The price corresponding
to price level k for an item is given by rk. Therefore, {rk : k ∈ K} becomes the
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possible prices for an item. If we use the price level k for item j, then its preference
weight is vjk. Our notation indicates that the set of possible prices for each item
is the same, but it is straightforward to extend our formulation to incorporate
different sets of possible prices for different items. To capture our pricing decisions,
we use x = {xjk : j ∈ N, k ∈ K} ∈ {0, 1}|N |×|K|, where xjk = 1 if we set the price
of item j at price level k, otherwise xjk = 0. Thus, we want to solve the problem
max
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈K rk vjk xjk
1 +
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈K vjk xjk
st
∑
k∈K
xjk = 1 ∀ j ∈ N
xjk ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j ∈ N, k ∈ K,
where the constraints ensure that each item is offered at one price level. Similar
to our observations for display location effects, the problem above is a special case
of problem (2.2) where each product is indexed by (j, k) ∈ N × K. Each row of
the constraint matrix corresponds to an item j and it includes consecutive ones,
corresponding to the different price levels for item j. Thus, the constraint matrix
is an interval matrix, which is totally unimodular. In this case, using Theorem
2.4.1, we can find the optimal prices by solving a linear program. Our formulation
above assumes that each product has to be offered. If we need to jointly decide
which products to offer and the prices of the offered products, then we can simply
replace the equality constraint in the problem above with a “less than” constraint.
Furthermore, if we want to impose a limit of b on the number of products we offer,
then we can add the constraint
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈K xjk ≤ b. The additional constraint
amounts to adding a row of ones to the constraint matrix, which does not change
the fact that the constraint matrix is an interval matrix.
Pricing models traditionally assume a parametric relationship between the price
of an item and its preference weight. In particular, it is usually assumed that if
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the price of item j is p, then its preference weight is eαj−βj p, for some constants
αj and βj. Using this parametric form, the pricing problem can be formulated
as a smooth optimization problem, involving prices as the decision variables, but
the objective function of this problem is not concave. [55] and [12] formulate the
problem in terms of the market share of an item to get a concave objective function,
but their work is based on the specific parametric relationship between price and
preference weight. In our formulation, the preference weight of an item can depend
on its price in an arbitrary fashion. Furthermore, since we work with discrete price
levels, we can limit attention to operationally appealing prices, such as those in
increments of a dollar.
2.5.4 Quality Consistent Pricing
Similar to our pricing model above, consider the case where the prices of the
products are decision variables, but there is an inherent ordering between the
products in terms of their quality. In particular, the products are indexed such
that the first product is lower quality than the second one, the second product
is lower quality than the third one and so on. When setting the prices of the
products, we need to ensure that the lower quality products have lower prices. Such
a pricing scheme is called quality consistent pricing or price laddering. It occurs
when products have a clear ordering in terms of quality, richness of features or
durability. For example, [48] describe an application where option rich automobiles
of the same model have to be priced higher than the option poor ones. The objective
is to choose the prices of the products to maximize the expected revenue from each
customer, while adhering to the quality consistency constraint.
We index the items by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and the possible price levels for an
item by K = {1, . . . ,m}. The price corresponding to price level k of an item is rk.
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Therefore, the possible price levels for an item are given by {rk : k ∈ K}. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the possible price levels are indexed such that
r1 ≤ r2 ≤ . . . ≤ rm so that lower indices correspond to lower prices. Also, we
assume that the items are indexed such that the first item is the lowest quality one
and the last item is the highest quality one. So, the price of the first item must
be smaller than the price of the second item, which, in turn, must be smaller than
the price of the third item and so on. We let vjk be the preference weight of item j
when we price this item at price level k. To capture our pricing decisions, we use
x = {xjk : j ∈ N, k ∈ K} ∈ {0, 1}|N |×|K|, where xjk = 1 if we price item j at price
level k, otherwise xjk = 0. To impose the quality consistency constraint, we use the
additional decision variables z = {zjk : j ∈ N, k ∈ K \ {m}} ∈ {0, 1}|N |×(|K|−1),
where zjk = 1 if we price item j at price level k + 1 or higher, otherwise zjk = 0.
Note that we do not need the decision variables {zjm : j ∈ N}. We want to solve
the problem
max
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈K rk vjk xjk
1 +
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈K vjk xjk
st x11 + z11 = 1
x1k + z1k = z1,k−1 ∀ k = 2, . . . ,m− 1
x1m = z1,m−1
xj1 + zj1 = xj−1,1 ∀ j = 2, . . . , n
xjk + zjk = xj−1,k + zj,k−1 ∀ j = 2, . . . , n, k = 2, . . . ,m− 1
xjm = xj−1,m + zj,m−1 ∀ j = 2, . . . , n
xjk, zjl ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j ∈ N, k ∈ K, l ∈ K \ {m}.
We give interpretations for the last three sets of constraints above and the first
three sets can be interpreted in a similar fashion. The fourth set of constraints
ensure that if item j − 1 is priced at level 1, then item j is either priced at level 1
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or it is priced at level 2 or higher. The fifth set of constraints ensure that if item
j − 1 is priced at level k or if we decide to price item j at level k or higher, then
item j is either priced at level k or it is priced at level k + 1 or higher. The sixth
set of constraints ensure that if item j − 1 is priced at level m or if we decide to
price item j at level m or higher, then item j is priced at level m.
The constraint matrix above corresponds to the constraints of a shortest path
problem. To see this result, consider a network composed of the nodes {(j, k) : j ∈
N, k ∈ K} and a sink node. Figure 2.5.4 shows a sample network with n = 4 and
m = 3. In the problem above, the decision variable xjk for j ∈ N \ {n}, k ∈ K
corresponds to an arc from node (j, k) to node (j+ 1, k). The decision variable xnk
for k ∈ K corresponds to an arc from node (n, k) to the sink node. Finally, the
decision variable zjk for j ∈ N , k ∈ K \{m} corresponds to an arc from node (j, k)
to node (j, k+1). The first three sets of constraints are the flow balance constraints
for the nodes in {(1, k) : k ∈ K}, whereas the last three sets of constraints are the
flow balance constraints for the nodes in {(j, k) : j ∈ N \ {1}, k ∈ K}. The flow
balance constraint of the sink node is redundant and it is omitted. The supply of
node (1, 1) is one. So, the horizontal arcs in Figure 2.5.4 correspond to the decision
variables {xjk : j ∈ N, k ∈ K}, whereas the vertical arcs correspond to the decision
variables {zjk : k ∈ N, k ∈ K\{m}}. The important observation is that if a unit of
flow from node (1, 1) to the sink node follows the arc corresponding to the decision
variable xjk, then it can never follow the arc corresponding to the decision variable
xj+1,k−1, which means that if we choose price level k for item j, then we cannot
choose price level k− 1 for item j + 1, which is enough to impose the price ladder.
Lastly, we observe that if we add the first three sets of constraints above, then
we obtain
∑
k∈K x1k = 1, whereas if we add the last three sets of constraints over
k ∈ K for a particular item j, then we obtain ∑k∈K xjk = ∑k∈K xj−1,k. Thus, the
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constraints above ensure that
∑
k∈K xjk = 1 for all j ∈ N , indicating that we offer
each item at one price level.
Figure 2.1: Shortest path problem in the quality consistent pricing setting.
Network matrices are totally unimodular by Proposition 3.1 in Chapter III.1
of [44]. So, by Theorem 2.4.1, we can solve quality consistent pricing problems
by using a linear program. To our knowledge, tractability of incorporating quality
consistency or laddering constraints into pricing problems under MNL was not
known previously.
The development in this section assumes that the qualities of the items satisfy
the full ordering 1  2  . . .  n, in which case, the prices of the items have to
satisfy this ordering as well. By modifying the network in Figure 2.5.4 slightly, we
can handle the case where we have a partial ordering between the qualities of the
items. For example, assuming that there are five items, the qualities of the items
may satisfy the partial ordering 1  {2, 3, 4}  5, which is to say that the first item
is lower quality than the second, third and fourth items, which are, in turn, lower
quality than the fifth item, but there is no clear ordering between the qualities
of the second, third and fourth items. In this case, the price of the first item
should be lower than the prices of the second, third and fourth items. Similarly,
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the prices of the second, third and fourth items should be lower than the price of
the fifth item, but there is no constraint on how the prices of the second, third
and fourth items are ordered. Building on the approach described in this section,
it is possible to show that we can still solve a linear program to enforce such a
partial quality consistency constraint. Finally, our approach continues to apply
when there are disjoint quality consistency constraints in the sense that the items
are partitioned into disjoint subsets S1, . . . , SL and we impose a separate quality
consistency constraint for the items in each one of the subsets Sl for l = 1, . . . , L.
2.5.5 Product Precedence Constraints
We consider assortment optimization problems where a particular product cannot
be offered to customers unless a certain set of related products are also offered. This
kind of a constraint can arise when a company offers multiple versions of a product
and company policy or law prohibits offering a more expensive or sophisticated
version of the product unless a more inexpensive or basic version is offered. For
example, it may not be possible to offer the brand name version of a drug unless
the generic version is offered. To model such product precedence constraints, we
use Sj ⊂ N to denote the set of products that we need to offer to be able to offer
product j. So, the feasible set of product offer decisions is given by F = {x ∈
{0, 1}|N | : xj − xi ≤ 0 ∀ j ∈ N, i ∈ Sj}, indicating that we can have xj = 1 only
when xi = 1 for all i ∈ Sj. In this constraint matrix, each row includes only a +1
and a −1. Such matrices are known to be totally unimodular; see Proposition 2.6
in Chapter III.1 of [44], along with [26] and [27]. Thus, by Theorem 2.4.1, it follows
that we can find the optimal assortment under product precedence constraints by
solving a linear program. We observe that the subsets {Sj : j ∈ N} in product
precedence constraints can be completely arbitrary. In particular, they can be
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overlapping and products can have circular dependencies on each other.
Closing this section, we note that if we want to enforce offering a certain prod-
uct in any of the applications considered in this section, then we can impose a
lower bound of one on the sum of the decision variables corresponding to the offer
decisions for this product. We can check that the constraint matrix remains totally
unimodular under this additional constraint. Furthermore, joining two totally uni-
modular matrices does not yield a totally unimodular matrix in general, but it may
be possible to combine some of the constraints considered in this section without
destroying the total unimodularity of the constraint matrix. For example, joining
two interval matrices yields an interval matrix. Since a cardinality constraint and
pricing with a finite price menu both yield interval constraint matrices, we can
impose a cardinality constraint on the offered assortment when solving a pricing
problem with a finite price menu.
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CHAPTER 3
ASSORTMENT OPTIMIZATION UNDER THE NESTED LOGIT
MODEL
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study a class of assortment optimization problems where the
choices of the customers are governed by the nested logit model. Under this model,
customers first select a nest, and then, a product within the nest. We assume that
there is a revenue associated with each product and the objective is to find a set
of products, or an assortment, to offer that maximizes the expected revenue per
customer. This assortment optimization problem is combinatorial in nature and
the number of possible assortments can be very large, particularly when there are
many potential products to offer. In airline and hotel revenue management settings,
for example, the number of products can easily exceed 30 or 40, yielding 230 or
240 possible assortments. Therefore, it is important to classify when the problem
is polynomially solvable. When not, it is important to find solution methods with
worst-case performance guarantees.
To our knowledge, there is no work on assortment optimization under the
nested logit model that can deal with a large number of nests. One of our main
contributions is to classify the complexity of the assortment problem for nested
attraction models. We do this along two dimensions. The first dimension is the
magnitude of the nest dissimilarity parameters, which characterize the degree of
dissimilarity of the products within a nest. The second dimension is the presence
or absence of the no purchase alternative within a nest. This divides the problem
into four cases.
We show that the only polynomially solvable case is when the nest dissimilarity
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parameters are less than one and the no purchase alternative is only available at
the time of selecting a nest. This situation conforms to the standard form of the
nested logit model; see [4]. For this case, we show that it is optimal to offer a
nested-by-revenue assortment within each nest, but this result does not immedi-
ately imply that the problem is polynomially solvable since there are exponentially
many combinations of nested-by-revenue assortments we can choose for the differ-
ent nests. We deal with this difficulty by giving a linear program that finds the best
combination of nested-by-revenue assortments for each nest. Thus, the problem is
tractable under the standard form of the nested logit model.
If the nest dissimilarity parameters exceed one or the customers can choose
a no purchase option after selecting a nest, then we show that the problem is
NP-hard. These cases correspond to nonstandard versions of the nested logit
model, but we justify the practical importance of these cases. For all of these
cases we give parsimonious collections of assortments such that if we focus only on
these assortments then we obtain a solution with a certain worst-case performance
guarantee.
In particular, the second case we consider focuses on the situation where the
dissimilarity parameters can take on any value, but the customers always purchase
a product within the selected nest. For this case, we show that if we focus only on
nested-by-revenue assortments, then assuming that the revenues of the products in
the same nest differ by at most a factor of ρ and the attractiveness parameters of the
products in the same nest differ by at most a factor of κ, the expected revenue from
the best nested-by-revenue assortment cannot deviate from the optimal expected
revenue by more than a factor of min{ρ, 2κ}. Therefore, we can expect the nested-
by-revenue assortments to perform well when the revenues or the attractiveness of
the products within a particular nest are not too different from each other. It is
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important to emphasize that this result allows the revenues or the attractiveness
of the products to differ arbitrarily when the products are in different nests.
In the third case, we consider the situation where the dissimilarity parameters
of the nests are less than one, but customers may leave a chosen nest without pur-
chasing. For this case, we construct a small collection of assortments such that the
best assortment within this collection provides an expected revenue that deviates
from the optimal expected revenue by no more than a factor of two. Finally, the
fourth case considers the most general problem instances with no restrictions on
the dissimilarity parameters of the nests and the no purchase behavior. For this
case, we give a collection of assortments such that the best assortment within this
collection has a worst-case performance guarantee of 2κ, where κ is as defined in
the paragraph above. Furthermore, we exploit the connections of our assortment
problem to the partition problem to give a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for
the most general instances of our problem. Finally, using γ¯ to denote the largest
dissimilarity parameter for the nests, for any given δ > 1, we give a collection of
assortments that provides a worst-case performance guarantee of δ2 max{γ¯,1}+1, but
the work required to obtain this collection increases as δ gets close to one. Thus,
this result is akin to a polynomial-time approximation scheme when γ¯ is fixed. Ta-
ble 3.1 summarizes the four cases and indicates which sections in the paper include
each one of these cases.
In addition to the worst-case performance guarantees, we formulate a convex
program that yields an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue. By compar-
ing the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue with the expected revenue
provided by an assortment, we bound the optimality gap of the assortment we
obtain for a particular problem instance. We use this approach in our computa-
tional experiments to test the performance of the solutions we obtain by focusing
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Case 1: Section 3.5 Case 3: Section 3.7
Polynomially-solvable Worst-case guarantee of 2
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Case 2: Section 3.6 Case 4: Section 3.8
Worst-case guarantee of Worst-case guarantee of 2κ,
min{ρ, 2κ} pseudo-poly-time algorithm,
approximation scheme for fixed γ¯
Table 3.1: Four cases considered in the chapter. The ratio between the largest and
the smallest product revenues in a nest is bounded by ρ, the ratio between the
largest and the smallest attractiveness parameters in a nest is bounded by κ and
the dissimilarity parameters are bounded by γ¯.
on the collections of assortments mentioned above. In this way, we characterize the
problem parameters that affect the solution quality and empirically demonstrate
that the performance of the assortments we propose follows the trends predicted
by their worst-case performance guarantees.
3.2 Literature Review
Research on pricing in the context of the multinomial logit and nested logit models
has been fairly active. In that setting, the problem is to choose a set of prices for
the products, where the prices of all products jointly determine the probability
that a customer purchases a particular product. The objective is to maximize
the expected revenue per customer. For the pricing problem, [25] notice that the
expected revenue function fails to be concave in prices for the multinomial logit
model, but significant progress was made by formulating the pricing problem in
terms of market shares, as this results in a concave expected revenue function;
see [55] and [12]. [34] extend the concavity result to the nested logit model by
assuming that the price sensitivities of the products are constant within each nest
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and the nest dissimilarity parameters are all between zero and one. They show that
the expected revenue maximization problem can be reduced to optimizing over a
single variable. [21] relax both of the assumptions in [34] and extend the analysis
to more general nested attraction models. The key result is that the optimal prices
add two terms to the unit costs, where the first term is the inverse of the price
sensitivities of the products and the second term is a nest-dependent constant.
This result implies that products with the same price sensitivity in a nest have the
same markup, irrespective of their quality.
When the price of each product is fixed then we are faced with a pure assort-
ment problem. We address the pure assortment problem when customers choose
according to the multinomial logit model (MNL) in Chapter 1. Additionally, if the
customers choose according to the MNL then [57] show that the optimal assort-
ment includes a certain number of products with the largest revenues. We refer to
assortments that include a certain number of products with the largest revenues
as nested-by-revenue assortments. The problem becomes more complicated when
more general choice models are considered. [52] study the assortment problem
under the mixed multinomial logit model, where there are multiple customer types
and customers of different types choose according to different multinomial logit
models. They show that the assortment optimization problem is NP-hard in the
weak sense even with two customer types and provide a performance guarantee
for nested-by-revenue assortments. [5] show that the same problem is NP-hard in
the strong sense and [43] give a branch-and-cut algorithm to find the optimal as-
sortment. [53] study the robust assortment problem under the multinomial logit
model when some of the parameters of the choice model are not known. [50]
consider constraints on the size of the offered assortment when customers choose
according to the multinomial logit model. [30] consider joint assortment optimiza-
52
tion and pricing problems under the nested logit model, where both the set of
products offered and their corresponding prices are decision variables. They work
with two nest structures. In the first nest structure, customers first select a brand,
and then, a product type within the selected brand, whereas in the second nest
structure, customers first select a product type, and then, a brand for the selected
product type. The authors characterize the structure of the optimal solution, but
the problem becomes difficult when the number of brands is large or the product
prices are fixed.
In this chapter, we use the nested logit model to capture customer choices.
There are several desirable aspects of this choice model. To begin with, the nested
logit model alleviates the independence of irrelevant alternatives property suffered
by the multinomial logit model; see [2]. In particular, if a product is added to the
offered assortment, then the multinomial logit model predicts that the market share
of each product in the offered assortment decreases by the same relative amount,
which clearly should not occur when different products cannibalize on each other
to different extents. Furthermore, it is possible to show that the nested logit model
is compatible with a random utility-based choice model, where customers associate
random utilities with the products and with the option of not making a purchase
and they follow the option providing the largest utility. This feature gives some
behavioral justification to the nested logit model; see [4]. Finally, the nested logit
model allows correlations between the utilities of the products, capturing the fact
that the way a customer evaluates a certain product may help us predict how this
customer would evaluate other similar products.
Beside its desirable aspects, the standard form of the nested logit model has
some limitations. This choice model works with a fixed nest structure, where
customers first select a nest, and then, a product within the selected nest. For
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example, nests may correspond to different airlines and products within a nest
may correspond to different cabin classes offered by an airline. However, not all
customers follow the same nest structure. Some customers may select an airline
first, and then, a cabin class offered by this airline, whereas some customers may
select a cabin class first, and then, an airline that offers this cabin class. Several
extensions to the nested logit model are designed to alleviate this concern; see
[59]. In the mixed nested logit model, there are customers of multiple types and
customers of different types choose according to different nested logit models, pos-
sibly with different nest structures. In paired combinatorial and cross nested logit
models, a product may appear in multiple nests. In this paper, we use the stan-
dard form of the nested logit model with a fixed nest structure. [5] show that the
assortment problem is NP-hard under the mixed multinomial logit model and this
result carries over to the mixed nested logit model. [30] characterize the optimal
assortment under a mixed nested logit model with identical product prices.
3.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we describe the nested logit model that we use to model the cus-
tomer choice, and then, formulate our assortment optimization problem. There
are m nests indexed by M = {1, . . . ,m}. Depending on the application setting,
each nest may represent a different category of products, a different sales channel
or a different retail store. There are n products that we can offer in each nest.
We index the products in each nest by N = {1, . . . , n}. We use rij to denote the
revenue associated with product j in nest i. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the products in each nest are ordered such that ri1 ≥ ri2 ≥ . . . ≥ rin for all
i ∈ M . We let vij be the preference weight of product j in nest i and vi0 be the
preference weight of the no purchase option in nest i. We use Vi(Si) to denote
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the total preference weight of all available options when we offer the assortment
Si ⊂ N in nest i. In other words, we have Vi(Si) = vi0 +
∑
j∈Si vij. Under the
nested logit model, given that a customer decides to purchase a product in nest i,
if we offer the assortment Si in this nest, then the probability that the customer
purchases product j ∈ Si is given by
Pij(Si) =
vij
vi0 +
∑
k∈Si vik
=
vij
Vi(Si)
.
We observe that the assumption that each nest includes the same number of prod-
ucts is without loss of generality because if some nest i includes fewer than n
products, then we can include additional products j in this nest with preference
weight vij = 0 and these products would never be purchased. Also, it is possible
to have vi0 = 0 for some nest i or even all nests, in which case, given that a cus-
tomer selects nest i, he never leaves without purchasing anything. We note that if
vi0 = 0, then the expression for Pij(∅) can evaluate to 0/0, but this does not pose
any difficulty since if we offer the empty assortment in nest i and vi0 = 0, then a
customer would never decide to make a purchase in nest i and the value of Pij(∅)
becomes irrelevant.
Each nest i has a parameter γi ≥ 0 associated with it that characterizes the
degree of the dissimilarity of the products in the nest. Furthermore, we use v0 to
denote the preference weight for the option of not choosing any of the nests. If
we offer the assortment (S1, . . . , Sm) over all nests, then a customer chooses nest i
with probability
Qi(S1, . . . , Sm) =
Vi(Si)
γi
v0 +
∑
l∈M Vl(Sl)
γl
. (3.1)
We note that γi serves the purpose of dampening or magnifying the total preference
weight of the available options within nest i. We allow having v0 = 0. We note
that if we have v0 = 0, we offer the empty assortment in all nests and vi0 = 0
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as well for all i ∈ M , then the expression for Qi(∅, . . . , ∅) evaluates to 0/0, but
this does not create any complication since if we offer the empty assortment in all
nests, then we trivially make an expected revenue of zero. Therefore, all of our
development in the paper applies to the case where some or all of the preference
weights v0 and (v10, . . . , vm0) associated with the no purchase options are equal to
zero.
If we offer the assortment Si in nest i, then we can write the expected revenue
we obtain from this nest as
Ri(Si) =
∑
j∈Si
rij Pij(Si) =
∑
j∈Si rij vij
Vi(Si)
,
with the interpretation that Ri(∅) = 0. Therefore, if we offer the assortment
(S1, . . . , Sm) over all nests with Si ⊂ N for all i ∈M , then we obtain an expected
revenue of
Π(S1, . . . , Sm) =
∑
i∈M
Qi(S1, . . . , Sm)Ri(Si).
Our goal is to choose an assortment (S1, . . . , Sm) that maximizes the expected
revenue over all nests, yielding the assortment optimization problem
Z∗ = max
(S1,...,Sm):Si⊂N, i∈M
Π(S1, . . . , Sm). (3.2)
Throughout this paper, we classify the instances of the assortment optimization
problem in (3.2) along two dimensions. The first dimension is based on the values
of the dissimilarity parameters (γ1, . . . , γm) of the nests. Along this dimension, we
separately consider the two cases where (i) we have γi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M , and (ii)
there are no restrictions on the dissimilarity parameters. The second dimension
of classification is based on the values of the preference weights (v10, . . . , vm0) of
the no purchase options within the nests. Along this dimension, we separately
consider the two cases where (i) we have vi0 = 0 for all i ∈ M , and (ii) there
56
are no restrictions on the preference weights of the no purchase options. Since
there are two cases to consider along each one of the two dimensions, we study the
assortment optimization problem in (3.2) under four cases. It turns out that while
the assortment optimization problem in (3.2) is polynomially solvable when γi ≤ 1
and vi0 = 0 for all i ∈M , lifting any one of these restrictions renders the problem
NP-hard and we resort to approximation methods.
Along the first dimension, the case with γi ≤ 1 for all i ∈M corresponds to the
standard form of the nested logit model studied by [38] and [40]. In these papers,
the author notes that having γi ≤ 1 for all i ∈M implies that the nested logit model
is always compatible with a random utility-based choice model, irrespective of the
values of the preference weights of the products and the preference weights of the
no purchase options. In particular, [40] postulates three assumptions that need to
be satisfied for the nested logit model to be compatible with a random utility-based
choice model and shows that these assumptions are always satisfied when the nest
dissimilarity parameters do not exceed one. [4] revisits the compatibility of the
nested logit model with utility maximization principle and shows that even if we
do not have γi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M , the three assumptions postulated by [40] can
be satisfied for certain values of the preference weights {vij : i ∈ M, j ∈ N},
{vi0 : i ∈ M} and v0. Therefore, the nested logit model can still be compatible
with a random utility-based choice model when we have γi ≥ 1 for some i ∈
M . Similarly, [59] notes that the preference weight vij of product j in nest i
has the form eu¯ij/γi , where u¯ij is the mean utility of product j in nest i captured
through a linear combination of its attributes, such as price, quality and ease of use.
He argues that even if the dissimilarity parameters exceed one, the nested logit
model can be compatible with utility maximization principle for certain values
of the mean utilities {u¯ij : i ∈ M, j ∈ N}. There are a number of empirical
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studies that fit the nested logit model to customer choice data and end up with
estimates for the nest dissimilarity parameters exceeding one; see [61], [60], [32],
[58] and [66] applications in telephone service and housing choice. [61] interpret
a nest dissimilarity parameter exceeding one as a signal that substitution across
nests happens more readily than substitution within a nest.
Interestingly, using dissimilarity parameters that take on values larger than
one allows us to model synergistic, or halo, effects among the products within the
same nest. In particular, under the nested logit model, if we offer the assortment
(S1, . . . , Sm), then the probability that a customer purchases product j ∈ Si in
nest i is given by
Qi(S1, . . . , Sm)Pij(Si) =
Vi(Si)
γi−1
v0 +
∑
l∈M Vl(Sl)
γl
vij.
From the expression above, we observe that when γi ≤ 1, adding a product k /∈ Si
to nest i always decreases the purchase probability of product j ∈ Si. Therefore,
when the dissimilarity parameters of the nests do not exceed one, the products
in a nest always act as competitors to each other and adding a new product to
a nest decreases the probability of purchase for the other products in the nest.
In practice, this is not always the case. For example, if the nests correspond to
different car dealers, then offering a new luxury car may increase the probability
of purchase for other cars in the same dealer because the newly offered luxury car
may help attract a larger fraction of customers. We observe that if γi > 1 and
we add a new product to nest i, then both Vi(Si)
γi−1 and
∑
l∈M Vl(Sl)
γl increase
in the expression above. As a result, the probability that a customer purchases
product j may increase or decrease. This feature may allow us to model synergies
between different products in a nest. When such synergies exist, it may even be
beneficial to include loss leaders in a nest to attract traffic to this nest. Motivated
by this observation, we refer to the case with γi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M as the case
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with purely competitive products, whereas we refer to the case with no restrictions
on the dissimilarity parameters of the nests as the case with possibly synergistic
products.
Along the second dimension, the case with vi0 = 0 for all i ∈ M corresponds
to a situation where if a customer decides to make a purchase within a particu-
lar nest, then the customer always makes a purchase within the selected nest. In
other words, the demand within a nest is fully captured without loss to the no
purchase option. We refer to this situation as the case with fully-captured nests.
On the other hand, if the preference weight of the no purchase option within a
nest is strictly positive, then a customer may leave without purchasing anything
in the selected nest. We refer to this situation as the case with partially-captured
nests. There are a number of reasons to consider the case with partially-captured
nests. To begin with, firms do not make their assortment offer decisions in isola-
tion and the preference weight vi0 of the no purchase option in nest i can be used
to capture the attractiveness of the products offered by other firms in nest i. For
example, if each nest corresponds to a particular store, then the total preference
weight of the products offered by all firms may serve to attract the customers to
a store, but once a customer decides to make a purchase in a particular store, he
may choose a product offered by another firm, which is equivalent to not making
a purchase within the offered assortment. As mentioned above, the assortment
problem becomes NP-hard when we allow partially-captured nests. Game theo-
retic assortment optimization models is beyond the scope of our paper, but this
computational complexity result also indicates that finding the best response of a
firm to the assortments already offered by other firms is a computationally difficult
problem.
Another reason to consider the case with partially-captured nests is that there
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are extensions of the nested logit model that allow offering a particular alternative
within multiple nests. These extensions are referred to as generalized nested logit
models and [59] shows that generalized nested logit models are consistent with a
random utility-based choice model. Our use of the partially-captured nests cor-
responds to a version of generalized nested logit models where the no purchase
option is offered within multiple nests. When we also impose the restriction that
the dissimilarity parameters of all of the nests are equal to each other, the resulting
choice model is referred to as the cross nested logit model. [13] use the cross nested
logit model to include a no purchase option within each nest. The choice model in
[13] precisely corresponds to the partially-captured nests that we consider in this
paper.
A final reason to consider the case with partially-captured nests is that certain
products may have to be included in the offered assortment, in which case, the
parameter vi0 can be used to capture the total preference weight of the products
that have to be included in the offered assortment. Naturally, there is a revenue
contribution associated with the products that have to be included in the offered
assortment and the definition of the expected revenue Ri(Si) above does not keep
track of this revenue contribution. However, it turns out that we can follow the
same line of reasoning that we use to deal with partially-captured nests to deal
with the case where certain products have to be included in the offered assortment.
Thus, by building on our treatment of partially-captured nests, we can address
assortment optimization problems where certain products are already included in
the offered assortment and we need to decide which additional products should be
offered.
In our nested logit model, the dissimilarity parameters (γ1, . . . , γm) are assumed
to be constants. To understand this assumption, it is useful to view the nested
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logit model as a random utility-based choice model. In particular, consider the
case where a customer associates random utilities with the products and with the
no purchase options. The random utilities have a multi-dimensional generalized
extreme value distribution. The utility of product j in nest i has mean u¯ij and
unit variance. The utilities of the options in different nests are independent of each
other. The customer, being a utility maximizer, follows the option with the largest
utility. In this case, we can show that the probability of choosing a particular
product under this random utility-based choice model has the same form specified
by the nested logit model; see [40]. To obtain the nested logit model corresponding
to this random utility-based choice model, we need to set the preference weight
vij of product j in nest i as e
u¯ij/γi . The correlation structure between the random
utilities of the options in nest i determines the value of the dissimilarity parameter
γi of nest i. Thus, the means and correlation structure of the random utilities
are the primitives of a random utility-based choice model that is consistent with
the nested logit model. In our nested logit model, we assume that the means and
correlations of the random utilities are fixed, implying that the preference weights
and the dissimilarity parameters are fixed as well. It is possible to consider richer
choice models where the means and correlations of the random utilities depend on
the offered assortment, in which case, the preference weights and the dissimilarity
parameters depend on the offered assortment as well, but this extension makes it
difficult to solve the corresponding assortment optimization problem. We expand
on this issue in Section 3.11.
3.4 Linear Programming Representation
The assortment optimization problem in (3.2) is of a combinatorial nature. In
this section, we present a linear programming formulation of this problem. The
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linear programming formulation is not too useful directly as a computational tool
since its number of constraints grows exponentially with the number of products.
However, it turns out that we can build on the linear programming formulation
to develop a general approximation result for problem (3.2). The approximation
methods that we propose throughout the paper are tightly related to this general
approximation result.
To formulate problem (3.2) as a linear program, we first observe that this prob-
lem is equivalent to min{x : x ≥∑i∈M Qi(S1, . . . , Sm)Ri(Si) ∀ (S1, . . . , Sm) with Si ⊂
N, i ∈ M}. By using the definition of Qi(S1, . . . , Sm) in (3.1), we can write the
constraints in this problem as
v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
(Vi(Si)
γiRi(Si)− Vi(Si)γix) ∀ (S1, . . . , Sm) with Si ⊂ N, i ∈M,
which, in turn, are equivalent to the single constraint
v0 x ≥ max
(S1,...,Sm):Si⊂N,i∈M
{∑
i∈M
Vi(Si)
γi(Ri(Si)− x)
}
.
The key observation is that the optimization problem on the right side of the
constraint above decomposes by the nests and the constraint can be written as
v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
max
Si⊂N
Vi(Si)
γi(Ri(Si)− x).
Therefore, problem (3.2) is equivalent to
min x
s.t. v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
max
Si⊂N
Vi(Si)
γi(Ri(Si)− x),
where the only decision variable is x. Noting that Z∗ is the optimal objective value
of problem (3.2), the discussion so far implies that if x∗ is the optimal solution
to the problem above, then the optimal objective value of this problem is also x∗
and we have x∗ = Z∗. The constraint of the problem above is nonlinear, but to
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linearize this constraint, we can define the decision variables y = (y1, . . . , ym) as
yi = maxSi⊂N Vi(Si)
γi (Ri(Si)− x) and write the problem as
min x (3.3)
s.t. v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
yi
yi ≥ Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)− x) ∀Si ⊂ N, i ∈M,
where the decision variables are (x, y). Problem (3.3) is a linear program with
1 + m decision variables and 1 + m 2n constraints. When v0 = 0, the first con-
straint above reads
∑
i∈M yi ≤ 0, but the second set of constraints prevent x from
becoming arbitrarily small because if x becomes arbitrarily small, then the decision
variables (y1, . . . , ym) would take arbitrarily large values and we cannot satisfy the
constraint
∑
i∈M yi ≤ 0. Therefore, problem (3.3) continues to apply when the
preference weight v0 of the no purchase option is zero. Another useful observation
is that the number of possible assortments in problem (3.2) is 2mn, which increases
exponentially in both the number of nests and the number of products in each
nest. In contrast, the numbers of decision variables and constraints in problem
(3.3) grow linearly with the number of nests, and problem (3.3) can be tractable
when the number of products in each nest is relatively small, irrespective of the
number of nests. When the number of products in each nest is large, a possible
solution approach for problem (3.3) is to use column generation on its dual, but
due to the presence of the dissimilarity coefficient in the second set of constraints,
the column generation subproblem is nonlinear and this renders column generation
intractable.
Although problem (3.3) is difficult to solve when the number of products in each
nest is large, we can build on this problem to develop a general approximation
method. Assume that we identify a collection of candidate assortments {Ait :
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t ∈ Ti} that we may consider offering in nest i, where we have Ait ⊂ N for
all t ∈ Ti. We are interested in finding a combination of these assortments for
the different nests so that the combined assortment provides the largest possible
expected revenue. In other words, we are interested in finding the assortment that
provides the largest expected revenue when we consider assortments of the form
(S1, . . . , Sm) with Si ∈ {Ait : t ∈ Ti} for all i ∈M . This problem can be formulated
as the linear program
min x (3.4)
s.t. v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
yi
yi ≥ Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)− x) ∀Si ∈ {Ait : t ∈ Ti}, i ∈M.
The number of decision variables in problem (3.4) is still 1 + m. The number
of constraints is 1 +
∑
i∈M |Ti|, which can be reasonable when the collections of
candidate assortments are not too large.
We now provide some observations to develop a general approximation result
by building on problem (3.4). The constraints in problem (3.4) can succinctly be
written as
v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
max
Si∈{Ait : t∈Ti}
Vi(Si)
γi(Ri(Si)− x).
We will now argue that the constraint above must be satisfied as equality at an
optimal solution. Let (xˆ, yˆ) be an optimal solution to problem (3.4) and suppose
there is a gap. We can then decrease the value of xˆ without violating the constraint,
thereby obtaining a strictly better solution to problem (3.4) than xˆ, establishing
the claim. Therefore, letting Sˆi be the solution to the maximization problem on
the right side of the constraint above with x = xˆ, it must be the case that v0 xˆ =
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∑
i∈M Vi(Sˆi)
γi(Ri(Sˆi)− xˆ). Solving for xˆ, we obtain
xˆ =
∑
i∈M Vi(Sˆi)
γiRi(Sˆi)
v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(Sˆi)
γi
=
∑
i∈M
Qi(Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm)Ri(Sˆi) = Π(Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm).
Consequently, if (xˆ, yˆ) is an optimal solution to problem (3.4) and Sˆi is an optimal
solution to the problem maxSi∈{Ait : t∈Ti} Vi(Si)
γi(Ri(Si) − xˆ), then the expected
revenue obtained by offering the assortment (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm) is precisely xˆ.
We observe that problem (3.4) includes only a subset of the constraints in
problem (3.3), which implies that problem (3.4) is a relaxed version of problem
(3.3). Therefore, if we let (x∗, y∗) and (xˆ, yˆ) respectively be the optimal solutions
to problems (3.3) and (3.4), then we have Z∗ = x∗ ≥ xˆ. Furthermore, for some α
and β, if we can show that (α xˆ, β yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.3), then we
also obtain α xˆ ≥ Z∗ = x∗ ≥ xˆ, which implies that the expected revenue obtained
by offering the assortment (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm) as defined above deviates from the optimal
expected revenue by no more than a factor of α. We collect these observations in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.1. Let (xˆ, yˆ) be an optimal solution to problem (3.4), and for all
i ∈M , let Sˆi be an optimal solution to the problem
max
Si∈{Ait : t∈Ti}
Vi(Si)
γi(Ri(Si)− xˆ). (3.5)
If (α xˆ, β yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.3) for some α and β, then the
expected revenue obtained by offering the assortment (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm) deviates from
the optimal objective value of problem (3.2) by no more than a factor of α. In
other words, letting Zˆ = Π(Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm), we have α Zˆ ≥ Z∗ ≥ Zˆ.
Theorem 3.4.1 provides sufficient conditions under which we can stitch together
a good assortment from the collections of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} for
i ∈ M . The thought process we used to reach Theorem 3.4.1 will be critical
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throughout the paper. In particular, we will design collections of assortments such
that if (xˆ, yˆ) is the optimal solution to problem (3.4) with these collections of
assortments, then (α xˆ, β yˆ) ends up being a feasible solution to problem (3.3) for
some α and β. In that case, we can solve problem (3.4) with these collections of
assortments to obtain the optimal solution (xˆ, yˆ). Letting Sˆi be the assortment
that solves problem (3.5), Theorem 3.4.1 implies that the expected revenue from
the assortment (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm) deviates from the optimal expected revenue by at most
a factor of α.
We use various collections of candidate assortments. One possibility is to use
the assortments that include a certain number of products with the largest rev-
enues. This class of assortments is known to be optimal when the customer choices
are governed by the multinomial logit model and [52] give a performance guarantee
for such assortments when the underlying choice model is the multinomial logit
model with multiple customer types. In the next section, we show that this class
of assortments is still optimal under the nested logit model as long as we only have
competitive products and fully-captured nests, but in general, we may need to look
beyond this class to find good solutions for the assortment optimization problem
we are interested in.
3.5 Competitive Products and Fully-Captured Nests
In this section, we focus on instances of the assortment optimization problem in
(3.2) with γi ≤ 1 and vi0 = 0 for all i ∈ M . For this case, we show that there
exists an optimal solution (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m) to problem (3.2) such that each one of
the assortments S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m is either the empty assortment or is of the form S
∗
i =
{1, 2, . . . , j} for some j ∈ N . Noting that the products in each nest are ordered
such that ri1 ≥ ri2 ≥ . . . ≥ rin, this result implies that an optimal assortment in
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each nest includes a certain number of products with the largest revenues. We call
such assortments nested-by-revenue assortments. For notational brevity, we use
Nij to denote the nested-by-revenue assortment that includes the first j products
with the largest revenues in nest i. In other words, we have Nij = {1, 2, . . . , j} for
all i ∈M , j ∈ N . For notational uniformity, we also let Ni0 = ∅ and N+ = N∪{0},
in which case, our goal is to show that an optimal solution (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m) to problem
(3.2) is of the form S∗i = Nij for some j ∈ N+. Throughout this section, we assume
without loss of generality that v0 > 0. Otherwise, since we have vi0 = 0 for all
i ∈M , it is optimal to offer only one product with the largest revenue maxi∈M ri1
over all nests and this product would be purchased with probability one.
The following proposition shows that if it is optimal to offer a nonempty as-
sortment in a nest, then the expected revenue from this nest should at least be
equal to the optimal expected revenue over all nests.
Proposition 1. If (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m) is an optimal solution to problem (3.2) and S
∗
i 6= ∅,
then Ri(S
∗
i ) ≥ Z∗.
Proof. To get a contradiction, assume that S∗i 6= ∅ and Ri(S∗i ) < Z∗. For notational
convenience, let Rl = Rl(S
∗
l ) and ql = Vl(S
∗
l )
γl for all l ∈ M . Thus, we have
Qi(S
∗
1 , . . . , S
∗
m) = qi/(v0 +
∑
l∈M ql) and we can write the optimal expected revenue
as
Z∗ = Π(S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m) =
∑
l∈M qlRl
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
=
v0 +
∑
l∈M,l 6=i ql
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
∑
l∈M,l 6=i qlRl
v0 +
∑
l∈M,l 6=i ql
+
qiRi
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
=
v0 +
∑
l∈M,l 6=i ql
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
Π(S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
i−1, ∅, S∗i+1, . . . , S∗m) +
qi
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
Ri.
Noting that v0 > 0 and qi = Vi(S
∗
i )
γi > 0, the equality above shows that Z∗
is a nontrivial convex combination of Π(S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
i−1, ∅, S∗i+1, . . . , S∗m) and Ri =
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Ri(S
∗
i ). So, having Ri < Z
∗ implies that Π(S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
i−1, ∅, S∗i+1, . . . , S∗m) > Z∗
contradicting the fact that Z∗ is the optimal expected revenue.
In the following lemma, we show that the products with small revenues can be
removed from the assortment without degrading the performance.
Lemma 3.5.1. Assume that Z = Π(S1, . . . , Sm) for some assortment (S1, . . . , Sm)
and there exists a product j ∈ Si that satisfies rij < γi Z + (1 − γi)Ri(Si) and
Ri(Si) ≥ Z. Then, removing product j from Si yields a strictly larger expected
revenue than Z.
Proof. Let Sˆi be the assortment constructed by removing product j from Si.
We show that the assortment (S1, . . . , Si−1, Sˆi, Si+1, . . . , Sm) provides an expected
revenue of Zˆ satisfying Zˆ > Z. For notational convenience, let Rˆi = Ri(Sˆi),
qˆi = Vi(Sˆi)
γi , Rl = Rl(Sl) and ql = Vl(Sl)
γl for all l ∈ M . Following an argument
similar to the one in the proof of Proposition 1, we can write the expected revenue
from the assortment (S1, . . . , Sm) as
Z = Π(S1, . . . , Sm) =
∑
l∈M qlRl
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
=
v0 +
∑
l∈M,l 6=i ql + qˆi
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
∑
l∈M,l 6=i qlRl + qˆiRˆi
v0 +
∑
l∈M,l 6=i ql + qˆi
+
qiRi − qˆiRˆi
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
=
v0 +
∑
l∈M,l 6=i ql + qˆi
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
Π(S1, . . . , Si−1, Sˆi, Si+1, . . . , Sm) +
qi − qˆi
v0 +
∑
l∈M ql
qiRi − qˆiRˆi
qi − qˆi .
Therefore, Z is a convex combination of Zˆ = Π(S1, . . . , Si−1, Sˆi, Si+1, . . . , Sm) and
(qiRi − qˆiRˆi)/(qi − qˆi). In this case, the desired result follows if we can show that
Z > (qiRi − qˆiRˆi)/(qi − qˆi). In the rest of the proof, we equivalently show that
qiRi − qˆiRˆi < (qi − qˆi)Z.
Let α = Vi(Sˆi)/Vi(Si), so qˆi = α
γiqi. Using the fact that vij = Vi(Si)− Vi(Sˆi),
we can write Rˆi as
Rˆi =
∑
k∈Sˆi rik vik
Vi(Sˆi)
=
∑
k∈Si rik vik − rij (Vi(Si)− Vi(Sˆi))
αVi(Si)
=
1
α
Ri − 1− α
α
rij.
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Therefore, qiRi − qˆiRˆi < (qi − qˆi)Z holds if and only of
qiRi − αγiqi
[
1
α
Ri − 1− α
α
rij
]
< (qi − αγi qi)Z.
Arranging the terms in the expression above, we observe that qiRi − qˆiRˆi < (qi −
qˆi)Z holds if and only if rij < g(α)Z+(1−g(α))Ri, where g(α) = (1−αγi)/(αγi−1−
αγi). By the hypothesis, we have rij < γi Z + (1− γi)Ri. So, it is enough to show
that γi Z+(1−γi)Ri ≤ g(α)Z+(1−g(α))Ri. Since both sides of the last inequality
are convex combinations of Z and Ri and Z ≤ Ri by the hypothesis, the inequality
holds as long as g(α) ≤ γi. However, the last relationship is true because g(α) is
increasing in α when γi ≤ 1 and by L’Hopital’s rule, g(α) ≤ limα↑1 g(α) = γi.
Lemma 3.5.1 gives us a mechanism to remove certain products with small
revenues without reducing the expected revenue from an assortment. To see a
useful implication of Proposition 1 and Lemma 3.5.1, assume that (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m) is
an optimal solution to problem (3.2) with S∗i 6= ∅. We must have Ri(S∗i ) ≥ Z∗
by Proposition 1. In this case, we must have rij ≥ γi Z∗ + (1 − γi)Ri(S∗i ) for all
j ∈ S∗i by Lemma 3.5.1. Otherwise, we can remove a product from S∗i and obtain
an assortment that provides a strictly larger expected revenue than Z∗. We use this
observation in the following theorem to show that nested-by-revenue assortments
provide an optimal solution to problem (3.2).
Theorem 3.5.2. There exists an optimal solution (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m) to problem (3.2)
such that, for all i ∈M , we have S∗i = Nij for some j ∈ N+.
Proof. Assume that (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
m) is an optimal solution to problem (3.2) providing
an expected revenue of Z∗ and that there is a nest i such that S∗i contains product
j but not product k with k < j. Let Sˆi be the assortment constructed by adding
product k to S∗i . Using Zˆ to denote the expected revenue from the assortment
(S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
i−1, Sˆi, S
∗
i+1, . . . , S
∗
m), we show that Zˆ ≥ Z∗. Therefore, the assortment
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(S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
i−1, Sˆi, S
∗
i+1, . . . , S
∗
m) must also be optimal. Repeating the argument un-
til the assortments for all nests are of the form {1, 2, . . . , j} for some j ∈ N+
establishes the result.
Similar to the notation in the proof of Lemma 3.5.1, let Rˆi = Ri(Sˆi), Ri =
Ri(S
∗
i ), qˆi = Vi(Sˆi)
γi and qi = Vi(S
∗
i )
γi . The main idea is to use an argument similar
to the one in the proof of Lemma 3.5.1 to write Zˆ = Π(S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
i−1, Sˆi, S
∗
i+1, . . . , S
∗
m)
as a convex combination of Z∗ and (qˆiRˆi− qiRi)/(qˆi− qi). In this case, the desired
result follows if we can show that Z∗ ≤ (qˆiRˆi − qiRi)/(qˆi − qi). We equivalently
show that (qˆi − qi)Z∗ ≤ qˆiRˆi − qiRi. Let α = Vi(S∗i )/Vi(Sˆi), so qˆi = qi/αγi . Using
the fact that vik = Vi(Sˆi)− Vi(S∗i ), we write Rˆi as
Rˆi =
∑
j′∈Sˆi rij′ vij′
Vi(Sˆi)
= α
∑
j′∈S∗i rij′ vij′ + rik (Vi(Sˆi)− Vi(S
∗
i ))
Vi(S∗i )
= αRi + (1− α) rik.
Therefore, (qˆi − qi)Z∗ ≤ qˆiRˆi − qiRi holds if and only if[ qi
αγi
− qi
]
Z∗ ≤ qi
αγi
(αRi + (1− α) rik)− qiRi.
Arranging the terms in the expression above, we observe that (qˆi− qi)Z∗ ≤ qˆiRˆi−
qiRi holds if and only if h(α)Z
∗ + (1 − h(α))Ri ≤ rik, where we let h(α) = (1 −
αγi)/(1−α). From the discussion that follows Lemma 3.5.1, since j ∈ S∗i , we know
that γi Z
∗ + (1− γi)Ri ≤ rij ≤ rik, where the last inequality follows from the fact
that k < j. So, it is enough to show that h(α)Z∗+(1−h(α))Ri ≤ γi Z∗+(1−γi)Ri.
Since both sides of the last inequality are convex combinations of Z∗ and Ri and
Z∗ ≤ Ri by Proposition 1, the inequality holds if and only if h(α) ≥ γi. However,
the last relationship is true because h(α) is decreasing in α and by L’Hoptial’s
rule, h(α) ≥ limα↑1 h(α) = γi.
Theorem 3.5.2 shows that we can construct an optimal solution to problem
(3.2) by only considering the nested-by-revenue assortments. To find the best
combination of such assortments for the different nests, we can make use of problem
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(3.4). In particular, we replace the collection of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈
Ti} in problem (3.4) with the nested-by-revenue assortments {Nij : j ∈ N+} and
solve problem (3.4) to find the best combination of nested-by-revenue assortments
for the different nests. By Theorem 3.5.2, this best combination has to be an
optimal solution to problem (3.2). In this way, we can find an optimal solution
to problem (3.2) by solving a linear program with 1 + m decision variables and
1 +m (1 + n) constraints.
3.6 Possibly Synergistic Products and Fully-Captured Nests
In this section, we focus on instances of the assortment optimization problem
in (3.2), where we do not have any restrictions on the dissimilarity parameters
(γ1, . . . , γm) of the nests, but we still have vi0 = 0 for all i ∈ M . We show that
allowing the dissimilarity parameters for the nests to take on values larger than one
changes the structure of problem (3.2) drastically. In particular, the result that we
establish in the previous section does not necessarily hold when the dissimilarity
parameters of the nests can take on arbitrary values and the nested-by-revenue
assortments are no longer optimal. In the next section, we first characterize the
computational complexity of the problem when we have no restrictions on the nest
dissimilarity parameters. Following this result, we give a performance guarantee
for the nested-by-revenue assortments. Throughout this discussion, we assume
that γi > 1 for some i ∈M . Otherwise, nested-by-revenue assortments are optimal
by Theorem 3.5.2.
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3.6.1 Computational Complexity
We begin by giving an example that shows why nested-by-revenue assortments
are no longer optimal when the dissimilarity parameters of the nests can take on
values larger than one. This example also demonstrates that nested-by-revenue
assortments can perform arbitrarily badly when the revenues and the preference
weights of the products in a nest drastically differ from each other. Following
this example, we establish that the assortment optimization problem in (3.2) is
NP-hard whenever we allow γi > 1 for some i ∈M .
To give an example where nested-by-revenue assortments do not perform well,
we consider an instance of problem (3.2) with a single nest. The preference weight
for the option of not choosing any of the nests is v0 = 1. The dissimilarity param-
eter of the nest is γ1 = 2. There are three products in the nest. Letting ε ≤ 1 be
a small positive number, the following table gives the revenues and the preference
weights associated with the three products.
Product 1 2 3
Revenue 1 ε4 0
Preference Weight ε2 3/ε2 1/ε
Since there is only one nest with γ1 = 2, the expected revenue from an assortment
S1 ⊂ {1, 2, 3} is
Π(S1) = Q1(S1)R1(S1) =
V1(S1)
2
v0 + V1(S1)2
∑
j∈S1 r1j v1j
V1(S1)
=
V1(S1)
∑
j∈S1 r1j v1j
v0 + V1(S1)2
.
We compute and bound the expected revenues from the three nested-by-revenue
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assortments as
Π({1}) = ε
2 ε2
1 + (ε2)2
≤ ε4
Π({1, 2}) = (ε
2 + 3/ε2) (ε2 + 3 ε2)
1 + (ε2 + 3/ε2)2
≤ (4/ε
2) 4 ε2
9/ε4
=
16
9
ε4
Π({1, 2, 3}) = (ε
2 + 3/ε2 + 1/ε) (ε2 + 3 ε2)
1 + (ε2 + 3/ε2 + 1/ε)2
≤ (5/ε
2) 4 ε2
9/ε4
=
20
9
ε4,
which implies that the expected revenue from the best nested-by-revenue assort-
ment is no larger than 20
9
ε4. On the other hand, the expected revenue from the
assortment {1, 3} is given by
Π({1, 3}) = (ε
2 + 1/ε) (ε2)
1 + (ε2 + 1/ε)2
≥ (1/ε) ε
2
1 + (1/ε+ 1/ε)2
≥ ε
1/ε2 + (1/ε+ 1/ε)2
=
1
5
ε3.
Thus, the optimal expected revenue exceeds the expected revenue from the best
nested-by-revenue assortment by at least a factor of (ε3/5)/(20
9
ε4) = 9/(100 ε).
As ε→ 0, the performance of the best nested-by-revenue assortment becomes ar-
bitrarily poor. The key observation in this problem instance is that the revenue
associated with product 1 is quite large when compared with the other product rev-
enues. Therefore, we would like to be able to sell product 1 with high probability.
One can check that if we offer product 1 by itself, then the probability of purchase
for product 1 is between ε4/2 and ε4. On the other hand, if we offer products 1 and
2 together, then the probability of purchase for product 1 is always smaller than
ε4/2. Therefore, if we offer product 2 next to product 1, then the probability of
purchase for product 1 goes down. In contrast, if we offer products 1 and 3, then it
is possible to check that the probability of purchase for product 1 always exceeds
ε3/5, which is larger than ε4 for small values of ε. This observation indicates that
product 3 acts as a synergistic product to product 1 and offering product 3 next to
product 1 increases the probability of purchase for product 1. We also note that
even if the revenue of product 3 was not zero but slightly negative, it would still
be beneficial to add this product to the offered assortment, justifying a loss leader.
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It turns out that if we allow the dissimilarity parameters of the nests to take on
values larger than one, then not only the nested-by-revenue assortments cease to
be optimal, but problem (3.2) becomes NP-hard. We devote the rest of this section
to showing this result. To show the result we are interested in, we focus on the
following decision-theoretic formulation of the assortment optimization problem.
Assortment Feasibility. Given a profit thresholdK, is there an assortment (S1, . . . , Sm)
that provides an expected revenue of K or more for problem (3.2)?
To establish the NP-hardness of problem (3.2), Theorem 3.6.1 below shows that
any instance of the partition problem, which is a well-known NP-hard problem as
established in [23], can be reduced to an instance of the assortment feasibility
problem. [52] also use a reduction from the partition problem to show the NP-
hardness of an assortment optimization problem, but their choice model is the
multinomial logit model with multiple customer types, rather than the nested
logit model. The partition problem is described as follows.
Partition. Given integer-valued sizes (c1, . . . , cn) such that
∑n
j=1 cj = 2T with T
integer, can we find a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} such that ∑j∈S cj = ∑j∈{1,...,n}\S cj =
T?
Theorem 3.6.1. If we allow the dissimilarity parameters for the nests to take on
values larger than one, then the assortment feasibility problem is NP-hard.
Proof. Assume that we are given any instance of the partition problem with sizes
(c1, . . . , cn) and
∑n
j=1 cj = 2T . We define an instance of the assortment feasibility
problem as follows. There is only one nest. The preference weight for the option
of not choosing any of the nests is v0 = (1 + T )
2. The dissimilarity parameter of
the nest is γ1 = 2. There are n + 1 products in the nest. The revenue associated
with the first n products is given by r1j = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n. The revenue
associated with the last product is r1,n+1 = 2 (1 + T ). The preference weights of
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the first n products are given by v1j = cj for all j = 1, . . . , n. The preference
weight associated with the last product is v1,n+1 = 1. We set the expected revenue
threshold in the assortment feasibility problem as K = 1.
In the rest of the proof, we show that there exists an assortment that provides an
expected revenue of K or more in the assortment feasibility problem if and only if
there exists a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} such that ∑j∈S cj = T . The first observation
that if we want to get a positive expected revenue in the assortment feasibility
problem, then we have to offer the last product with revenue 2 (1 +T ). Therefore,
the only question for the assortment feasibility problem is to choose a subset S
among the products with zero revenues that makes sure that we obtain an expected
revenue of K = 1 or more. If we offer a subset S of the first n products together
with the last product, then the expected revenue is Q1(S∪{n+1})R1(S∪{n+1}),
which evaluates to
(
∑
j∈S cj + 1)
2
(1 + T )2 + (
∑
j∈S cj + 1)
2
2 (1 + T )
(
∑
j∈S cj + 1)
.
Therefore, there exists an assortment with an expected revenue of K = 1 or more
if and only if
(
∑
j∈S cj + 1) 2 (1 + T )
(1 + T )2 + (
∑
j∈S cj + 1)
2
≥ 1.
Arranging the terms in the expression above, the inequality above is equivalent to
2 (1 + T )
∑
j∈S
cj + 2 (1 + T ) ≥ 1 + 2T + T 2 + 1 + 2
∑
j∈S
cj +
(∑
j∈S
cj
)2
,
which can equivalently be written as(∑
j∈S
cj
)2
− 2T
∑
j∈S
cj + T
2 ≤ 0.
Since the last inequality is equivalent to (
∑
j∈S cj − T )2 ≤ 0, there exists an
assortment with an expected revenue of K = 1 or more if and only if there exists
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a subset S with (
∑
j∈S cj − T )2 ≤ 0. However, the only way for the last inequality
to hold is to have
∑
j∈S cj = T . Therefore, finding an assortment that yields an
expected revenue of K or more is equivalent to finding a subset S that satisfies∑
j∈S cj = T and the latter statement is precisely what the partition problem is
interested in.
3.6.2 Performance of Nested-by-Revenue Assortments
In the previous section, we show that nested-by-revenue assortments may not per-
form well when we allow the dissimilarity parameters of the nests to take on values
larger than one. Our goal in this section is to develop a performance bound for
this class of assortments as a function of the problem data. In particular, recalling
that we use Nij to denote the nested-by-revenue assortment that includes the first
j products with the largest revenues in nest i, we show that by focusing only on
the nested-by-revenue assortments, we can construct a solution to problem (3.2)
whose expected revenue deviates from the optimal expected revenue by no more
than a factor of
max
i∈M,j=2,...,n
{
Ri(Ni,j−1)
Ri(Nij)
∧ Ri(Nij)
Ri(Ni,j−1)
Vi(Nij)
γi
Vi(Ni,j−1)γi
}
, (3.6)
where we let a ∧ b = min{a, b}. Before we show this result, it is useful to observe
the implications of this performance guarantee.
To see the effect of the first term in the minimum operator in (3.6), assume
that the revenues of the products within a nest are balanced in the sense that the
largest and the smallest product revenues within a nest differ from each other by
at most a factor of ρ. Since the preference weights of the no purchase options
within the nests are zero, Ri(·) is always smaller than the largest product revenue
in nest i and is always larger than the smallest product revenue. Therefore, the
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ratio Ri(Nij)/Ri(Ni,j−1) in the expression above cannot exceed ρ. This observation
implies that we expect the nested-by-revenue assortments to perform well when
the revenues of the products within a particular nest are balanced. Note that the
revenues of the products in different nests can still differ from each other arbitrar-
ily. On the other hand, if we assume that the preference weights of the products
within a nest are balanced in the sense that the largest and the smallest preference
weights within a nest differ from each other by at most a factor of κ, then we
obtain Ri(Ni,j−1)/Ri(Nij) = (
∑j−1
k=1 rik vik/
∑j
k=1 rik vik) (
∑j
k=1 vik/
∑j−1
k=1 vik) ≤∑j
k=1 vik/
∑j−1
k=1 vik = Vi(Nij)/Vi(Ni,j−1). Since the assortments Nij and Ni,j−1
respectively include j and j − 1 products, the ratio Vi(Nij)/Vi(Ni,j−1) is bounded
from above by (jκ)/(j − 1) and the latter expression does not exceed 2κ for any
j = 2, . . . , n. Therefore, (3.6) indicates that the nested-by-revenue assortments
provide a performance guarantee of 2κ as well, implying that these assortments
are also expected to perform well when the preference weights of the products
within a nest do not differ from each other drastically. Similar to the discussion for
the product revenues, the preference weights of the products in different nests can
still differ from each other arbitrarily. To see the effect of the second term in the
minimum operator in (3.6), we observe that the expression in the curly brackets
in (3.6) takes its largest value when the two terms of the minimum operator are
equal to each other and this happens when
Ri(Ni,j−1)
Ri(Nij)
=
Vi(Nij)
γi/2
Vi(Ni,j−1)γi/2
.
Therefore, the value of the minimum operator in (3.6) is bounded from above by the
expression on the right side above. Noting that we have Vi(Nij)
γi/2/Vi(Ni,j−1)γi/2 ≤
(2κ)γi/2, the performance guarantee we give for nested-by-revenue assortments
cannot exceed maxi∈M(2κ)γi/2 either. When γi ≤ 2 for all i ∈ M , the latter
performance guarantee is better than 2κ.
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We make use of Theorem 3.4.1 to establish the performance guarantee that we
give in (3.6). Assume that we solve problem (3.4) after replacing the collection
of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of constraints with the
nested-by-revenue assortments {Nij : j ∈ N+}. Letting (xˆ, yˆ) be the optimal
solution we obtain in this fashion and using α to denote the expression in (3.6), if
we can show that (α xˆ, α yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.3), then Theorem
3.4.1 implies that we can focus only on nested-by-revenue assortments and still
obtain an assortment whose expected revenue deviates from the optimal expected
revenue by no more than a factor of α.
To pursue this line of reasoning, we note that the second set of constraints in
problem (3.3) can be written as yi ≥ maxSi⊂N Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si) − x) for all i ∈ M .
Using the decision variables zi = (zi1, . . . , zin) ∈ [0, 1]n, we formulate a tighter
version of problem (3.3) as
min x (3.7)
s.t. v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
yi
yi ≥ max
zi∈[0,1]n
{(∑
j∈N
vij zij
)γi[∑j∈N rij vij zij∑
j∈N vij zij
− x
]}
∀ i ∈M.
Note that if we imposed the constraint zi ∈ {0, 1}n in the maximization problem
on the right side of the second set of constraints above, then problems (3.3) and
(3.7) would be equivalent to each other. The way it is formulated, problem (3.3) is
a relaxed version of problem (3.7) in the sense that any feasible solution (x, y) to
problem (3.7) is also feasible to problem (3.3). In the following lemma, we study
the optimal solution to the maximization problem on the right side of the second
set of constraints above.
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Lemma 3.6.2. There exists an optimal solution z∗i to the problem
max
zi∈[0,1]n
{(∑
j∈N
vij zij
)γi [∑j∈N rij vij zij∑
j∈N vij zij
− x
]}
(3.8)
such that z∗i1 = 1, z
∗
i2 = 1, . . . , z
∗
i,k−1 = 1, z
∗
ik ∈ [0, 1], z∗i,k+1 = 0, . . . , z∗in = 0 for
some k = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Assume that zˆi is an optimal solution to problem (3.8) and let C =∑
j∈N vij zˆij. In this case, note that an optimal solution to the continuous knapsack
problem
max
{∑
j∈N
rij vij zij :
∑
j∈N
vij zij = C, zi ∈ [0, 1]n
}
is also an optimal solution to problem (3.8). In the continuous knapsack prob-
lem above, the utility of item j is rij vij and the space consumption of item j
is vij. Thus, we can solve this problem by sorting the products with respect to
their utility-to-space consumption ratios and filling the knapsack starting from
the item with the largest utility-to-space consumption ratio. Since the utility-to-
space consumption ratio of item j is rij and the products are ordered such that
ri1 ≥ ri2 ≥ . . . ≥ rin, there exists an optimal solution to the continuous knapsack
problem above with the form given in the lemma.
Except for at most one possible fractional component, Lemma 3.6.2 shows that
a nested-by-revenue assortment is optimal for the maximization problem on the
right side of the second set of constraints in problem (3.7). Thus, it is not too
surprising that if we solve problem (3.4) after replacing the collection of candidate
assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of constraints with the nested-by-
revenue assortments {Nij : j ∈ N+} and obtain the optimal solution (xˆ, yˆ), then
(xˆ, yˆ) is almost feasible to problem (3.7). Since problem (3.3) is a relaxed version of
problem (3.7), the solution (xˆ, yˆ) would be almost feasible to problem (3.3) as well.
We make this intuitive argument precise in the following theorem and show that
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nested-by-revenue assortments provide the performance guarantee that we give in
(3.6). We defer the proof of this result to the appendix.
Theorem 3.6.3. Let (xˆ, yˆ) be an optimal solution to problem (3.4) when we solve
this problem after replacing the collection of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti}
in the second set of constraints with the nested-by-revenue assortments {Nij : j ∈
N+}. Then, using α to denote the expression in (3.6), (α xˆ, α yˆ) is a feasible
solution to problem (3.3).
Theorem 3.6.3, along with Theorem 3.4.1, shows that if we only consider the
nested-by-revenue assortments as candidate assortments, then we can construct
a solution to problem (3.2) whose expected revenue deviates from the optimal
expected revenue by at most a factor given in (3.6). Similar to the discussion at the
end of Section 3.5, to find the best combination of nested-by-revenue assortments,
we can solve problem (3.4) after replacing the collection of candidate assortments
{Ait : t ∈ Ti} with the nested-by-revenue assortments {Nij : j ∈ N+}. This
amounts to solving a linear program with 1+m decision variables and 1+m (1+n)
constraints.
3.7 Competitive Products and Partially-Captured Nests
In this section, we consider instances of the assortment optimization problem in
(3.2) with γi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M , but the preference weights of the no purchase
options within the nests can take on arbitrary values. In other words, we allow
(v10, . . . , vm0) to take on strictly positive values so that a customer can leave with-
out purchasing anything even after this customer chooses a particular nest. For
this case, nested-by-revenue assortments are no longer optimal. As a matter of
fact, problem (3.2) turns out to be NP-hard. However, we are able to characterize
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a small class of assortments such that if we focus on this class of assortments, then
we can construct a solution to problem (3.2) whose expected revenue deviates from
the optimal expected revenue by no more than a factor of two.
In the following theorem, we show that the assortment optimization problem
in (3.2) is NP-hard when we have vi0 > 0 for some i ∈M . Our proof technique is
similar to the one in Section 3.6.1. We consider the assortment feasibility problem
as defined in Section 3.6.1 and show that any instance of the partition problem
can be reduced to an instance of the assortment feasibility problem. However, the
specifics of the reduction are more involved and we give the proof of this theorem
in the appendix.
Theorem 3.7.1. If we allow the preference weights of the no purchase options
within the nests to take on strictly positive values, then the assortment feasibility
problem is NP-hard.
The difficulty with partially-captured nests is that such nests do not allow
Proposition 1 to hold, which implies that it may be optimal to offer a nonempty
assortment in a partially-captured nest even if the expected revenue from this
nest is below the optimal expected revenue. As a result, our line of reasoning
in Section 3.5 does not hold. It is possible to show that if we have a mixture
of partially-captured and fully-captured nests, then it is still optimal to offer
nested-by-revenue assortments in the fully-captured nests, but it is not clear what
to do for the partially-captured ones. Motivated by the computational complexity
result in Theorem 3.7.1, we turn our attention to obtaining approximate solutions.
In this section, we develop a tractable approach that obtains a solution to problem
(3.2) whose expected revenue deviates from the optimal expected revenue by at
most a factor of two. To that end, we use an alternative representation of prob-
lem (3.3). Using the decision variables zi = (zi1, . . . , zin), we define Ki(i) as the
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optimal objective value of the knapsack problem
Ki(i) = max
{∑
j∈N
rij vij zij :
∑
j∈N
vij zij ≤ i, zi ∈ {0, 1}n
}
. (3.9)
In this case, noting that Vi(Si) and Ri(Si) in the second set of constraints in
problem (3.3) are respectively given by Vi(Si) = vi0 +
∑
j∈Si vij and Ri(Si) =∑
j∈Si rij vij/Vi(Si), we consider the problem
min x (3.10)
s.t. v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
yi
yi ≥ max
i≥0
{
(vi0 + i)
γi
[
Ki(i)
vi0 + i
− x
]}
∀ i ∈M.
The following lemma shows that problem (3.10) is equivalent to problem (3.3).
Lemma 3.7.2. Problems (3.3) and (3.10) are equivalent to each other in the sense
that an optimal solution to one problem is also an optimal solution to the other.
Proof. Noting that the second set of constraints in problem (3.3) can equivalently
be written as yi ≥ maxSi⊂N Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)− x) for all i ∈M , the result follows if
we can show that
max
Si⊂N
Vi(Si)
γi(Ri(Si)− x) = max
i≥0
{
(vi0 + i)
γi
[
Ki(i)
vi0 + i
− x
]}
for any x ≥ 0. Let ζ∗L and ζ∗R respectively be the optimal objective values of the
problems on the left and right side above. First, we show that ζ∗L ≤ ζ∗R. Assume
that S∗i is an optimal solution to the problem on the left side above and define
∗i =
∑
j∈S∗i vij. The solution obtained by setting zij = 1 for all j ∈ S
∗
i and zij = 0
otherwise is a feasible solution to problem (3.9) with i = 
∗
i , which implies that
Ki(
∗
i ) ≥
∑
j∈S∗i rij vij. Thus, if we evaluate the objective value of the problem on
the right side above at i = 
∗
i , then we obtain at least ζ
∗
L, in which case, we obtain
ζ∗R ≥ ζ∗L.
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Second, we show that ζ∗L ≥ ζ∗R. Let ∗i be an optimal solution to the problem
on the right side above and solve problem (3.9) after setting i = 
∗
i . Letting z
∗
i be
the solution we obtain, we observe that we can assume without loss of generality
that
∑
j∈N vij z
∗
ij = 
∗
i . To see this claim, if we have
∑
j∈N vij z
∗
ij < 
∗
i , then we can
decrease the value of ∗i to ˆi =
∑
j∈N vij z
∗
ij while still preserving Ki(
∗
i ) = Ki(ˆi).
In this case, using the fact that γi ≤ 1 and x ≥ 0, we obtain
(vi0 + 
∗
i )
γi
[
Ki(
∗
i )
vi0 + ∗i
− x
]
=
Ki(
∗
i )
(vi0 + ∗i )1−γi
− (vi0 + ∗i )γix
≤ Ki(ˆi)
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
− (vi0 + ˆi)γix = (vi0 + ˆi)γi
[
Ki(ˆi)
vi0 + ˆi
− x
]
,
which shows that ˆi should also be an optimal solution to the problem on the
right side above, establishing the claim. By using the solution z∗i , we define the
assortment S∗i as S
∗
i = {j ∈ N : z∗ij = 1}. Since
∑
j∈S∗i vij =
∑
j∈N vij z
∗
ij = 
∗
i and∑
j∈S∗i rij vij =
∑
j∈N rij vij z
∗
ij = Ki(
∗
i ), the assortment S
∗
i provides an objective
value of ζ∗R for the problem on the left side above and we obtain ζ
∗
L ≥ ζ∗R.
To exploit the equivalence between problems (3.3) and (3.10) in a tractable
fashion, we use the continuous relaxation of the knapsack problem in (3.9), which
is given by
Kˆi(i) = max
{∑
j∈N
rij vij zij :
∑
j∈N
vij zij ≤ i, 0 ≤ zij ≤ 1(vij ≤ i) ∀ j ∈ N
}
,
(3.11)
where we use 1(·) to denote the indicator function. Since problem (3.11) is a
relaxation of problem (3.9), we have Kˆi(i) ≥ Ki(i). The problem above is a
continuous knapsack problem, where the utility of item j is rij vij, the space con-
sumption of item j is vij and we can only consider the items whose space con-
sumptions do not exceed i. Noting that the utility-to-space consumption ratio of
item j is rij, we can solve this problem by sorting the products with respect to
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their revenues and filling the knapsack starting from the product with the largest
revenue, as long as we only consider the products whose preference weights do
not exceed i. We let zˆi(i) = (zˆi1(i), . . . , zˆin(i)) be an optimal solution to prob-
lem (3.11) that we obtain in this fashion. We observe that zˆi(i) has at most
one fractional component. By using this solution, we define the assortment Sˆi(i)
as Sˆi(i) = {j ∈ N : zˆij(i) = 1}, which includes only the strictly positive and
integer-valued components of zˆi(i). We use the assortments {Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]}
as a collection of candidate assortments for nest i. We shortly show in this section
that this collection of assortments includes no more than 1 + n2 assortments and
each one of these 1 + n2 assortments can be identified in a tractable fashion.
To be able to obtain the performance guarantee of two, we augment the col-
lection of assortments {Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]} for nest i by the collection of singleton
assortments {{j} : j ∈ N}. We solve problem (3.4) after replacing the collection
of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of constraints with the
collection of assortments {Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}. Letting (xˆ, yˆ) be
the optimal solution to problem (3.4) that we obtain in this fashion, if we can show
that (2 xˆ, 2 yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.3), then Theorem 3.4.1 implies
that we can focus only on the assortments {Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}
for nest i and still obtain an assortment whose expected revenue deviates from the
optimal expected revenue by no more than a factor of two. We pursue this result
in the following theorem, but defer the proof of this result to the appendix.
Theorem 3.7.3. Let (xˆ, yˆ) be an optimal solution to problem (3.4) when we solve
this problem after replacing the collection of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti}
in the second set of constraints with the assortments {Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]} ∪ {{j} :
j ∈ N}. Then, (2 xˆ, 2 yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.3).
The equivalence between problems (3.3) and (3.10) given in Lemma 3.7.2 lays
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out the connection between the assortment optimization problem we are interested
in and the knapsack problem, as long as we have γi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M . It is well-
known that one can construct a solution to the knapsack problem in (3.9) by using
its continuous relaxation in (3.11) and the objective value of this solution would
deviate from the optimal objective value of the knapsack problem by no more than
a factor of two; see [65]. The proof of Theorem 3.7.3 implicitly makes use of this
result. Similarly, there exists a well-known fully polynomial-time approximation
scheme for the knapsack problem, which can be found in [65]. Building on this
fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, it is indeed possible to develop a fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme for the assortment optimization problem
we are interested in. We do not pursue the fully polynomial-time approximation
scheme because this scheme can be developed by using an argument that is very
similar to the preceding discussion in this section. The only difference is that
instead of constructing approximate solutions to the knapsack problem in (3.9) by
using its continuous relaxation, we construct approximate solutions by using the
fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for knapsack problems.
In the remainder of this section, we argue that the collection of assortments
{Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]} includes no more than 1 + n2 assortments and each one
of these 1 + n2 assortments can be identified in a tractable fashion. Fix i and
consider the assortment Sˆi(i). The definition of zˆi(i) implies that Sˆi(i) is a
nested-by-revenue assortment as long as we focus only on the products whose
preference weights do not exceed i. In other words, letting k be the number of
products whose preference weights do not exceed i, Sˆi(i) is a nested-by-revenue
assortment as long as we focus only on the products with the k smallest preference
weights. Given that we focus only on the products with the k smallest preference
weights, we use Nkij to denote the nested-by-revenue assortment that includes the
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first j products with the largest revenues in nest i. Therefore, Sˆi(i) must be
one of the assortments {Nkij : j = 0, . . . , k}, where we let Nki0 = ∅ for notational
uniformity. Since the only possible values for k are k = 1, . . . , n, it follows that
{Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]} ⊂ {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k}. The latter collection of
assortments includes no more than 1 +n2 distinct assortments, all of which can be
easily be identified.
Theorem 3.7.3 shows that if we use the assortments {Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]}
∪{{j} : j ∈ N} as a collection of candidate assortments for nest i, then we can
stitch together from these candidate assortments a solution to problem (3.2) whose
expected revenue deviates from the optimal expected revenue by at most a factor
of two. Since we have {Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]} ⊂ {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k}, using the
assortments {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N} as candidate assortments
for nest i cannot degrade the performance guarantee of two. To find the best
combination of these assortments, we can solve problem (3.4) after replacing the
collection of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} with the assortments {Nkij : k ∈
N, j = 0, . . . , k} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}. This amounts to solving a linear program with
1 +m decision variables and 1 +m (1 + n+ n2) constraints.
3.8 Possibly Synergistic Products and Partially-Captured
Nests
In this section, we consider the most general instances of the assortment optimiza-
tion problem in (3.2), where we do not have any restrictions on the dissimilarity
parameters (γ1, . . . , γm) of the nests and the preference weights (v10, . . . , vm0) of
the no purchase options within the nests. We establish three results for these most
general instances. First, we show that if the largest and the smallest preference
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weights within a nest do not differ from each other by more than a factor of κ,
then the collection of assortments developed in the previous section provides a
performance guarantee of 2κ. Second, using the links of our assortment problem
to the partition problem, we give a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm to obtain
the optimal assortment. Third, letting γ¯ = maxi∈M γi for notational brevity, for
any given δ > 1, we construct a collection of assortments that provides a per-
formance guarantee of δ2γ¯+1, but the computational work required to obtain this
collection increases as δ gets close to one. The important point about the last
result is that it allows us to choose δ close to one to obtain an assortment with an
arbitrarily good performance guarantee, but choosing δ close to one also increases
the computational work. So, this result allows us to tradeoff computational work
with performance guarantee. Throughout this section, we assume that γ¯ > 1.
Otherwise, we can use the ideas in the previous section.
3.8.1 Performance Guarantee
We begin by showing that if the largest and the smallest preference weights within
a nest differ from each other by at most a factor of κ, then the collection of assort-
ments that we develop in the previous section provides a performance guarantee
of 2κ. It turns out that this result follows by synthesizing the results that are
already given in Sections 3.6 and 3.7. In Section 3.6, we show that if we fo-
cus only on the nested-by-revenue assortments {Nij : j ∈ N+}, then we obtain
the performance guarantee in (3.6) when we have possibly synergistic products
and fully-captured nests. Noting the definition of Nkij in the previous section,
Nnij is identical to the nested-by-revenue assortment Nij. Therefore, we have
{Nij : j ∈ N+} ⊂ {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k}, which implies that if we focus
on the collection of assortments {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k}, then we still obtain
87
the performance guarantee in (3.6) when we have possibly synergistic products and
fully-captured nests. On the other hand, in Section 3.7, we show that if we focus
only on the collection of assortments {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N},
then we obtain a performance guarantee of two when we have competitive products
and partially-captured nests. In this case, using M f and Mp to respectively denote
the sets of fully-captured and partially-captured nests and letting a∨b = max{a, b},
it is possible to synthesize these results to show that if we focus only on the col-
lection of assortments {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k}∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}, then we obtain
a performance guarantee of
max
i∈Mf ,j=2,...,n
{
Vi(Nij)
Vi(Ni,j−1)
}
∨ max
i∈Mp,j=1,...,n
{
Vi(Nij)
Vi(Ni,j−1)
}
∨ 2 (3.12)
for the most general instances of the assortment optimization problem. Note that
if i is a fully-captured nest, then Vi(Ni0) = Vi(∅) = 0 and we do not consider the
term Vi(Ni1)/Vi(Ni0) in the expression above for fully-captured nests. To see the
implication of the performance guarantee in (3.12), we observe that if the largest
and the smallest preference weights within a nest differ from each other by at most
a factor of κ, then we have Vi(Nij)/Vi(Ni,j−1) ≤ (jκ)/(j − 1) for fully-captured
nests and Vi(Nij)/Vi(Ni,j−1) ≤ (j + 1)κ/j for partially-captured nests. Thus, the
performance guarantee in (3.12) cannot exceed 2κ ∨ 2 = 2κ. This observation
implies that if we use {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k}∪ {{j} : j ∈ N} as the collection
of candidate assortments for nest i, then the best assortment that we can stitch
together from these candidate assortments is expected to perform well when the
preference weights within a nest do not differ too much from each other.
We can build on Theorem 3.4.1 to establish the performance guarantee in (3.12).
Assume that we solve problem (3.4) after replacing the collection of candidate
assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of constraints with the collection
{Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}. Letting (xˆ, yˆ) be the optimal
88
solution we obtain in this fashion and using β to denote the expression in (3.12),
if we can show that (β xˆ, β yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.3), then Theorem
3.4.1 implies that we can focus only on the collection of assortments {Nkij : k ∈
N, j = 0, . . . , k}∪{{j} : j ∈ N} and obtain an assortment whose expected revenue
deviates from the optimal expected revenue by no more than a factor of β. The
following theorem shows this result. Its proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 3.8.1. Let (xˆ, yˆ) be an optimal solution to problem (3.4) when we solve
this problem after replacing the collection of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti}
in the second set of constraints with the assortments {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k}∪
{{j} : j ∈ N}. Then, using β to denote the expression in (3.12), (β xˆ, β yˆ) is a
feasible solution to problem (3.3).
Thus, similar to the discussion at the end of Section 3.7, since there are 1+n+n2
assortments in the collection {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}, we
can solve a linear program with 1 + m decision variables and 1 + m (1 + n + n2)
constraints to obtain an assortment whose expected revenue deviates from the
optimal expected revenue by at most a factor given in (3.12).
3.8.2 Near-Optimal Assortments
In this section, we give a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for our assortment
problem. Following this result, we develop an approximation scheme that can
tradeoff performance guarantee with computational work. Both of these results
are based on viewing problem (3.3) from a knapsack perspective. In particular, we
define Gi(i) as the optimal objective value of the knapsack problem
Gi(i) = max
Si⊂N
{∑
j∈Si
rij vij : vi0 +
∑
j∈Si
vij = i
}
, (3.13)
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where we let Gi(i) = −∞ when the problem on the right side above is infeasible.
The second set of constraints in problem (3.3) are given by
yi ≥ Vi(Si)γi(
∑
j∈Si
rijvij/Vi(Si)− x)
for all Si ⊂ N , i ∈ M and problem (3.13) finds the largest value of
∑
j∈Si rij vij
while keeping Vi(Si) constant at i. Thus, problem (3.3) can equivalently be written
as
min x (3.14)
s.t. v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
yi
yi ≥ γii
[
Gi(i)
i
− x
]
∀ i ≥ 0, i ∈M,
where we treat 0/0 as zero in the second set of constraints. Letting vLi = vi0 +
minj∈N vij and vUi = vi0 +
∑
j∈N vij, the definition of Gi(i) in (3.13) implies that
Gi(i) = Gi(vi0) or Gi(i) = −∞ for all i < vLi , whereas Gi(i) = −∞ for all
i > v
U
i . Therefore, it is enough to consider the values of i with i = vi0 or
i ∈ [vLi , vUi ] in the second set of constraints in problem (3.14).
Problem (3.13) can be visualized as an optimization version of the partition
problem since it tries to find an assortment Si that maximizes the objective value
among all assortments whose preference weights add up to i. There is a well-
known pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for the partition problem; see [23]. This
pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm operates under the assumption that all pref-
erence weights are integer-valued, in which case, the only values of i that ren-
der problem (3.13) feasible are integer-valued. By using a dynamic program, the
pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm computes Gi(i) for all i ∈ [vLi , vUi ] in O(n vUi )
time. We give such a dynamic program in Appendix 3.12.5. Thus, also noting
that Gi(vi0) = 0, the pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm can compute Gi(i) for all
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values of i that we need to consider in the second set of constraints in problem
(3.14). Once we have Gi(i) for all values of i, we can solve problem (3.14) to
obtain the optimal objective value of problem (3.3), which is, in turn, equal to the
optimal expected revenue in problem (3.2). This approach amounts to solving a
linear program with 1+m decision variables and 1+m (2+vUi −vLi ) constraints and
it provides a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for our assortment optimization
problem.
It is also possible to build on problem (3.14) to develop an approximation
method that can tradeoff computational work with performance guarantee. This
approximation method is based on constructing tractable approximations to Gi(i).
In particular, instead of considering every single possible value of i with i = vi0
or i ∈ [vLi , vUi ] in the second set of constraints in problem (3.14), we choose some
δ > 1 and consider the values of i that are close to the powers of δ. To do this,
we define lLi as l
L
i = min{l ∈ Z : δl ≥ vLi } and lUi = min{l ∈ Z : δl ≥ vUi } so that
we have [vLi , v
U
i ] ⊂ [δlLi −1, δlUi ]. In this case, whenever i lies in the interval [δl−1, δl]
for some l = lLi , . . . , l
U
i , we approximate Gi(i) by
Gˆil = max
Si⊂N
{∑
j∈Si
rij vij : δ
l−1 ≤ vi0 +
∑
j∈Si
vij ≤ δl
}
. (3.15)
Problem (3.15) is still difficult to solve exactly as it is a knapsack problem with both
upper and lower bounds, but it turns out we can compute approximate solutions to
this problem. In particular, Proposition 3 in the appendix shows that we can find
an assortment Sˆil that satisfies δ
l−1 ≤ vi0 +
∑
j∈Sˆil vij ≤ δl and δ
∑
j∈Sˆil rij vij ≥
Gˆil. In other words, the assortment Sˆil is a feasible solution to problem (3.15)
and the objective value provided by this assortment deviates from the optimal
objective value of problem (3.15) by no more than a factor of δ. Proposition 3 also
shows that the computational work required to obtain the assortment Sˆil takes
O(dδ/(δ− 1)e2 n2 dδ/(δ−1)e) time, where we use d·e to denote the round up function.
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Thus, if we want Sˆil to be a more accurate solution to problem (3.15), then we
need to choose δ closer to one, but choosing δ closer to one also increases the
computational work to obtain the assortment Sˆil. In this way, we can use Sˆil as
an approximate solution problem (3.15) whenever i lies in the interval [δ
l−1, δl],
while balancing computational work with accuracy.
We propose using the assortments {Sˆil : l = lLi , . . . , lUi } ∪ {∅} as a collection of
candidate assortments for nest i. To find the best combination of such assortments,
we solve problem (3.4) after replacing the collection of candidate assortments {Ait :
t ∈ Ti} in the second set of constraints with the collection of assortments {Sˆil :
l = lLi , . . . , l
U
i } ∪ {∅}. Letting (xˆ, yˆ) be the optimal solution to problem (3.4) that
we obtain in this fashion and recalling that γ¯ = maxi∈M γi, if we can show that
(δ2γ¯+1 xˆ, δγ¯+1 yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.3), then Theorem 3.4.1 implies
that we can focus only on the assortments {Sˆil : l = lLi , . . . , lUi } ∪ {∅} for nest i
and still obtain an assortment whose expected revenue deviates from the optimal
expected revenue by no more than a factor of δ2γ¯+1. We establish this result in
the following theorem. The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix.
Theorem 3.8.2. Let (xˆ, yˆ) be an optimal solution to problem (3.4) when we solve
this problem after replacing the collection of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti}
in the second set of constraints with the assortments {Sˆil : l = lLi , . . . , lUi } ∪ {∅}.
Then, (δ2γ¯+1 xˆ, δγ¯+1 yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.3).
Theorem 3.8.2 implies that if we use the assortments {Sˆil : l = lLi , . . . , lUi } ∪{∅}
as candidate assortments for nest i, then we can combine these assortments for
the different nests to obtain a solution to problem (3.2) whose expected revenue
deviates from the optimal expected revenue by no more than a factor of δ2γ¯+1.
To find the best combination of these assortments, we need to solve problem (3.4)
after replacing the collection of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second
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set of constraints with the collection of assortments {Sˆil : l = lLi , . . . , lUi } ∪{∅}.
Since we have δl
L
i ≥ vLi and δlUi −1 ≤ vUi , we have lUi − lLi ≤ 1 + logδ(vUi /vLi ).
Therefore, for the most general instances of the assortment optimization problem
we are interested in, we can solve a linear program with 1+m decision variables and
at most 1 +m (2 + logδ(v
U
i /v
L
i )) constraints to find an assortment whose expected
revenue deviates from the optimal expected revenue by no more than a factor of
δ2γ¯+1.
3.9 Upper Bounds on Optimal Expected Revenue
In the previous three sections, we give collections of candidate assortments such
that if we focus on these collections, then we can stitch together an assortment
with a certain performance guarantee. The performance guarantees we give reflect
the worst-case performance of a given collection of assortments, where the worst-
case is taken over all possible problem instances. In this section, our goal is to
develop a tractable upper bound on the optimal expected revenue that we can
compute for each individual problem instance. We can then use the collections of
assortments given in the previous sections to obtain the best possible assortment
and compare the expected revenue from this assortment with the problem instance-
specific upper bound on the optimal expected revenue. In this way, we can bound
the optimality gap of the assortment we obtain for a particular problem instance.
To construct an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue, we use a
tighter version of problem (3.3) that is similar to the one in Section 3.6.2. In
particular, since the second set of constraints in problem (3.3) can be written
as yi ≥ maxSi⊂N Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si) − x) for all i ∈ M , using the decision variables
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zi = (zi1. . . . , zin) ∈ [0, 1]n, we formulate a tighter version of problem (3.3) as
min x (3.16)
s.t. v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
yi
yi ≥ max
zi∈[0,1]n
{(
vi0 +
∑
j∈N
vij zij
)γi[ ∑j∈N rij vij zij
vi0 +
∑
j∈N vij zij
− x
]}
∀ i ∈M.
Problem (3.16) is a tighter version of problem (3.3) as any feasible solution to
problem (3.16) is a feasible solution to problem (3.3). Therefore, if we can solve
problem (3.16) in a tractable fashion, then the optimal objective value of this
problem provides an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue.
To see how we can solve problem (3.16) in a tractable fashion, for a fixed
value of x, we use Fi(zi |x) to denote the objective function of the maximization
problem on the right side of the second set of constraints in problem (3.16) and
let Fˆi(x) = maxzi∈[0,1]n Fi(zi |x). So, problem (3.16) is equivalent to
min x (3.17)
s.t. v0 x ≥
∑
i∈M
yi
yi ≥ Fˆi(x) ∀ i ∈M.
If we can show that Fˆi(x) is a convex function of x, then the feasible region of
problem (3.17) ends up being convex. Thus, noting that the objective function
is linear, problem (3.17) becomes a convex optimization problem. Furthermore,
if we can obtain subgradients of Fˆi(x) with respect to x in a tractable fashion,
then we can use a standard cutting plane method for convex optimization to solve
problem (3.17); see [54]. The following proposition follows a standard argument
in nonlinear programming to show that Fˆi(x) is indeed a convex function of x and
demonstrates how to obtain subgradients of this function with respect to x.
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Proposition 2. The function Fˆi(·) is convex. Furthermore, if we let zˆi(x) be an
optimal solution to the problem maxzi∈[0,1]n Fi(zi |x), then a subgradient of Fˆi(·) at
x is given by −(vi0 +
∑
j∈N vij zˆij(x))
γi.
Proof. By the definitions of Fˆi(x) and zˆi(x), it follows that Fˆi(x) = Fi(zˆi(x) |x)
and Fˆi(x
′) ≥ Fi(zˆi(x) |x′). Subtracting the equality from the inequality and noting
that Fi(zˆi(x) |x′)− Fi(zˆi(x) |x) = −(vi0 +
∑
j∈N vij zˆij(x))
γi (x′ − x), we obtain
Fˆi(x
′) ≥ Fˆi(x)−
(
vi0 +
∑
j∈N
vij zˆij(x)
)γi
(x′ − x),
which implies that Fˆi(·) satisfies the subgradient inequality at x with a subgradient
given by −(vi0 +
∑
j∈N vij zˆij(x))
γi . In this case, by Theorem 3.2.6 in [1], Fˆi(x) is
a convex function of x with a subgradient as given in the proposition.
Proposition 2 shows that we can obtain a subgradient of Fˆi(·) at x by solving
the problem
max
zi∈[0,1]n
Fi(zi |x) = max
zi∈[0,1]n
{(
vi0 +
∑
j∈N
vij zij
)γi[ ∑j∈N rij vij zij
vi0 +
∑
j∈N vij zij
− x
]}
(3.18)
at a fixed value of x. Thus, if we can solve the problem above in a tractable fashion,
then we can also solve problem (3.17) through a standard cutting plane method.
In the rest of this section, we focus on solving problem (3.18) at a fixed value of x.
Following the same argument in the proof of Lemma 3.6.2, we can show that
there exists an optimal solution z∗i to problem (3.18) that satisfies z
∗
i1 = 1, z
∗
i2 =
1, . . . , z∗i,k−1 = 1, z
∗
ik ∈ [0, 1], z∗i,k+1 = 0, . . . , z∗in = 0 for some k = 1, . . . , n. In other
words, if we define the vector ηk = (ηk1 , . . . , η
k
n) ∈ <n such that ηk1 = 1, . . . , ηkk−1 =
1, ηkk = 0, . . . , η
k
n = 0 and use e
k to denote the k-th unit vector in <n, then an
optimal solution to problem (3.18) is of the form ηk+ρ ek for some ρ ∈ [0, 1] and k =
1, . . . , n. To find the best value for ρ, we can solve the problem maxρ∈[0,1] Fi(ηk +
ρ ek |x), which is a scalar optimization problem. A simple check verifies that the
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first derivative of Fi(η
k + ρ ek |x) with respect to ρ vanishes at one point and
the point at which the first derivative vanishes can be computed in closed-form
fashion. Therefore, the optimal objective value of the problem maxρ∈[0,1] Fi(ηk +
ρ ek |x) is attained either at one of the two end points of the interval [0, 1] or at the
point where the first derivative of Fi(η
k + ρ ek |x) with respect to ρ vanishes. By
checking the objective value of the problem maxρ∈[0,1] Fi(ηk+ρ ek |x) at these three
points, we can easily solve this problem. In this case, the optimal objective value
of problem (3.18) can be obtained by solving the problem maxρ∈[0,1] Fi(ηk+ρ ek |x)
for all k = 1, . . . , n and picking the one that yields the largest optimal objective
value.
3.10 Computational Experiments
In this section, we provide computational experiments to test the quality of the so-
lutions that we obtain by focusing on various collections of candidate assortments.
Our goal is to compare the performance of different collections of candidate assort-
ments under different problem characteristics. We begin by describing the details
of our experimental setup. Following this description, we give the findings from
our computational experiments.
3.10.1 Experimental Setup
The results in Sections 3.6.2 and 3.8.1 suggest that the performance guarantee
provided by the collections of assortments considered in these sections can depend
on how much the revenues or the preference weights of the products in the same nest
differ. Similarly, the results in Sections 3.6.2 and 3.8.2 show that the performance
of the collections of assortments that we develop can depend on the magnitude
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of the dissimilarity parameters. In our computational experiments, we investigate
how the performance of different collections of candidate assortments changes with
various problem parameters.
Throughout this section, we consider test problems with possibly synergistic
products and partially-captured nests, which correspond to the most general in-
stances of our assortment problem. We build on the example in Section 3.6.1 to
generate our test problems. Noting that ε ≤ 1 is a small positive number, product
1 in this example has a large revenue but a small preference weight. Product 2 has
a small revenue but a large preference weight. Product 3 has zero revenue and a
moderate preference weight. We observe that although product 1 has a large rev-
enue, its preference weight is too small to attract customers to its nest. In contrast,
product 2 has a large preference weight and it can effectively attract customers
to the nest, but if a customer is attracted to the nest, then the preference weight
of product 2 is so large that the customer ends up buying product 2 with high
probability. Since the revenue of product 2 is small, this outcome yields a small
revenue. While product 3 has a revenue of zero, its moderate preference weight can
attract customers to the nest, but its preference weight is not so large that once
a customer is attracted to the nest, there is a reasonable probability that he can
end up buying product 1. So, product 3 is essentially a loss leader, whose purpose
is to attract customers to the nest. Recall that nested-by-revenue assortments can
perform poorly in this example.
We proceed as follows to generate test problems with the same flavor as above,
but with reasonably large numbers of nests and products. In all of our test prob-
lems, the number of nests is m = 5 and the number of products in each nest
is n = 25. This results in problem sizes that correspond to applications arising
in some revenue management and retail settings. We choose a positive parame-
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ter ε ≤ 1 that characterizes the degree to which the revenues and the preference
weights of the products in the same nest differ. We vary the parameter ε in
our computational experiments. To come up with the revenues and the prefer-
ence weights associated with the first n − 1 products in nest i, we generate Uij
from the uniform distribution over [0, 4] for all j ∈ N \ {n}. Also, we generate
Xij and Yij respectively from the uniform distributions over [1, 10] and [0.2, 1.8]
for all j ∈ N \ {n}. In this case, we set the revenue of product j in nest i as
rij = ε
Uij × Xij, whereas we set the preference weight associated with product j
in nest i as vij = ε
2−Uij × Yij. The reasoning behind our choice of revenues and
preference weights is that if we multiply the revenues and the preference weights
of products 1 or 2 in the example in Section 3.6.1, then we end up with a quantity
that is of magnitude ε2. If we multiply the revenues and the preference weights
of the products we generate, then we obtain εUij ×Xij × ε2−Uij × Yij, which is of
magnitude ε2 as well. If the generated value of Uij turns out to be closer to zero,
then we obtain a product that resembles product 1 in the example in Section 3.6.1,
whereas if the generated value of Uij turns out to be closer to four, then we obtain
a product that resembles product 2. The role of Xij and Yij is to introduce some
noise in the revenues and the preference weights. To generate the revenue and
the preference weight associated with the last product n in nest i, we generate Yin
from the uniform distribution over [0.2, 1.8] and set the revenue and the preference
weight of this product respectively as rin = 0 and vin = ε
−1 × Yin. We observe
that the revenue and the preference weight of the last product are of the same
magnitude as the revenue and the preference weight of product 3 in the example
in Section 3.6.1. With this setup, it is possible to check that as ε gets smaller,
there are larger differences between the revenues or the preference weights of the
products in the same nest.
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To come up with the dissimilarity parameter of nest i, we generate γi from
the uniform distribution over [γL, γU ] for all i ∈ M , where γL and γU are pa-
rameters we vary. We set the preference weights of the no purchase options to
v0 = 10 and vi0 = ε
−4 for all i ∈M . In our computational experiments, we vary ε
over {0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3}, whereas we vary [γL, γU ] over {[0.5, 1.5], [1.0, 2.0], [1.5, 2.5],
[2.0, 3.0]}. In this way, we obtain 16 combinations of problem parameters. Follow-
ing the approach described in the paragraph above, we generate 5,000 individual
problem instances for each combination of problem parameters ε and [γL, γU ].
We test the performance of three different collections of assortments on each
problem instance. The first collection of assortments is nested-by-revenue assort-
ments. This collection for nest i corresponds to {Nij : j ∈ N+}. While nested-by-
revenue assortments provide the performance guarantee in (3.6) for fully-captured
nests, we are not able to give a performance guarantee for these assortments
for the most general instances of our assortment problem. However, since they
are intuitively appealing and easy to implement, it is useful to test their perfor-
mance. We refer to the second collection of assortments as nested-by-preference-
and-revenue assortments. This collection of assortments for nest i is given by
{Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}. In Section 3.8.1, we show that this
collection provides the performance guarantee given in (3.12) for the most gen-
eral instances of our assortment problem. The third collection that we consider
is referred to as powers-of-δ assortments and this collection for nest i is given by
{Sˆil : l = lLi , . . . , lUi }∪ {∅}. We work with powers-of-δ assortments in Section 3.8.2
and show that these assortments provide a performance guarantee of maxi∈M δ2γi+1.
The computational work required to obtain the powers-of-δ assortments depends
on the value of δ and we set δ = 1.25 in all of our computational experiments. With
this value of δ, we can generate all powers-of-δ assortments for a particular problem
99
instance and find the best assortment within this class in one tenths of a second. We
note that there are 1 + n nested-by-revenue assortments and 1 + n + n2 nested-
by-preference-and-revenue assortments in each nest. So, both of these collections
grow polynomially with n. In contrast, there are 2 + logδ(v
U
i /v
L
i ) powers-of-δ as-
sortments in nest i and noting that vUi = vi0 +
∑
j∈N vij and v
L
i = vi0 + minj∈N vij,
the number of powers-of-δ assortments grows logarithmically with n.
3.10.2 Computational Results
We give our main computational results in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, where Tables 3.2,
3.3 and 3.4 respectively show the performance of the nested-by-revenue, nested-by-
preference-and-revenue and powers-of-δ assortments. In these tables, the first col-
umn shows the combination of problem parameters by using the tuple ([γL, γU ], ε).
Recall that we generate 5,000 individual problem instances for each combination
of problem parameters. For each problem instance we generate, we solve problem
(3.16) to obtain an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue. We use UBk to
denote the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue we obtain for problem
instance k. Furthermore, given a collection of candidate assortments, we find the
best assortment that we can stitch together by focusing on these candidate assort-
ments. In Table 3.2, the candidate assortments are the nested-by-revenue assort-
ments, whereas in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the candidate assortments are respectively
the nested-by-preference-and-revenue and powers-of-δ assortments. For problem
instance k, we use Bestk to denote the expected revenue provided by the best
assortment we can find by focusing on a particular collection of candidate assort-
ments. The second column in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 shows the number of problem
instances k for which we have UBk > Bestk. These problem instances correspond to
those where we are not able to establish the optimality of the best assortment we
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can find. The third column focuses on the problem instances for which we cannot
establish the optimality of the best assortment we can find, and reports the average
percent gap between UBk and Bestk over these problem instances. In other words,
using K to denote the set of problem instances {k = 1, . . . , 5,000 : UBk > Bestk},
the third column gives
1
|K|
∑
k∈K
100
UBk − Bestk
UBk
.
The third column can be interpreted as the estimate of the average optimality gap
of the best assortment we can find given that we cannot verify the optimality of
this assortment. This column gives only an estimate of the average optimality
gap since we do not know the optimal expected revenue for our problem instances
and we only have an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue. The fourth
column in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 gives the 99-th percentile of the gaps between
UBk and Bestk over all 5,000 problem instances. That is, the fourth column gives
the 99-th percentile of the data {100(UBk − Bestk)/UBk : k = 1, . . . , 5,000}. The
fifth column shows the largest percent gap between UBk and Bestk over all 5,000
problem instances. The sixth column shows the average number of products per
nest in the best assortment we find. Finally, the last two columns give a feel for
how much the revenues and the preference weights of the products in the same
nest differ. In particular, the seventh column gives the average ratio between the
largest and the smallest revenues in a nest, averaged over all nests and all 5,000
problem instances. Naturally, we do not consider the loss leader product with a
revenue of zero when computing the ratio between the largest and the smallest
revenues in a nest. The eighth column gives the average ratio between the largest
and the smallest preference weights in a nest, averaged over all nests and all 5,000
problem instances.
The results in Table 3.2 indicate that nested-by-revenue assortments can per-
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form well. When the dissimilarity parameters of the nests take values over [0.5, 1.5],
we can verify that nested-by-revenue assortments are optimal in about half of the
problem instances. Furthermore, the optimality gaps of these assortments never
exceeds 0.81%. As [γL, γU ] shifts from [0.5, 1.5] to [2.0, 3.0], the average optimality
gaps of nested-by-revenue assortments increase from 0.01% to 0.38%. The overall
trend is that the performance of nested-by-revenue assortments can degrade as
[γL, γU ] increases and the nest dissimilarity parameters become larger. Another
trend we observe from Table 3.2 is that the optimality gaps of nested-by-revenue
assortments tend to increase as ε gets smaller. For the problem instances with
[γL, γU ] = [0.5, 1.5], the average optimality gaps of nested-by-revenue assortments
increase from 0.01% to 0.05% as ε decreases from 0.6 to 0.3, whereas for the prob-
lem instances with [γL, γU ] = [2.0, 3.0], the average optimality gaps increase from
0.09% to 0.38% as ε decreases from 0.6 to 0.3. We recall that as ε gets smaller,
the difference between both the revenues and the preference weights of the prod-
ucts in the same nest gets larger. Thus, our results indicate that the performance
nested-by-revenue assortments can degrade when we have drastic differences be-
tween the revenues and the preference weights. When we have [γL, γU ] = [2.0, 3.0]
and ε = 0.3, there are problem instances where the estimated optimality gap of
nested-by-revenue assortments can reach 5.45%. Nevertheless, we note that these
problem instances seem unlikely to come up in practice as they involve products
in the same nest with revenues differing by a factor of about 234 and preference
weights differing by a factor of about 221.
Our findings in Table 3.3 indicate that nested-by-preference-and-revenue as-
sortments provide small improvements over nested-by-revenue assortments when
we consider the problem instances with [γL, γU ] = [0.5, 1.5]. The performance
of nested-by-revenue assortments is already quite satisfactory for these problem
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Prob. Avg. 99-th Avg. Avg. Avg.
Param. Sub. % Gap Per. Larg. Ass. Rev. Pref.
([γL, γU ], ε) Cnt. in Sub. % Gap. % Gap Size Rat. Rat.
([0.5, 1.5], 0.6) 1,999 0.01 0.07 0.34 6.38 24.08 22.59
([0.5, 1.5], 0.5) 2,235 0.02 0.12 0.38 6.37 42.58 40.05
([0.5, 1.5], 0.4) 2,494 0.03 0.20 0.66 6.55 88.42 83.35
([0.5, 1.5], 0.3) 2,832 0.05 0.33 0.81 6.90 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 2.0], 0.6) 3,933 0.03 0.20 0.52 5.94 24.08 22.59
([1.0, 2.0], 0.5) 4,194 0.05 0.35 0.71 6.36 42.58 40.05
([1.0, 2.0], 0.4) 4,447 0.08 0.51 1.43 7.00 88.42 83.35
([1.0, 2.0], 0.3) 4,624 0.13 0.87 2.70 7.87 234.61 221.63
([1.5, 2.5], 0.6) 4,529 0.06 0.40 1.56 5.17 24.08 22.59
([1.5, 2.5], 0.5) 4,773 0.09 0.59 1.63 5.85 42.58 40.05
([1.5, 2.5], 0.4) 4,899 0.14 0.85 2.13 6.74 88.42 83.35
([1.5, 3.0], 0.3) 4,947 0.25 1.49 4.21 7.87 234.61 221.63
([2.0, 3.0], 0.6) 4,696 0.09 0.61 2.00 4.42 24.08 22.59
([2.0, 3.0], 0.5) 4,871 0.14 0.86 2.47 5.28 42.58 40.05
([2.0, 3.0], 0.4) 4,960 0.22 1.25 3.70 6.33 88.42 83.35
([2.0, 3.0], 0.3) 4,984 0.38 2.07 5.45 7.61 234.61 221.63
Table 3.2: Performance of nested-by-revenue assortments.
instances and it turns out to be difficult to improve over these assortments. As
[γL, γU ] increases, however, nested-by-preference-and-revenue assortments can pro-
vide noticeable improvements over nested-by-revenue assortments. For the problem
instances with [γL, γU ] = [2.0, 3.0], nested-by-preference-and-revenue assortments
can decrease the largest optimality gaps of nested-by-revenue assortments by more
than 2%. Finally, Table 3.4 shows that the performance of powers-of-δ assortments
is not as good as the performance of the other two collections of assortments we
consider. For almost all of the problem instances, we cannot verify the optimality
of the best powers-of-δ assortment. Nevertheless, the largest optimality gaps of
powers-of-δ assortments are still below 5%. Also, for the problem instances with
[γL, γU ] = [2.0, 3.0] and ε = 0.3, comparing the largest optimality gaps of nested-
by-revenue and powers-of-δ assortments indicates that there are problem instances
where powers-of-δ assortments improve over nested-by-revenue assortments.
Our results suggest two problem parameters that can affect the performance
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Prob. Avg. 99-th Avg. Avg. Avg.
Param. Sub. % Gap Per. Larg. Ass. Rev. Pref.
([γL, γU ], ε) Cnt. in Sub. % Gap. % Gap Size Rat. Rat.
([0.5, 1.5], 0.6) 1,999 0.01 0.06 0.20 6.38 24.08 22.59
([0.5, 1.5], 0.5) 2,235 0.02 0.11 0.31 6.37 42.58 40.05
([0.5, 1.5], 0.4) 2,494 0.03 0.18 0.48 6.55 88.42 83.35
([0.5, 1.5], 0.3) 2,832 0.04 0.28 0.78 6.90 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 2.0], 0.6) 3,933 0.03 0.18 0.51 5.94 24.08 22.59
([1.0, 2.0], 0.5) 4,194 0.04 0.27 0.71 6.37 42.58 40.05
([1.0, 2.0], 0.4) 4,447 0.07 0.39 0.92 7.02 88.42 83.35
([1.0, 2.0], 0.3) 4,624 0.11 0.65 1.31 7.89 234.61 221.63
([1.5, 2.5], 0.6) 4,529 0.05 0.34 0.79 5.18 24.08 22.59
([1.5, 2.5], 0.5) 4,773 0.08 0.47 1.03 5.87 42.58 40.05
([1.5, 2.5], 0.4) 4,899 0.12 0.68 2.13 6.78 88.42 83.35
([1.5, 3.0], 0.3) 4,947 0.19 1.03 2.42 7.92 234.61 221.63
([2.0, 3.0], 0.6) 4,696 0.08 0.51 1.24 4.43 24.08 22.59
([2.0, 3.0], 0.5) 4,871 0.12 0.68 1.82 5.31 42.58 40.05
([2.0, 3.0], 0.4) 4,960 0.18 0.88 2.20 6.38 88.42 83.35
([2.0, 3.0], 0.3) 4,984 0.29 1.33 3.26 7.68 234.61 221.63
Table 3.3: Performance of nested-by-preference-and-revenue assortments.
Prob. Avg. 99-th Avg. Avg. Avg.
Param. Sub. % Gap Per. Larg. Ass. Rev. Pref.
([γL, γU ], ε) Cnt. in Sub. % Gap. % Gap Size Rat. Rat.
([0.5, 1.5], 0.6) 4,996 0.93 2.22 3.20 6.46 24.08 22.59
([0.5, 1.5], 0.5) 4,991 0.89 2.13 3.09 6.43 42.58 40.05
([0.5, 1.5], 0.4) 4,969 0.80 2.06 2.90 6.61 88.42 83.35
([0.5, 1.5], 0.3) 4,937 0.68 1.82 2.86 6.96 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 2.0], 0.6) 4,994 1.01 2.42 3.68 6.01 24.08 22.59
([1.0, 2.0], 0.5) 4,998 0.97 2.33 3.72 6.42 42.58 40.05
([1.0, 2.0], 0.4) 4,998 0.88 2.27 3.95 7.08 88.42 83.35
([1.0, 2.0], 0.3) 4,997 0.78 2.05 3.14 7.91 234.61 221.63
([1.5, 2.5], 0.6) 4,999 1.12 2.87 4.40 5.25 24.08 22.59
([1.5, 2.5], 0.5) 4,999 1.07 2.67 3.90 5.92 42.58 40.05
([1.5, 2.5], 0.4) 5,000 0.99 2.53 3.80 6.81 88.42 83.35
([1.5, 3.0], 0.3) 4,999 0.91 2.37 3.26 7.91 234.61 221.63
([2.0, 3.0], 0.6) 4,997 1.22 3.42 4.37 4.53 24.08 22.59
([2.0, 3.0], 0.5) 5,000 1.18 3.08 4.64 5.37 42.58 40.05
([2.0, 3.0], 0.4) 5,000 1.10 2.84 4.92 6.40 88.42 83.35
([2.0, 3.0], 0.3) 4,999 1.03 2.73 4.02 7.66 234.61 221.63
Table 3.4: Performance of powers-of-δ assortments.
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of the collections of assortments we propose. The first parameter is the dissimi-
larity parameters of the nests. The second parameter is the degree to which the
revenues or the preference weights of the products in the same nest differ. To make
such trends clear, Figure 3.1 plots the optimality gaps for nested-by-preference-
and-revenue assortments as a function of the nest dissimilarity parameters and
the difference between the revenues and the preference weights of the products in
the same nest. Our earlier results indicate that nested-by-preference-and-revenue
assortments generally provide better performance than the other two collections
and to conserve space, we focus only on these assortments in Figure 3.1. The
horizontal axis in this figure shows the values of [γL, γU ] and ε for the 16 combi-
nations of problem parameters. The thin data series plot the average optimality
gap of nested-by-preference-and-revenue assortments, whereas the thick data series
plot the 99-th percentile of the optimality gaps over the 5,000 problems instances
generated for a certain combination of problem parameters. From the figure, we
observe that as ε shifts from 0.6 to 0.3, keeping [γL, γU ] constant, the optimal-
ity gaps of nested-by-preference-and-revenue assortments get larger. Similarly, as
[γL, γU ] shifts from [0.5, 1.5] to [2.0, 3.0], keeping ε constant, the optimality gaps
of nested-by-preference-and-revenue assortments get larger as well.
In Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we keep the width of the interval [γL, γU ] con-
stant at one and systematically increase the value of γL. An interesting question
is how our collections of assortments perform as we increase the width of the
interval [γL, γU ]. To answer this question, we fix γL at one and vary γU over
{1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0}. We fix ε at 0.3, which corresponds to the case with the largest
optimality gaps in our earlier results. Table 3.5 shows our findings. The layout
of this table is similar to that of Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. The three portions of
this table focus on the performance of nested-by-revenue, nested-by-preference-
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Figure 3.1: Optimality gaps for nested-by-preference-and-revenue assortments.
and-revenue and powers-of-δ assortments. The results in Table 3.5 indicates that
as γU increases and the nest dissimilarity parameters tend to take values signifi-
cantly larger than one, the optimality gaps of all three collections of assortments
get larger. Nevertheless, even with ε = 0.3, which corresponds to a case where
the revenues and the preference weights of the products in the same nest differ
respectively by factors of about 234 and 221, the 99-th percentile of the optimality
gaps for the best collections of assortments do not exceed 1.40% and the largest
optimality gaps do not exceed 3.85%.
3.11 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied a class of assortment optimization problems under vari-
ants of the nested logit model. We showed that the problem is polynomially solvable
when the dissimilarity parameters of the nests are less than one, and the customers
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Nested-by-revenue assortments
Prob. Avg. 99-th Avg. Avg. Avg.
Param. Sub. % Gap Per. Larg. Ass. Rev. Pref.
([γL, γU ], ε) Cnt. in Sub. % Gap. % Gap Size Rat. Rat.
([1.0, 1.5], 0.3) 3,866 0.05 0.37 0.88 7.81 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 2.0], 0.3) 4,624 0.13 0.87 2.70 7.87 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 2.5], 0.3) 4,827 0.22 1.53 4.62 7.74 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 3.0], 0.3) 4,898 0.32 2.12 6.73 7.55 234.61 221.63
Nested-by-preference-and-revenue assortments
Prob. Avg. 99-th Avg. Avg. Avg.
Param. Sub. % Gap Per. Larg. Ass. Rev. Pref.
([γL, γU ], ε) Cnt. in Sub. % Gap. % Gap Size Rat. Rat.
([1.0, 1.5], 0.3) 3,866 0.05 0.31 0.76 7.82 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 2.0], 0.3) 4,624 0.11 0.65 1.31 7.89 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 2.5], 0.3) 4,827 0.18 1.00 1.93 7.78 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 3.0], 0.3) 4,898 0.24 1.40 3.85 7.60 234.61 221.63
Powers-of-δ assortments
Prob. Avg. 99-th Avg. Avg. Avg.
Param. Sub. % Gap Per. Larg. Ass. Rev. Pref.
([γL, γU ], ε) Cnt. in Sub. % Gap. % Gap Size Rat. Rat.
([1.0, 1.5], 0.3) 4,981 0.69 1.84 2.46 7.86 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 2.0], 0.3) 4,997 0.78 2.05 3.14 7.91 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 2.5], 0.3) 4,998 0.87 2.31 3.32 7.78 234.61 221.63
([1.0, 3.0], 0.3) 4,999 0.97 2.69 3.96 7.60 234.61 221.63
Table 3.5: Performance of the three different collections of assortments as a func-
tion of γU .
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always purchase a product within their selected nest. Relaxing either one of these
assumptions renders the problem NP-hard. To deal with the NP-hard cases, we
developed collections of assortments with worst-case performance guarantees. Fur-
thermore, we formulated a tractable convex program whose optimal objective value
provides an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue. In this case, we can
compare the expected revenue provided by an assortment with the upper bound
on the optimal expected revenue to get a feel for the optimality gap of the as-
sortment. By following this approach, our computational experiments tested the
performance of the collections of candidate assortments that we develop.
There are still interesting research questions within the context of assortment
optimization under the nested logit model. In this paper, we assume that the
dissimilarity parameters (γ1, . . . , γm) of the nests and the preference weights {vij :
i ∈ M, j ∈ N}, {vi0 : i ∈ M} and v0 of the products and the no purchase
options are constants. As we explain at the end of Section 3.3, this assumption
can be justified by deriving the nested logit model through a random utility-based
choice model, where the means and correlation structure of the random utilities are
assumed to be fixed. Naturally, we can obtain richer choice models by allowing the
means and correlation structure of the random utilities to depend on the offered
assortment. For example, if a certain product is offered along with some others,
then it may appear more attractive to customers, which can be modeled by allowing
the mean utility of the product to depend on the whole set of offered products.
Similarly, the correlation structure of the random utilities may also depend on
which assortment is offered. When we allow the means or correlation structure of
the random utilities to depend on the offered assortment, the preference weights or
the dissimilarity parameters become dependent on the offered assortment as well.
The approach that we use in this paper has difficulties when working with
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such assortment-dependent preference weights or dissimilarity parameters. For
example, consider a case where the preference weights of the products in nest i
or the dissimilarity parameter of nest i depends on the assortment offered within
this nest. In this case, one difficulty that we run into is that the performance
guarantees in Sections 3.6.2, 3.7 and 3.8.1 are obtained by using various continuous
relaxations, such as those on the right side of the second set of constraints in
problems (3.7) and (3.10), but it is not clear how to construct and work with such
continuous relaxations when we have assortment-dependent preference weights or
dissimilarity parameters. Furthermore, the proofs of the results in these sections
use the monotonicity, concavity and convexity properties of Vi(Si)
γi when viewed
as a function of Vi(Si). For example, the proof of Theorem 3.7.3 uses the fact that
Vi(Si)
γi and Vi(Si)
1−γi are both increasing in Vi(Si) when γi ≤ 1, whereas the proof
of Theorem 3.8.1 uses the fact that Vi(Si)
1−γi is a convex function of Vi(Si) when
γi ≥ 1. Similar monotonicity, concavity and convexity properties are used in the
proofs of Theorems 3.5.2 and 3.6.3 as well. These properties naturally hold when
the dissimilarity parameters are constants but it is not clear how to ensure the
analogous monotonicity, concavity and convexity properties when the preference
weights or the dissimilarity parameters depend on the offered assortment.
Another important research direction is to work with more general forms of the
nested logit model, such as the mixed or cross nested logit models. In Section 3.4,
we exploit the fact that the problem max(S1,...,Sm):Si⊂N,i∈M
∑
i∈M Vi(Si)
γi(Ri(Si)−
x) decomposes by the nests. As a result, for a fixed value of the decision variable
x, the second set of constraints in problem (3.3) separates by the nests and we
can construct candidate assortments by considering each nest separately. Unfortu-
nately, this separable structure is lost under more general forms of the nested logit
model. Therefore, dealing with assortment-dependent preference weights or dis-
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similarity parameters and solving assortment problems under more general forms
of the nested logit model remain open for further research.
3.12 Appendix: Omitted Proofs
3.12.1 Proof of Theorem 3.6.3
Noting that problem (3.3) is a relaxed version of problem (3.7), it is enough to
show that (α xˆ, α yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.7). We observe that since
(xˆ, yˆ) is an optimal solution to problem (3.4) after replacing the collection of as-
sortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of constraints with the nested-by-revenue
assortments {Nij : j ∈ N+}, this solution satisfies the second set of constraints for
nest i and the nested-by-revenue assortment Ni0 = ∅. Noting that Vi(∅) = 0, it
follows that yˆi ≥ 0 for all i ∈M . In this case, the first constraint in problem (3.4)
implies that xˆ ≥ 0.
We fix an arbitrary nest i and let zˆi be an optimal solution to the maximization
problem on the right side of the second set of constraints in problem (3.7) when
this maximization problem is solved at x = α xˆ. By Lemma 3.6.2, zˆi is of the
form zˆi1 = 1, zˆi2 = 1, . . . , zˆi,k−1 = 1, zˆik ∈ [0, 1], zˆi,k+1 = 0, . . . , zˆin = 0 for some
k = 1, . . . , n. We define ρ as ρ = zˆik ∈ [0, 1] and consider two cases.
Case 1. Assume that k ≥ 2. We branch into two subcases.
Case 1.a. Noting that (xˆ, yˆ) is the optimal solution to problem (3.4) after replacing
the collection of assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of constraints with the
nested-by-revenue assortments {Nij : j ∈ N+}, this solution satisfies the second
set of constraints in problem (3.4) for nest i and the nested-by-revenue assortment
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Nik = {1, 2, . . . , k}. Thus, it holds that
yˆi ≥
( k∑
j=1
vij
)γi[∑kj=1 rij vij∑k
j=1 vij
− xˆ
]
.
For notational convenience, let Rik′ =
∑k′
j=1 rij vij and qik′ =
∑k′
j=1 vij for all
k′ = 1, . . . , n. Multiplying the inequality above by Ri,k−1+rik vik ρ
qi,k−1+vik ρ
qik
Rik
, we obtain
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
qik
Rik
yˆi ≥ qγiik
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
qik
Rik
xˆ
]
. (3.19)
It is simple to check that the first derivative of
Ri,k−1+rik vik ρ
qi,k−1+vik ρ
with respect to ρ has
the same sign as rik qi,k−1 − Ri,k−1 and we have rik qi,k−1 − Ri,k−1 =
∑k−1
j=1(rik −
rij) vij ≤ 0, where the last inequality is by the fact that ri1 ≥ ri2 ≥ . . . ≥ rin.
Thus, it follows that
Ri,k−1+rik vik ρ
qi,k−1+vik ρ
is decreasing in ρ so that is it bounded from
above by Ri,k−1/qi,k−1. Also, noting the definitions of Ri(Si), Rik′ and qik′ , we have
Rik′/qik′ = Ri(Nik′). In this case, we can bound the expression that multiplies yˆi
and xˆ in (3.19) as
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
qik
Rik
≤ Ri,k−1
qi,k−1
qik
Rik
=
Ri(Ni,k−1)
Ri(Nik)
.
Letting α1ik = Ri(Ni,k−1)/Ri(Nik) for notational brevity, using the upper bound
above in (3.19) and noting that yˆi ≥ 0 and xˆ ≥ 0, the inequality in (3.19) implies
that
α1ik yˆi ≥ qγik
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− α1ik xˆ
]
.
Finally, if we multiply the right side of the inequality above by (qk−1+vik ρ)γi/q
γi
k ≤
1, but not the left side, then the inequality is above still preserved and we have
α1ik yˆi ≥ (qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− α1ik xˆ
]
. (3.20)
Case 1.b. Noting that (xˆ, yˆ) is the optimal solution to problem (3.4) after replacing
the collection of assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of constraints with
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the nested-by-revenue assortments {Nij : j ∈ N+}, this solution also satisfies the
second set of constraints in problem (3.4) for nest i and the nested-by-revenue
assortment Ni,k−1 = {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}. Thus, we obtain
yˆi ≥
( k−1∑
j=1
vij
)γi[∑k−1j=1 rij vij∑k−1
j=1 vij
− xˆ
]
= qγii,k−1
[
Ri,k−1
qi,k−1
− xˆ
]
.
Multiplying the inequality above by
(qi,k−1+vik ρ)γi
q
γi
i,k−1
Ri,k−1+rik vik ρ
qi,k−1+vik ρ
qi,k−1
Ri,k−1
and arranging
the terms, we have
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
(qi,k−1 + vik ρ)1−γi
q1−γii,k−1
Ri,k−1
yˆi
≥ (qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
qi,k−1
Ri,k−1
xˆ
]
.
Since xˆ ≥ 0, if we make the expression that multiplies xˆ in the inequality above
even larger by multiplying it by
(qi,k−1+vik ρ)γi
q
γi
i,k−1
≥ 1, then the inequality above is still
preserved and we have
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
(qi,k−1 + vik ρ)1−γi
q1−γii,k−1
Ri,k−1
yˆi
≥ (qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
(qi,k−1 + vik ρ)1−γi
q1−γii,k−1
Ri,k−1
xˆ
]
. (3.21)
It is simple to check that whenever the first derivative of
Ri,k−1+rik vik ρ
(qi,k−1+vik ρ)1−γi
with re-
spect to ρ vanishes, the second derivative takes a positive value. Therefore, this
expression is maximized at either ρ = 0 or ρ = 1. In this case, we can bound the
expression that multiplies yˆi and xˆ in (3.21) as
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
(qi,k−1 + vik ρ)1−γi
q1−γii,k−1
Ri,k−1
≤ 1 ∨ Rik
q1−γiik
q1−γii,k−1
Ri,k−1
= 1 ∨ Ri(Nik)
Ri(Ni,k−1)
Vi(Nik)
γi
Vi(Ni,k−1)γi
,
where we use a ∨ b = max{a, b}. The two terms in the maximum operator on the
right side of the first inequality are obtained by evaluating the expression on the
left side of the inequality at ρ = 0 and ρ = 1. The equality above follows by noting
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that Rik′/qik′ = Ri(Nik′) and qik′ = Vi(Nik′). Letting α
2
ik =
Ri(Nik)
Ri(Ni,k−1)
Vi(Nik)
γi
Vi(Ni,k−1)γi
for
notational convenience, using the upper bound above in (3.21) and noting that
yˆi ≥ and xˆ ≥ 0, the inequality in (3.21) implies that
(1 ∨ α2ik) yˆi ≥ (qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− (1 ∨ α2ik) xˆ
]
. (3.22)
Putting Cases 1.a and 1.b together, we observe that yˆi and xˆ satisfy both (3.20)
and (3.22), in which case, they must also satisfy
[α1ik ∧ (1 ∨ α2ik)] yˆi ≥ (qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− [α1ik ∧ (1 ∨ α2ik)] xˆ
]
.
(3.23)
Lemma 3.12.1 below shows that α ≥ 1 for the value of α given in (3.6). The proof
of that lemma also shows that α1ik = Ri(Nik)/Ri(Ni,k−1) ≥ 1. By the definitions
of α, α1ik and α
2
ik, we obtain α ≥ α1ik ∧ α2ik as well. In this case, we have
α1ik ∧ (1 ∨ α2ik) = (α1ik ∧ 1) ∨ (α1ik ∧ α2ik) = 1 ∨ (α1ik ∧ α2ik) ≤ α.
Thus, replacing the expression that multiplies yˆi and xˆ in (3.23) with an even larger
expression α, the inequality is still preserved and we obtain
α yˆi ≥ (qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− α xˆ
]
. (3.24)
Case 2. Assume that k = 1. Since (xˆ, yˆ) is the optimal solution to problem (3.4)
after replacing the collection of assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of
constraints with the nested-by-revenue assortments {Nij : j ∈ N+}, this solution
satisfies the second set of constraints in problem (3.4) for nest i and the nested-
by-revenue assortment Ni1 = {1}. Therefore, we have yˆi ≥ vγii1
[
ri1 vi1
vi1
− xˆ]. Since
α ≥ 1, yˆi ≥ 0 and xˆ ≥ 0, this inequality yields α yˆi ≥ vγii1
[
ri1 vi1
vi1
− α xˆ]. If we
multiply the right side of the last inequality by ργi ≤ 1, but not the left side, then
the inequality is still preserved and we obtain
α yˆi ≥ (vi1 ρ)γi
[
ri1 vi1 ρ
vi1 ρ
− α xˆ
]
. (3.25)
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Putting Cases 1 and 2 together, we succinctly write the inequalities in (3.24)
and (3.25) as
α yˆi ≥
( k−1∑
j=1
vij zˆij + vik zˆik
)γi[∑k−1j=1 rij vij zˆij + rik vik zˆik∑k−1
j=1 vij zˆij + vik zˆik
− α xˆ
]
= max
zi∈[0,1]n
{(∑
j∈N
vij zij
)γi[∑j∈N rij vij zij∑
j∈N vij zij
− α xˆ
]}
,
where the equality follows from the definition of zˆi. Since the choice of nest i is
arbitrary, the inequality above holds for all i ∈M , which implies that the solution
(α xˆ, α yˆ) satisfies the second set of constraints in problem (3.7). Since (xˆ, yˆ) is
an optimal solution to problem (3.4), we have v0 xˆ ≥
∑
i∈M yˆi, which implies that
v0 α xˆ ≥
∑
i∈M α yˆi. Therefore, the solution (α xˆ, α yˆ) satisfies the first constraint
in problem (3.7) as well and we obtain the desired result.
Lemma 3.12.1. Using α to denote the expression in (3.6), if we have γi > 1 for
some i ∈M , then α ≥ 1.
Proof. Noting that Ri(Nij) =
∑j
k=1 rik vik/
∑j
k=1 vik, Rij(Nij) is the weighted
average of the revenues of the first j products in nest i. Since ri1 ≥ ri2 ≥ . . . ≥ rin,
it follows that Ri(Ni,j−1) ≥ Ri(Nij). On the other hand, since γi > 1, we have
Ri(Nij)Vi(Nij)
γi =
∑j
k=1 rij vij∑j
k=1 vij
( j∑
k=1
vij
)γi
≥
∑j−1
k=1 rij vij∑j−1
k=1 vij
( j−1∑
k=1
vij
)γi
= Ri(Ni,j−1)Vi(Ni,j−1)γi .
Therefore, both terms of the minimum operator in the expression in (3.6) for nest
i are at least one, which implies that α is also at least one.
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3.12.2 Proof of Theorem 3.7.1
Assume that we are given any instance of the partition problem with sizes (c1, . . . , cn)
and
∑n
j=1 cj = 2T . We define an instance of the assortment feasibility problem as
follows. There are two nests. The preference weight for the option of not choos-
ing any of the nests is v0 = 0. The dissimilarity parameters of the two nests are
γ1 = γ2 = 1/2. For the first nest, the preference weight of the no purchase option
is v10 = 2. This nest has only one product in it. The revenue and the preference
weight associated with this product are r11 = 2 (T +1)(T +3) and v11 = 2 (2T +1).
For the second nest, the preference weight of the no purchase option is v20 = 1.
The second nest has n products in it. The revenues of the products in the second
nest are identical and they are given by r2j = (T + 1)(2T + 1) for all j = 1, . . . , n.
The preference weights of the products in the second nest are given by v2j = cj
for all j = 1, . . . , n. We set the expected revenue threshold in the assortment
feasibility problem as K = (T + 2)(2T + 1).
The first observation that if we only offer the product in the first nest, then
the expected revenue we generate from the first nest is
R1({1}) = r11 v11
v01 + v11
=
2 (T + 1)(T + 3) 2 (2T + 1)
2 + 2 (2T + 1)
= (T + 3)(2T + 1),
which is larger than the revenues of the products in the second nest. Thus, if we
want to get the largest possible expected revenue, then it is always optimal to
offer the product in the first nest. Therefore, the only question for the assortment
feasibility problem is to choose a subset S among the products in the second nest
that makes sure that we obtain an expected revenue of K = (T+2)(2T+1) or more.
If we offer a subset S of the products in the second nest together with the product in
the first nest, then the expected revenue is Q1({1}, S)R1({1}) +Q2({1}, S)R2(S),
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which evaluates to√
2 + 2 (2T + 1)√
2 + 2 (2T + 1) +
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj
2 (T + 1)(T + 3) 2 (2T + 1)
2 + 2 (2T + 1)
+
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj√
2 + 2 (2T + 1) +
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj
(T + 1)(2T + 1)
∑
j∈S cj
1 +
∑
j∈S cj
.
Thus, arranging the terms in the expression above, the assortment feasibility prob-
lem asks the question of whether there is a subset S such that
2(T + 1)(T + 3) 2 (2T + 1)√
2 + 2(2T + 1)
+ (T + 1)(2T + 1)
∑
j∈S cj√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj√
2 + 2(2T + 1) +
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj
≥ (T + 2)(2T + 1).
If we cancel the terms in the first fraction in the numerator on the left side and
move the denominator to the right, then the inequality above is equivalent to
2 (T + 3)(2T + 1)
√
T + 1 + (T + 1)(2T + 1)
∑
j∈S cj√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj
≥ 2 (T + 2)(2T + 1)√T + 1 + (T + 2)(2T + 1)
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj.
Canceling the term 2T + 1 from both sides of the inequality above, multiplying
the inequality by
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj and adding and subtracting one from the term∑
j∈S cj, the inequality above can be written as
2(T + 3)
√
T + 1
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj + (T + 1)
(
1 +
∑
j∈S
cj
)
− (T + 1)
≥ 2 (T + 2)√T + 1
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj + (T + 2)
(
1 +
∑
j∈S
cj
)
.
Finally, collecting all of the terms to the right, the last inequality becomes
(
1 +
∑
j∈S
cj
)
− 2√T + 1
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj + (T + 1) ≤ 0.
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Since the last inequality is equivalent to (
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj −
√
T + 1)2 ≤ 0, there
exists an assortment with an expected revenue of K = (T + 2)(2T + 1) or more if
and only if there exists a subset S with (
√
1 +
∑
j∈S cj −
√
T + 1)2 ≤ 0. However,
the only way for the last inequality to hold is to have
∑
j∈S cj = T . Therefore,
finding an assortment that yields an expected revenue of K or more is equivalent to
finding a subset S that satisfies
∑
j∈S cj = T and the latter statement is precisely
what the partition problem is interested in.
3.12.3 Proof of Theorem 3.7.3
Since problem (3.10) is equivalent to problem (3.3), it is enough to show that
(2 xˆ, 2 yˆ) is a feasible solution to problem (3.10). First, note that xˆ ≥ 0. To see
this claim, if xˆ < 0, then the right sides of the second set of constraints in problem
(3.4) are strictly positive for nonempty assortments so that yˆi > 0 for all i ∈ M .
In this case, (xˆ, yˆ) cannot satisfy the first constraint in problem (3.4), establishing
the claim.
We fix an arbitrary nest i and let ˆi be the optimal solution to the maximization
problem on the right side of the second set of constraints in problem (3.10) when
this maximization problem is solved at x = 2 xˆ. Finally, let zˆi(ˆi) be the optimal
solution to problem (3.11) when this continuous knapsack problem is solved at
i = ˆi. We consider two cases.
Case 1. Assume that the solution zˆi(ˆi) has exactly one fractional component. We
denote this factional component by k ∈ N . Since (xˆ, yˆ) is the optimal solution to
problem (3.4) after replacing the collection assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second
set of constraints with {Sˆi(i) : i ∈ [0,∞]} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}, the solution (xˆ, yˆ)
satisfies the second set of constraints in problem (3.4) for nest i and the assortment
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Sˆi(ˆi) and we obtain
yˆi ≥ Vi(Sˆi(ˆi))γi(Ri(Sˆi(ˆi))− xˆ)
=
∑
j∈Sˆi(ˆi) rij vij
(vi0 +
∑
j∈Sˆi(ˆi) vij)
1−γi −
(
vi0+
∑
j∈Sˆi(ˆi)
vij
)γi
xˆ ≥
∑
j∈Sˆi(ˆi) rij vij
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
−(vi0+ˆi)γi xˆ,
(3.26)
where the second inequality above follows by γi ≤ 1 and noting that we have∑
j∈Sˆi(ˆi) vij ≤
∑
j∈N vij zˆij(ˆi) ≤ ˆi by the definitions of Sˆi(ˆi) and zˆi(ˆi). Similarly,
the solution (xˆ, yˆ) satisfies the second set of constraints in problem (3.4) for nest
i and the singleton assortment {k} so that
yˆi ≥ Vi({k})γi(Ri({k})− xˆ)
=
rik vik
(vi0 + vik)1−γi
− (vi0 + vik)γi xˆ ≥ rik vik
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
− (vi0 + ˆi)γi xˆ, (3.27)
where the second inequality above follows from the fact that we must have vik ≤ ˆi
for zˆik(ˆi) to take a fractional value. Since Sˆi(ˆi) includes all strictly positive and
integer-valued components of zˆi(ˆi) and k is the only component of zˆi(ˆi) that takes
a fractional value, we have
∑
j∈Sˆi(ˆi) rij vij + rik vik ≥
∑
j∈N rij vij zˆij(ˆi) = Kˆi(ˆi),
where the equality follows by the definition of zˆi(ˆi). Using this relationship and
adding (3.26) and (3.27), we have
2 yˆi ≥
∑
j∈Sˆi(ˆi) rij vij + rik vik
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
− (vi0 + ˆi)γi 2 xˆ ≥ Kˆi(ˆi)
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
− (vi0 + ˆi)γi 2 xˆ
≥ Ki(ˆi)
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
− (vi0 + ˆi)γi 2 xˆ = max
i≥0
{
(vi0 + i)
γi
[
Ki(i)
vi0 + i
− 2 xˆ
]}
, (3.28)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that problem (3.11) is a relaxation
of problem (3.9) and the last equality follows from the definition of ˆi.
Case 2. Assume that the solution zˆi(ˆi) does not have any fractional components.
In this case, Sˆi(ˆi) includes all strictly positive components of zˆi(ˆi) and we ob-
tain
∑
j∈Sˆi(ˆi) rij vij =
∑
j∈N rij vij zˆij(ˆi) = Kˆi(ˆi). Using this relationship and
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following the same argument that we used to obtain (3.26) in the first case, we
have
yˆi ≥
∑
j∈Sˆi(ˆi) rij vij
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
− (vi0 + ˆi)γi xˆ ≥ Ki(ˆi)
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
− (vi0 + ˆi)γi xˆ.
Multiplying the inequality above by two, we obtain
2 yˆi ≥ 2 Ki(ˆi)
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
− (vi0 + ˆi)γi 2 xˆ
≥ Ki(ˆi)
(vi0 + ˆi)1−γi
− (vi0 + ˆi)γi 2 xˆ = max
i≥0
{
(vi0 + i)
γi
[
Ki(i)
vi0 + i
− 2 xˆ
]}
, (3.29)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of ˆi.
Collecting (3.28) and (3.29) in the two cases, the solution (2 xˆ, 2 yˆ) satisfies
the second set of constraints for nest i in problem (3.10). Noting that our choice
of nest i is arbitrary, the second set of constraints in problem (3.10) is satisfied
by the solution (2 xˆ, 2 yˆ). Finally, since the solution (xˆ, yˆ) is optimal to problem
(3.4), we have v0 xˆ ≥
∑
i∈M yˆi, which implies that v0 2 xˆ ≥
∑
i∈M 2 yˆi. Therefore,
the solution (2 xˆ, 2 yˆ) satisfies the first constraint in problem (3.10) as well and we
obtain the desired result.
3.12.4 Proof of Theorem 3.8.1
The proof follows from a reasoning similar to those in the proofs of Theorems 3.6.3
and 3.7.3, but there are some key new points. Following an argument similar to
the one at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 3.7.3, we have xˆ ≥ 0. We fix an
arbitrary nest i and consider three cases.
Case 1. Assume that γi > 1 and yˆi ≥ 0. We let zˆi be an optimal solution to the
problem
max
zi∈[0,1]n
{(
vi0 +
∑
j∈N
vij zij
)γi [ ∑j∈N rij vij zij
vi0 +
∑
j∈N vij zij
− β xˆ
]}
.
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Using the same idea in the proof of Lemma 3.6.2, we can show that zˆi is of the
form zˆi1 = 1, zˆi2 = 1, . . . , zˆi,k−1 = 1, zˆik ∈ [0, 1], zˆi,k+1 = 0, . . . , zˆin = 0 for some
k = 1, . . . , n. We define ρ as ρ = zˆik ∈ [0, 1] and branch into two subcases.
Case 1.a. Assume that k ≥ 2. Noting that (xˆ, yˆ) is the optimal solution to
problem (3.4) after replacing the collection of assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the
second set of constraints with {Nk′ij : k′ ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k′} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}, this
solution satisfies the second set of constraints in problem (3.4) for nest i and the
assortment Nnik = {1, 2, . . . , k}. Thus, it holds that
yˆi ≥
(
vi0 +
k∑
j=1
vij
)γi[ ∑kj=1 rij vij
vi0 +
∑k
j=1 vij
− xˆ
]
.
For notational convenience, let Rik′ =
∑k′
j=1 rij vij and qik′ =
∑k′
j=1 vij for all
k′ = 1, . . . , n. The expression in the numerator of the fraction above corresponds to
Rik and if we replace the expression Rik with the smaller expression Ri,k−1+rik vik ρ,
then the inequality above still holds. Also, since β ≥ 1, we can increase yˆi on the
left side to β yˆi and the inequality still holds. Thus, the inequality above yields
β yˆi ≥ (vi0 + qik)γi−1 (Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ− (vi0 + qik) xˆ). Since yˆi ≥ 0, if we multiply
the right side of the last inequality by (vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi−1/(vi0 + qik)γi−1 ≤ 1,
but not the left side, then the last inequality is preserved and we obtain β yˆi ≥
(vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi−1 (Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ− (vi0 + qik) xˆ). We write this inequality as
β yˆi ≥ (vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− vi0 + qik
vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ
xˆ
]
≥ (vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− β xˆ
]
, (3.30)
where the second inequality above follows by (vi0 + qik)/(vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ) ≤
Vi(N
n
ik)/Vi(N
n
i,k−1) ≤ β.
Case 1.b. Assume that k = 1. In this case, if nest i is a partially-captured nest
with vi0 > 0, then we can use the same approach in Case 1.a to show that the
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inequality in (3.30) is satisfied with k = 1. On the other hand, if nest i is a fully-
captured nest with vi0 = 0, then we can use the same approach in Case 2 in the
proof of Theorem 3.6.3 to show that the inequality in (3.30) is satisfied with k = 1.
Thus, the inequality in (3.30) holds under Case 1.b as well. Putting Cases 1.a and
1.b together, we have
β yˆi ≥ (vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ)γi
[
Ri,k−1 + rik vik ρ
vi0 + qi,k−1 + vik ρ
− β xˆ
]
=
(
vi0 +
∑
j∈N
vij zˆij
)γi [ ∑j∈N rij vij zˆij
vi0 +
∑
j∈N vij zˆij
− β xˆ
]
≥ Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)− β xˆ)
for all Si ⊂ N , where the second inequality follows from the definition of zˆi.
Therefore, the solution (β xˆ, β yˆ) satisfies the second set of constraints for nest i in
problem (3.3).
Case 2. Assume that γi > 1 and yˆi < 0. We let zˆi be an optimal solution to the
problem
max
zi∈[0,1]n
{∑
j∈N
rij vij zij − β xˆ
(
vi0 +
∑
j∈N
vij zij
)
− β yˆi
(
vi0 +
∑
j∈N
vij zij
)1−γi}
.
(3.31)
Following the idea in the proof of Lemma 3.6.2, we can show that zˆi is of the
form zˆi1 = 1, zˆi2 = 1, . . . , zˆi,k−1 = 1, zˆik ∈ [0, 1], zˆi,k+1 = 0, . . . , zˆin = 0 for some
k = 1, . . . , n. We claim that we have either zˆik = 0 or zˆik = 1, implying that
the optimal solution to the problem above corresponds to a nested-by-revenue
assortment. To get a contradiction, we define ρ as ρ = zˆik and assume that ρ ∈
(0, 1). Since setting zˆi1 = 1, zˆi2 = 1, . . . , zˆi,k−1 = 1, zˆik = ρ, zˆi,k+1 = 0, . . . , zˆin = 0
yields an optimal solution to problem (3.31), if we fix all of the decision variables
except for zik at their optimal values in the problem above and optimize only over
the decision variable zik, then ρ ∈ (0, 1) must be an optimal solution. However,
since γi > 1 and yˆi < 0, the objective function of the problem above is strictly
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convex and its optimal solution must occur at either ρ = 0 or ρ = 1. Thus, the
claim holds, implying that the optimal solution to problem (3.31) corresponds to
a nested-by-revenue assortment and we denote this nested by revenue assortment
by {1, 2, . . . , k} for some k ∈ N .
Noting that (xˆ, yˆ) is the optimal solution to problem (3.4) after replacing the
collection of assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of constraints with
{Nk′ij : k′ ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k′} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N}, this solution satisfies the second set
of constraints in problem (3.4) for nest i and the assortment Nnik = {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Therefore, it follows that yˆi ≥ Vi(Nnik)γi (Ri(Nnik) − xˆ). Multiplying both sides of
this inequality with β, we obtain
β yˆi ≥ β Vi(Nnik)γi (Ri(Nnik)− xˆ) ≥ Vi(Nnik)γi (Ri(Nnik)− β xˆ),
where the second inequality uses the fact that β ≥ 1. Arranging the terms in
the inequality β yˆi ≥ Vi(Nnik)γi (Ri(Nnik) − β xˆ) by using the definitions of Vi(Si)
and Ri(Si), we obtain
∑
j∈Nnik rij vij − Vi(N
n
ik) β xˆ − Vi(Nnik)1−γi β yˆi ≤ 0. Noting
that the optimal solution to problem (3.31) corresponds to the nested-by-revenue
assortment Nnik = {1, 2, . . . , k}, the last inequality shows that the optimal objective
value of problem (3.31) is negative. Therefore, for all Si ⊂ N , we have∑
j∈Si
rij vij − Vi(Si) β xˆ− Vi(Si)1−γi β yˆi
≤ max
zi∈[0,1]n
{∑
j∈N
rij vij zij−β xˆ
(
vi0+
∑
j∈N
vij zij
)
−β yˆi
(
vi0+
∑
j∈N
vij zij
)1−γi} ≤ 0.
Arranging the terms in the inequality
∑
j∈Si rij vij−Vi(Si) β xˆ−Vi(Si)1−γi β yˆi ≤ 0
by using the definitions of Vi(Si) and Ri(Si), we obtain β yˆi ≥ Vi(Si)γi (Ri(Si)−β xˆ)
for all Si ⊂ N , which shows that the solution (β xˆ, β yˆ) satisfies the second set of
constraints for nest i in problem (3.3).
Case 3. Assume that γi ≤ 1. In this case, by using a line of reasoning that
is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.7.3, we can show that 2 yˆi ≥
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Vi(Si)
γi (Ri(Si) − 2 xˆ) for all Si ⊂ N . Multiplying this inequality by β/2 ≥ 1, we
obtain β yˆi ≥ Vi(Si)γi (β Ri(Si)/2 − β xˆ) ≥ Vi(Si)γi (Ri(Si) − β xˆ) for all Si ⊂ N .
The last inequality shows that the solution (β xˆ, β yˆ) satisfies the second set of
constraints for nest i in problem (3.3).
Collecting the three cases together, the solution (β xˆ, β yˆ) satisfies the second
set of constraints for nest i in problem (3.3). Noting that our choice of nest i is
arbitrary, the second set of constraints in problem (3.3) is satisfied by the solution
(β xˆ, β yˆ). Finally, since the solution (xˆ, yˆ) is optimal to problem (3.4), we have
v0 xˆ ≥
∑
i∈M yˆi, which implies that v0 β xˆ ≥
∑
i∈M β yˆi. Therefore, the solution
(β xˆ, β yˆ) satisfies the first constraint in problem (3.3) as well and we obtain the
desired result.
3.12.5 Knapsack Problems with Equality Constraints
In this section, we begin by giving a dynamic program that obtains the optimal
solution to problem (3.13) in O(n vUi ) time. Following this result, we develop a
tractable method to obtain approximate solutions to problem (3.15). To obtain
the optimal solution to problem (3.13) through a dynamic program, we let ζi(k, bi)
be the optimal objective value of problem (3.13) when we focus only on the first
k products in this problem and replace the right side of the constraint with bi. In
other words, we have
ζi(k, bi) = max
Si⊂{1,...,k}
{∑
j∈Si
rij vij : vi0 +
∑
j∈Si
vij = bi
}
with the convention that ζi(k, bi) = −∞ when the problem on the right side above
is infeasible. We note that ζi(n, i) corresponds to the optimal objective value of
problem (3.13). In this case, ζi(k, bi) satisfies the dynamic programming recursion
ζi(k, bi) = max
{
rik vik + ζi(k − 1, bi − vik), ζi(k − 1, bi)
}
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with the boundary condition that ζi(0, vi0) = 0 and ζi(0, bi) = −∞ for all bi ∈
{0, 1, . . . , vUi } \ {vi0}. We can use the dynamic programming recursion above to
compute ζi(n, bi) for all bi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , vUi } in O(n vUi ) time. In this case, the values
in the set {ζi(n, bi) : bi = 0, 1, . . . , vUi } correspond to the values {Gi(i) : i =
0, 1, . . . , vUi }, as desired. The dynamic program above is similar to the one that is
used for solving the partition and knapsack problems; see [23].
In the rest of this section, we focus on obtaining approximate solutions to
problem (3.15). For notational brevity, we omit the subscripts for the nest and use
the decision variables z = (z1, . . . , zn) to consider the problem
Gˆl = max
{
n∑
j=1
rj vj zj : δ
l−1 ≤ v0 +
n∑
j=1
vj zj ≤ δl, z ∈ {0, 1}n
}
. (3.32)
We are interested in finding a feasible solution to the problem above whose objec-
tive value deviates from the optimal objective value by no more than a factor of
δ. To that end, we begin by classifying the products in the problem above into
two categories. A product j satisfying vj > (δ − 1) δl−1 is called a large product,
whereas a product j satisfying vj ≤ (δ − 1) δl−1 is called a small product. We
use NL and NS to respectively denote the sets of large and small products, with
N = NL ∪ NS. We observe that an optimal solution to problem (3.32) cannot
include dδ/(δ − 1)e or more large products. Otherwise, the constraint in problem
(3.32) evaluates to more than dδ/(δ − 1)e (δ − 1) δl−1 ≥ δl, violating its upper
bound. For notational brevity, we set q = dδ/(δ − 1)e throughout this section so
that an optimal solution to problem (3.32) cannot include q or more large products.
To obtain a tractable approximation to problem (3.32), we consider a special
linear programming relaxation of this problem. In particular, we choose a subset
JL ⊂ NL of large products and a subset JS ⊂ NS of small products and solve the
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problem
max
n∑
j=1
rj vj zj (3.33)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
vj zj ≤ δl
zj = 1 ∀ j ∈ JL ∪ JS
zj = 0 ∀ j ∈ NL \ JL
0 ≤ zj ≤ 1(rj vj ≤ min
k∈JS
rk vk) ∀ j ∈ NS \ JS.
The problem above is a continuous knapsack problem with only an upper bound
constraint and the values of some of the variables are fixed at zero or one. In
particular, the decision variables corresponding to the products in JL and JS are
set at one. The decision variables corresponding to the large products in NL \ JL
are set to zero. If the objective function coefficient of a small product in NS \JS is
smaller than the smallest of the objective function coefficient of the small products
in JS, then the decision variable corresponding to this small product is allowed to
take values between zero and one. Otherwise, the decision variable corresponding
to this product is fixed at zero. Noting that the utility of product j in problem
(3.33) is given by rj vj and the utility-to-space consumption ratio of product j is
given by rj, we can solve problem (3.33) by using the following procedure. We
put all of the products in JL ∪ JS into the knapsack and drop these products
from consideration. Also, we drop the products in NL \ JL from consideration
immediately. We order the products in NS with respect to their utilities. If there
are any products in NS \ JS whose utilities exceed the smallest of the utilities
in JS, then we drop these products from consideration as well. Considering the
remaining products in NS \ JS, we order these products with respect to their
utility-to-space consumption ratios and fill the knapsack starting from the products
with the largest utility-to-space consumption ratios. Therefore, assuming that we
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already have the orderings of the items with respect to their utilities and utility-
to-space consumption ratios, we can solve problem (3.33) in O(n) time. It is also
useful to observe that the optimal solution to problem (3.33) that we obtain in
this fashion includes at most one fractional component. The continuous knapsack
problem in (3.33) is inspired by [17], where the authors use a similar continuous
knapsack problem to construct polynomial-time approximation schemes for multi-
dimensional knapsack problems. We use zˆ(JL, JS) to denote the optimal solution
to problem (3.33), where our notation emphasizes the fact that the solution to this
problem depends on the choice of JL and JS.
Using the solution zˆ(JL, JS), we define the assortment Sˆ(JL, JS) = {j ∈ N :
zˆj(J
L, JS) = 1}, including to the products that take strictly positive and integer
values in the solution zˆ(JL, JS). By using the discussion above, for given JL and
JS, we can compute Sˆ(JL, JS) in O(n) time. We use ℘L to denote the set of subsets
of NL with cardinality not exceeding q. Similarly, we use ℘S to denote the set of
subsets of NS with cardinality not exceeding q. In this case, the next proposition
shows that the collection of assortments {Sˆ(JL, JS) : JL ∈ ℘L, JS ∈ ℘S} includes
a feasible solution to problem (3.32) such that the objective value provided by this
feasible solution deviates from the optimal objective value of problem (3.32) by at
most a factor of δ.
Proposition 3. Assuming that problem (3.32) has a feasible solution, there ex-
ists an assortment in the collection {Sˆ(JL, JS) : JL ∈ ℘L, JS ∈ ℘S} such that
this assortment yields a feasible solution to problem (3.32) and the objective value
provided by this assortment deviates from the optimal objective value of problem
(3.32) by at most a factor of δ. Furthermore, all of the assortments in the collection
{Sˆ(JL, JS) : JL ∈ ℘L, JS ∈ ℘S} can be constructed in O(q2 n2q+1) time.
Proof. By the definitions of ℘L and ℘S, we have |℘L| = |℘S| = O(q nq). Therefore,
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there are O(q2 n2q) assortments in the collection {Sˆ(JL, JS) : JL ∈ ℘L, JS ∈ ℘S}.
Noting the discussion right before the proposition, each one of these assortments
can be constructed in O(n) time. Thus, all of the assortments in the collection
{Sˆ(JL, JS) : JL ∈ ℘L, JS ∈ ℘S} can be constructed in O(q2 n2q+1) time.
Letting z˜ be the optimal solution to problem (3.32), we define the assortment
S˜ corresponding to this solution as S˜ = {j ∈ N : z˜j = 1}. We let J˜L and
J˜S to respectively be the large and small products in the assortment S˜. By the
discussion that follows problem (3.32), we must have |J˜L| ≤ q, implying that
J˜L ∈ ℘L. If we assume that |J˜S| ≤ q, then we have J˜S ∈ ℘S as well. Thus, the
assortment Sˆ(J˜L, J˜S) is included in the collection {Sˆ(JL, JS) : JL ∈ ℘L, JS ∈
℘S}. Furthermore, by the definitions of zˆ(JL, JS) and Sˆ(JL, JS), the assortment
Sˆ(J˜L, J˜S) includes all of the products in J˜L and J˜S, which implies that Sˆ(J˜L, J˜S) ⊃
J˜L ∪ J˜S = S˜ so that Sˆ(J˜L, J˜S) includes all of the products in S˜. Thus, Sˆ(J˜L, J˜S)
must provide an objective value for problem (3.32) that is at least as large as
the one provided by S˜ and we conclude that Sˆ(J˜L, J˜S) is an optimal solution
to problem (3.32). This establishes the desired result under the assumption that
|J˜S| ≤ q. In the rest of the proof, we assume that |J˜S| > q.
We let AS be the subset of J˜S that includes the q products in J˜S with the largest
utilities. In other words, we have AS ⊂ J˜S, |AS| = q and rj vj ≤ mink∈AS rk vk for
all j ∈ J˜S \AS. Consider the solution zˆ(J˜L, AS) that we obtain by solving problem
(3.33) with JL = J˜L and JS = AS. If this solution has a fractional component j′,
then by the fourth set of constraints in problem (3.33), this component must satisfy
rj′ vj′ ≤ rk vk for all k ∈ AS. Also, the component j′ must be in NS \ AS so that
the product j′ is a small product. In this case, noting that the optimal objective
value of problem (3.32) is given by Gˆl, we have Gˆl =
∑
j∈J˜L rj vj +
∑
j∈J˜S rj vj =∑
j∈J˜L rj vj +
∑
j∈AS rj vj +
∑
j∈J˜S\AS rj vj ≥
∑
j∈AS rj vj ≥ q rj′ vj′ , where the first
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equality is by the fact that S˜ = J˜L ∪ J˜S is an optimal solution to problem (3.32)
and the second inequality is by the fact that rj′ vj′ ≤ rk vk for all k ∈ AS and
|AS| = q. The last chain of inequalities yields rj′ vj′ ≤ Gˆl/q.
We claim that the assortment Sˆ(J˜L, AS) provides a feasible solution to problem
(3.32). First, we show this claim under the assumption that the solution zˆ(J˜L, AS)
consumes all of the knapsack capacity in problem (3.33) when we solve this prob-
lem with JL = J˜L and JS = AS. We use j′ to denote the fractional component of
zˆ(J˜L, AS) when there is one. By the discussion in the paragraph above, j′ must be a
small product. Since the solution zˆ(J˜L, AS) consumes all of the knapsack capacity,
we have δl =
∑n
j=1 vj zˆj(J˜
L, AS) ≤∑j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) vj+vj′ ≤∑j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) +(δ−1) δl−1,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that Sˆ(J˜L, AS) includes all compo-
nents of zˆ(J˜L, AS) with the exception of j′ and the second inequality follows from
the fact that product j′ is a small product. From the last chain of inequalities, it fol-
lows that
∑
j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) vj ≥ δl−(δ−1) δl−1 = δl−1 so that the assortment Sˆ(J˜L, AS)
satisfies the lower bound constraint in problem (3.32). Furthermore, noting that
δl ≥ ∑nj=1 vj zˆj(J˜L, AS) = ∑j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) vj + vj′ zj′(J˜L, AS) ≥ ∑j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) vj, the
assortment Sˆ(J˜L, AS) satisfies the upper bound constraint in problem (3.32) as
well and the claim follows.
Second, we show the claim under the assumption that the solution zˆ(J˜L, AS)
does not consume all of the knapsack capacity in problem (3.33) when we solve
this problem with JL = J˜L and JS = AS. We recall that the discussion at the
beginning of the third paragraph of the proof shows that rj vj ≤ mink∈AS rk vk for
all j ∈ J˜S \AS. Thus, if we solve problem (3.33) with JL = J˜L and JS = AS, then
by the fourth set of constraints in this problem, the decision variables corresponding
to the products in J˜S \ AS are free to take values between zero and one. In this
case, since the solution zˆ(J˜L, AS) does not consume all of the knapsack capacity
128
in problem (3.33) and all of the objective function coefficients are positive, the
decision variables corresponding to the products in J˜S \ AS must take value one.
Furthermore, the decision variables corresponding to the products in J˜L and AS
are fixed at one when we solve problem (3.33) with JL = J˜L and JS = AS.
Therefore, if we solve problem (3.33) with JL = J˜L and JS = AS, then the
decision variables corresponding to the products in J˜L, AS and J˜S \AS take value
one, which implies that δl−1 ≤ ∑j∈S˜ vj = ∑j∈J˜L vj +∑j∈AS vj +∑j∈J˜S\AS vj ≤∑n
j=1 vj zj(J˜
L, AS) =
∑
j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) vj, where the first inequality follows from the
fact that S˜ is an optimal solution to problem (3.32), the first equality uses the fact
that S˜ = J˜L ∪ J˜S, the second inequality follows from the fact that the products
in J˜L, AS and J˜S \ AS all take value one when we solve problem (3.33) with
JL = J˜L and JS = AS and the last equality follows from the fact that if the
solution zˆ(J˜L, AS) does not consume all of the knapsack capacity, then it cannot
have any fractional components. On the other hand, since the solution zˆ(J˜L, AS)
does not have any fractional components and it is an optimal solution to problem
(3.33), we obtain δl ≥∑nj=1 vj zj(J˜L, AS) = ∑j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) vj. The last two chains of
inequalities show that the assortment Sˆ(J˜L, AS) satisfies the constraint in problem
(3.32) and the claim holds.
We proceed to checking the objective function value provided by the assortment
Sˆ(J˜L, AS). To that end, letting ζ(JL, JS) be the optimal objective value of problem
(3.33), we begin by arguing that Gˆl ≤ ζ(J˜L, AS). To establish this inequality, we
observe that by the definitions of J˜L and J˜S, the products in J˜L and J˜S take value
one in the optimal solution to problem (3.32). On the other hand, if we solve
problem (3.33) with JL = J˜L and JS = AS, then the products in J˜L and AS take
value one in the optimal solution. Furthermore, as discussed at the beginning of
the previous paragraph, the products in J˜S \ AS are free to take values between
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zero and one when we solve problem (3.33). Thus, the optimal solution to problem
(3.32) is a feasible solution to problem (3.33) when we solve this problem with
JL = J˜L and JS = AS, which implies that Gˆl ≤ ζ(J˜L, AS) as desired. In this
case, using j′ to denote the fractional component of zˆ(J˜L, AS) when there is one,
we obtain Gˆl ≤ ζ(J˜L, AS) =
∑n
j=1 rj vj zˆj(J˜
L, AS) ≤ ∑j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) rj vj + rj′ vj′ ≤∑
j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) rj vj + Gˆl/q, where the last inequality follows by noting that rj′ vj′ ≤
Gˆl/q, which is shown in the third paragraph of the proof. Focusing on the first and
last expressions in the last chain of inequalities and noting that q = dδ/(δ − 1)e,
we get
∑
j∈Sˆ(J˜L,AS) rj vj ≥ ((q − 1)/q)Gˆl ≥ Gˆl/δ. So, the assortment Sˆ(J˜L, AS)
corresponds to a feasible solution to problem (3.32), providing an objective value
to this problem that deviates from the optimal objective value by no more than a
factor of δ. Furthermore, noting that |J˜L| ≤ q and |AS| = q, we have Sˆ(J˜L, AS) ∈
{Sˆ(JL, JS) : JL ∈ ℘L, JS ∈ ℘S} and the result follows.
3.12.6 Proof of Theorem 3.8.2
By using the same argument at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 3.7.3, it
follows that xˆ ≥ 0. Fix an arbitrary nest i. Choose any assortment Si ⊂ N within
this nest. First, we consider the case where Si 6= ∅. Fix l = lLi , . . . , lUi such that
δl−1 ≤ vi0 +
∑
j∈Si vij ≤ δl. Since (xˆ, yˆ) is the optimal solution to problem (3.4)
after replacing the collection of assortments {Ait : t ∈ Ti} in the second set of
constraints with the assortments {Sˆi` : ` = lLi , . . . , lUi } ∪ {∅}, this solution satisfies
the second set of constraints in problem (3.4) for nest i and the assortment Sˆil.
Therefore, we have
yˆi ≥ Vi(Sˆil)γi(Ri(Sˆil)− xˆ) = Vi(Sˆil)γi−1
(∑
j∈Sˆil
rij vij
)
− Vi(Sˆil)γi xˆ.
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Multiplying both sides of this inequality by δγ¯+1, we obtain
δγ¯+1 yˆi ≥ δγ¯ Vi(Sˆil)γi−1
(
δ
∑
j∈Sˆil
rij vij
)
− δγ¯+1 Vi(Sˆil)γi xˆ. (3.34)
We proceed to bound each one of the terms δ
∑
j∈Sˆil rij vij, Vi(Sˆil)
γi−1 and Vi(Sˆil)γi
in the inequality above. By the definition of Sˆil, we have
δ
∑
j∈Sˆil
rij vij ≥ Gˆil = max
S′i⊂N
{∑
j∈S′i
rij vij : δ
l−1 ≤ vi0 +
∑
j∈S′i
vij ≤ δl
}
≥
∑
j∈Si
rij vij,
(3.35)
where the second inequality follows by noting that l is chosen such that δl−1 ≤
vi0 +
∑
j∈Si vij ≤ δl. The definition of Sˆil also implies that δl−1 ≤ vi0 +
∑
j∈Sˆil vij =
Vi(Sˆil) ≤ δl. In this case, if we have γi ≤ 1, then Vi(Sˆil)γi−1 ≥ (δl)γi−1. If, on the
other hand, we have γi > 1, then Vi(Sˆil)
γi−1 ≥ (δl−1)γi−1 = (δl)γi−1 δ−(γi−1). So,
combining the two cases, we bound Vi(Sˆil)
γi−1 by
Vi(Sˆil)
γi−1 ≥ (δl)γi−1 δ−[γi−1]+ ,
where we use [a]+ = max{a, 0}. Noting also that Vi(Sˆil)γi ≤ (δl)γi , using these
bounds on Vi(Sˆil)
γi−1 and Vi(Sˆil)γi together with the inequality in (3.35) in (3.34),
we obtain
δγ¯+1 yˆi ≥ δγ¯ (δl)γi−1 δ−[γi−1]+
(∑
j∈Si
rij vij
)
− δγ¯+1 (δl)γi xˆ
= δγ¯ (δl)γi−1 δ−[γi−1]
+
(∑
j∈Si
rij vij
)
− δγ¯+γi+1 (δl−1)γi xˆ. (3.36)
Our choice of l at the beginning of the proof implies that δl−1 ≤ vi0 +
∑
j∈Si vij =
Vi(Si) ≤ δl. In this case, if we have γi ≤ 1, then Vi(Si)γi−1 ≤ (δl−1)γi−1 =
(δl)γi−1 δ1−γi . If, on the other hand, we have γi > 1, then Vi(Si)γi−1 ≤ (δl)γi−1.
Combining the two cases yields Vi(Si)
γi−1 ≤ (δl)γi−1 δ[1−γi]+ so that we can bound
(δl)γi−1 by
(δl)γi−1 ≥ δ−[1−γi]+ Vi(Si)γi−1.
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Furthermore, noting that (δl−1)γi ≤ Vi(Si)γi , we use these bounds on (δl)γi−1 and
(δl−1)γi in the two terms on the right side of (3.36) to obtain
δγ¯+1 yˆi ≥ δγ¯ δ−[γi−1]+ δ−[1−γi]+Vi(Si)γi−1
(∑
j∈Si
rij vij
)
− δγ¯+γi+1 Vi(Si)γi xˆ.
If we have γi ≤ 1, then γ¯− [γi− 1]+− [1− γi]+ = γ¯− 1 + γi ≥ 0, where we use the
fact that γ¯ > 1. On the other hand, if we have γi > 1, then γ¯−[γi−1]+−[1−γi]+ =
γ¯ − γi + 1 ≥ 0 since γ¯ ≥ γi. Therefore, δγ¯ δ−[γi−1]+ δ−[1−γi]+ ≥ 1. We also have
δγ¯+γi+1 ≤ δ2γ¯+1. Thus, the last inequality above yields
δγ¯+1 yˆi ≥ Vi(Si)γi−1
(∑
j∈Si
rij vij
)
− δ2γ¯+1 Vi(Si)γi xˆ.
Since
∑
j∈Si rijvij/Vi(Si) = Ri(Si), the inequality above shows that the solution
(δ2γ¯+1 xˆ, δγ¯+1yˆ) satisfies the second set of constraints in problem (3.3) for the as-
sortment Si and nest i, as long as Si 6= ∅.
Second, we consider the case where Si = ∅. The solution (xˆ, yˆ) satisfies the
second set of constraints in problem (3.4) for the empty assortment within nest i, in
which case, we obtain yˆi ≥ Vi(∅)γi (Ri(∅)−xˆ). If we multiply this inequality by δγ¯+1
and note that Ri(∅) = 0, then we have δγ¯+1 yˆi ≥ δγ¯+1 Vi(∅)γi Ri(∅)−δγ¯+1 Vi(∅)γi xˆ =
Vi(∅)γi Ri(∅)− δγ¯+1 Vi(∅)γi xˆ. Replacing the term δγ¯+1 on the right side of the last
inequality with an even larger term δ2γ¯+1, it follows that
δγ¯+1 yˆi ≥ Vi(∅)γi Ri(∅)− δ2γ¯+1Vi(∅)γi xˆ.
Therefore, the solution (δ2γ¯+1 xˆ, δγ¯+1yˆ) satisfies the second set of constraints in
problem (3.3) for assortment Si = ∅ and nest i. Combining the two cases above
and noting that our choice of nest i and assortment Si is arbitrary, we conclude
that the solution (δ2γ¯+1 xˆ, δγ¯+1yˆ) satisfies the second set of constraints in problem
(3.3).
Since the solution (xˆ, yˆ) is optimal to problem (3.4), we have v0 xˆ ≥
∑
i∈M yˆi.
This implies that v0 δ
2γ¯+1 xˆ ≥ v0 δγ¯+1 xˆ ≥
∑
i∈M δ
γ¯+1 yˆi, in which case, the solution
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(δ2γ¯+1 xˆ, δγ¯+1yˆ) satisfies the first constraint in problem (3.3) as well and we obtain
the desired result.
We hope that it will be possible to extend the techniques developed in this
paper to solve assortment optimization problems under richer choice models. One
possible extension is to consider the case where the dissimilarity parameter of a par-
ticular nest depends on the assortment offered within this nest, in which case, the
dissimilarity parameter of nest i takes the form γi(Si). It turns out that there are
certain cases where we can deal with such assortment-dependent dissimilarity pa-
rameters. For example, consider the case where γi(Si) depends on Si only through
the cardinality of Si so that γi(Si) = fi(|Si|) for some fi(·). We assume that fi(·)
takes values over [0, 1], indicating that γi(Si) ≤ 1 for all Si ⊂ N so that we have
purely competitive products. Furthermore, we assume that vi0 = 0 for all i ∈ M ,
which implies that the nests are fully-captured. To obtain the optimal solution
under assortment-dependent dissimilarity parameters, we can solve problem (3.3)
after replacing γi in the second set of constraints with γi(Si). In this case, we ob-
serve that these constraints are equivalent to yi ≥ maxSi⊂N Vi(Si)γi(Si) (Ri(Si)− z)
for all i ∈M . Using the fact that γi(Si) depends only on the cardinality of Si, we
can alternatively write the last set of constraints as
yi ≥ max
Si⊂N :|Si|=ci
Vi(Si)
fi(ci) (Ri(Si)− z) ∀ ci = 1, . . . , n, i ∈M.
Subsequent to our work, [20] followed up on this paper by considering constrained
assortment optimization problems under the nested logit model. In particular, they
consider the case where there is a cardinality constraint on the assortment offered
in each nest, the products are purely competitive and the nests are fully-captured.
The maximization problem on the right side of the constraint above appears when
they deal with an assortment optimization problem where the cardinality of the
assortment offered in nest i is constrained to be ci and fi(ci) is the dissimilarity
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parameter of this nest. Using a proof technique that is entirely different than
our approach in this paper, Theorem 5 in [20] shows that for a given value of ci,
it is possible to construct a collection of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ T cii }
such that this collection always includes the optimal solution to the maximization
problem on the right side of the constraints above. Furthermore, the collection
{Ait : t ∈ T cii } includes at most n2 assortments. Therefore, we can equivalently
write the constraints above as yi ≥ Vi(Si)fi(ci) (Ri(Si) − z) for all ci = 1, . . . , n,
Si ∈ {Ait : t ∈ T cii }, i ∈ M . This discussion implies that if the dissimilarity
parameter of a nest depends on the cardinality of the assortment offered in this
nest and we have purely competitive products and fully-captured nests, then we
can obtain the optimal assortment by replacing the second set of constraints in
problem (3.3) with the constraints yi ≥ Vi(Si)fi(ci) (Ri(Si)−z) for all ci = 1, . . . , n,
Si ∈ {Ait : t ∈ T cii }, i ∈ M and solving the corresponding linear program. Since
there are at most n2 assortments in the collection {Ait : t ∈ T cii }, this linear
program has 1 +m decision variables and at most 1 +mn3 constraints.
Another possible case where we can deal with assortment-dependent dissimi-
larity parameters occurs when a certain subset of products Ci ⊂ N in nest i is
designated as a critical subset and if any product in Ci is offered, then the dissim-
ilarity parameter of nest i takes value Γ1i , whereas if no product in Ci is offered,
then the dissimilarity parameter of nest i takes value Γ0i . In this case, the second
set of constraints in problem (3.3) are equivalent to the two sets of constraints
yi ≥ max
Si⊂N :|Si∩Ci|≥1
Vi(Si)
Γ1i (Ri(Si)− z) ∀ i ∈M
yi ≥ max
Si⊂N :|Si∩Ci|=0
Vi(Si)
Γ0i (Ri(Si)− z) ∀ i ∈M.
[20] consider parent product constraints in assortment optimization problems under
the nested logit model. Parent product constraints designate a subset of products
in each nest as parent products. Each parent product has a set of child products.
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A child product cannot be offered unless its parent product is offered. They show
that it is tractable to solve assortment optimization problems under the nested logit
model with parent product constraints. By using their approach, it is possible to
show that we can construct a collection of candidate assortments {Ait : t ∈ T 1i }
such that this collection always includes the optimal solution to the maximization
problem on the right side of the first set of constraints above. Furthermore, the
collection {Ait : t ∈ T 1i } includes at most n2 assortments. On the other hand,
the maximization problem on the right side of the second set of constraints can
be solved by dropping the products in Ci from consideration and focusing only on
the products in N \Ci. In this case, by using the approach used in this paper, we
can show that a nested-by-revenue assortment solves the maximization problem on
right side of the second set of constraints above, as long as we focus on the products
in N \ Ci. Therefore, we can construct a collection of candidate assortments
{Ait : t ∈ T 0i } such that this collection always includes the optimal solution to
the maximization problem on the right side of the second set of constraints above
and there are at most 1 + n assortments in this collection. Thus, the two sets
of constraints above can succinctly be written as yi ≥ Vi(Si)Γ1i (Ri(Si)− z) for all
Si ∈ {Ait : t ∈ T 1i }, i ∈M and yi ≥ Vi(Si)Γ0i (Ri(Si)−z) for all Si ∈ {Ait : t ∈ T 0i },
i ∈M . In this case, we can obtain the optimal assortment replacing the second set
of constraints in problem (3.3) with the constraints yi ≥ Vi(Si)Γ1i (Ri(Si)−z) for all
Si ∈ {Ait : t ∈ T 1i }, i ∈M and yi ≥ Vi(Si)Γ0i (Ri(Si)−z) for all Si ∈ {Ait : t ∈ T 0i },
i ∈M and solving the corresponding linear program. This linear program has 1+m
decision variables and 1 +m (1 +n+n2) constraints since there are respectively at
most n2 and 1 + n constraints in the collections {Ait : t ∈ T 1i } and {Ait : t ∈ T 0i }.
We can extend this approach to cover the case where the number of possible values
of the dissimilarity parameter is more than two. For example, we can extend this
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approach to cover the case where the number of possible values of the dissimilarity
parameter of nest i are {Γ0,Γ1, . . . ,ΓK} and we have γi(Si) = Γ0i when |Si∩Ci| = 0,
whereas γi(Si) = Γ
k
i when |Si∩Ci| = k for k = 1, . . . , K−1 and γi(Si) = ΓKi when
|Si ∩ Ci| ≥ K.
The previous two paragraphs describe some cases where we can deal with
assortment-dependent dissimilarity parameters, as long as we have purely com-
petitive products and fully-captured nests. One direction for further research is to
investigate other cases where we can allow the dissimilarity parameter of a nest to
depend on the assortment offered within this nest. Such cases will clearly provide
more flexibility in modeling customer choices. Another possible direction for fur-
ther investigation is to work with more general forms of the nested logit model,
such as a mixture of nested logit models or the cross nested logit models. It is not
immediately clear how the approach that we used in this paper can be extended
to solve assortment optimization problems under the more general forms of the
nested logit model. In particular, our approach exploits the fact that the second
set of constraints in problem (3.3) separates by the nests for a fixed value of the
decision variable x. We loose this separable structure when solving assortment
optimization problems under more general forms of the nested logit model. Thus,
solving assortment optimization problems under general forms of the nested logit
model is still open for further research.
In Section 3.5, we show that nested-by-revenue assortments are optimal when
the dissimilarity parameters are less than one and the nests are fully-captured,
but by the discussion in the previous paragraph, this result does not hold under
assortment-dependent dissimilarity parameters. In Section 3.6.2, we show that
nested-by-revenue assortments provide the performance guarantee given by the
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expression in (3.6) when we have fully-captured nests. For the problem instance
above, one can check that the expression in (3.6) is no larger than 10/9, irrespective
of the value of k. However, the discussion in the previous paragraph shows that
nested-by-revenue assortments perform arbitrarily badly when we choose a large
value for k, indicating that they cannot provide a performance guarantee of 10/9.
In Section 3.7, we show that the collection of assortments {Nkij : k ∈ N, j =
0, . . . , k} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ N} provide a performance guarantee of two when the
dissimilarity parameters are less than one. Noting the definition of Nkij at the end
of Section 3.7, the collection of assortments {Nkij : k ∈ N, j = 0, . . . , k}∪{{j} : j ∈
N} is given by {∅, {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {2}, {2, 3}, {3}}, but as we describe in the
previous paragraph, all of the assortments in this collection can perform arbitrarily
badly when we choose a large value for k. So, they cannot provide a performance
guarantee of two under assortment-dependent dissimilarity parameters. Finally,
in Section 3.8.1, we show that the same collection of assortments provide the
performance guarantee given by the expression in (3.12). For the problem instance
above, we can check that the expression in (3.12) is equal to two, irrespective of
the value of k. However, as we just described, these assortments cannot provide a
performance guarantee of two.
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CHAPTER 4
QUALITY CONSISTENT PRICING UNDER THE NESTED LOGIT
MODEL
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider pricing problems when customers choose according
to the nested logit model and there is a quality consistency constraint on the
prices charged for the products. In the quality consistency constraint that we
impose on the prices, there is an intrinsic ordering between the qualities of the
products. The quality consistency constraint ensures that the prices charged for
the products of higher quality are also larger. The goal is to find the prices to charge
for the products to maximize the expected revenue obtained from a customer, while
making sure that the prices satisfy the quality consistency constraint.
We consider two types of quality consistency constraint. In the first type of
constraint, there is an intrinsic ordering between the qualities of the products in
each nest. We refer to this quality consistency constraint as price ladders inside
nests. Figure 4.1.b illustrates this quality consistency constraint with three prod-
ucts in each nest and the price of product j in nest i is denoted by pij. The products
in each nest are indexed such that the third product is of higher quality than the
second product in the same nest, which is, in turn, of higher quality than the
first product. Therefore, the price of the third product should be larger than the
price of the second product, which should, in turn, be larger than the price of the
first product. There is no dictated ordering between the qualities or prices of the
products in different nest. As an example of a situation where this type of quality
consistency constraint becomes relevant, we consider the case where the nests cor-
respond to different brands and the products within a particular nest correspond
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to the variants of a particular brand with different qualities. There is a verifiable
ordering between the qualities of the different variants of a particular brand and
the customers expect that the prices for the variants of higher quality should also
be larger. On the other hand, it is difficult to compare the variants of different
brands in terms of quality and there is no reason for the customers to expect a
particular ordering between the prices for the variants of different brands.
In the second type of constraint, there is an intrinsic ordering between the
qualities of the nests, but there is no clear ordering between the qualities of the
products in the same nest. We refer to this quality consistency constraint as price
ladders between nests. Figure 4.1.c illustrates this quality consistency constraint
with three nests. The nests are indexed such that the third nest corresponds to a
higher quality level than the second nest, which, in turn, corresponds to a higher
quality level than the first nest. So, the price for any product in the third nest
should be larger than the price for any product in the second nest, which should,
in turn, be larger than the price for any product in the first nest. As an example
of a situation where this type of quality consistency constraint becomes relevant,
we consider the case where the nests correspond to different quality levels and the
products within a particular nest correspond to products that differ in cosmetic
or personal features, such as color. The customers expect that the prices for the
products in a nest corresponding to a higher quality level are larger than the prices
for the products in a nest corresponding to a lower quality level, but there is no
reason for the customers to expect a particular ordering between the prices for the
products in a particular nest since these products differ in cosmetic or personal
features.
Although the two types of quality consistency constraints cover a variety of
useful situations, we observe that there can be other quality consistency constraints
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Figure 4.1: Nested logit model, price ladders inside nests and price ladders between
nests.
that are not covered by our results. In our conclusions, we discuss some possible
extensions of our quality consistency constraints.
In this chapter, we give algorithms to find the optimal prices to charge under
both types of quality consistency constraints. In our setting, there are m nests
and n products in each nest. The price of each product is chosen within a finite
set of possible prices and there are q possible prices for each product. Therefore,
the vector of prices charged for the products in a nest takes values in <n and
each component of this vector takes one of the q possible values, which implies
that there are O(qn) possible price vectors that we can charge for the products in
a nest. Under price ladders within nests, we show that the optimal price vector
to charge in a nest is one of at most nq candidate price vectors and all of these
candidate price vectors can be constructed by solving a linear program through the
parametric simplex method. The linear program that we use to come up with the
candidate price vectors has O(nq) decision variables and O(nq2) constraints. This
result reduces the number of possible price vectors to consider for each nest from
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O(qn) to O(nq). However, although the optimal price vector to charge in each nest
is one of O(nq) candidate price vectors, computing the optimal prices to charge
over all nests can still be challenging, since there are O((nq)m) different ways of
combining nq candidate price vectors from m nests. To deal with this difficulty, we
give a linear program with O(m) decision variables and O(mnq) constraints that
finds the optimal combination of price vectors to charge in different nests. Thus,
we solve a linear program with O(nq) decision variables and O(nq2) constraints
by using the parametric simplex method to come up with O(nq) candidate price
vectors for each nest. We find the optimal combination of candidate price vectors
to charge in different nests by solving another linear program with O(m) decision
variables and O(mnq) constraints.
Pricing problems under price ladders between nests are considerably more dif-
ficult than the ones under price ladders inside nests since price ladders between
nests create interactions between the prices charged for the products in different
nests. Under price ladders between nests, we show that the optimal price vector
to charge in a nest is one of at most nq3 candidate price vectors and all of these
candidate price vectors can be constructed by solving a linear program through
the parametric simplex method. The linear program that we use to come up with
the candidate price vectors has O(nq) decision variables and O(n) constraints. To
find the optimal combination of price vectors to charge in different nests, we give
a linear program with O(mq) decision variables and O(mnq4) constraints. In our
numerical experiments, we consider test problems with as many as m = 6 nests,
n = 30 products in each nest and q = 30 possible prices for each product, yielding
a total of 180 products. Under price ladders inside nests, we can compute the op-
timal prices to charge for the products in about two seconds, whereas under price
ladders between nests, we can compute the optimal prices in about two minutes.
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In addition to providing algorithms that find the optimal prices under price
ladders inside nests and between nests, we make practically useful contributions
through our formulation of the pricing problem. In our formulation, the price of
each product is chosen within a finite set of possible prices and the set of possible
prices for a product is defined by the modeler. The modeler can design the set of
possible prices for a product to correspond to the prices that are commonly used
in retail, such as prices that end in 99 cents or prices that are in increments of
10 dollars. Furthermore, the nested logit model commonly assumes that there is a
parametric relationship between the attractiveness of a product and its price. For
example, it is common to assume that if the price charged for product j in nest i
is pij, then the attractiveness of this product is given by exp(αij − βij pij), where
αij and βij are fixed parameters; see [34] and [21]. Our formulation of the pricing
problem does not assume a parametric relationship between the attractiveness of
a product and its price, allowing the attractiveness of a product to depend on its
price in an arbitrary fashion.
4.2 Literature Review
There is a significant amount of work on solving pricing problems under variants
of the multinomial and nested logit models. Under the multinomial logit model,
[25] observe that the expected revenue is not a concave function of the prices for
the products. [55] and [12] solve the pricing problem by expressing the expected
revenue as a function of the market shares of the products and showing that the
expected revenue is a concave function of the market shares. [8] and [63] give
tractable solution methods for joint assortment optimization and pricing problems
under the multinomial logit model, where the set of products offered to customers,
as well as the prices of the offered products, are decision variables. [68] discuss
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revenue management problems, where the prices charged for the products are dy-
namically adjusted over time as a function of the remaining time in the selling
horizon and the remaining inventory for the products. [10] show that pricing prob-
lems under the multinomial logit model with a finite set of possible prices can be
formulated as a linear program. [29] study pricing problems, where the attractive-
ness of a product depends on its price in a general fashion and there are constraints
on the expected number of sales for the products.
The literature on solving pricing problems under the nested logit model has
recently started growing. [34] study pricing problems under the assumption that
the products in the same nest have the same price sensitivity. They show that if the
products in the same nest have the same price sensitivity, then the pricing problem
can be formulated as a convex program. [21] consider the case where the products
in the same nest do not necessarily have the same price sensitivity. They show
that the expected revenue function can have multiple local maxima and show how
to find a local maximum of the expected revenue function. The authors also give
sufficient conditions that eliminate multiple local maxima. [47] develop algorithms
for computing solutions with a specified performance guarantee even when there
are multiple local maxima of the expected revenue function. [35] and [33] consider
pricing problems under the nested logit model, where the choice process proceeds
in more than two stages. The earlier work on pricing problems under the nested
logit model does not consider quality consistency constraints.
Charging quality consistent prices is practically important since such prices
convey a sense of fairness to customers. [48] consider quality consistent pricing
problems. Their work is motivated by a pricing problem in the automobile industry,
where the prices of the automobiles with richer features should also be larger. They
use a nonparametric choice model, show that the corresponding pricing problem
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with a quality consistency constraint is NP hard and provide an approximation
algorithm. [19] discuss fairness issues when providing upgrades to customers. In
the context of airline industry, they point out that if the customers need to be
upgraded, then the customers with low fare class reservations should be upgraded
to a relatively lower fare class, when compared with the customers with high fare
class reservations. They develop fluid models for revenue management problems
with upgrade possibilities. They show that if the prices satisfy a certain quality
consistency constraint, then their model upgrades customers with low fare class
reservations to a relatively lower fare class, when compared with the customers
with high fare class reservations.
A useful approach for solving optimization problems under the nested logit
model is to construct a small collection of candidate solutions for each nest and to
solve a linear program to combine the candidate solutions for the different nests.
[20] and [16] follow this approach for assortment optimization problems, where the
prices of the products are fixed and the goal is to find a set of products to offer
to customers to maximize the expected revenue obtained from a customer. The
development in this paper is based on this general approach as well, but there are
two important challenges that need to be overcome when using this approach for
pricing problems. First, constructing a small collection of candidate price vectors
to charge in each nest carefully exploits the structure of the pricing problem. In
particular, we make use of the fact that the attractiveness of a product is decreasing
in its price and it is not clear how to construct a small collection of candidate
price vectors when the attractiveness of a product is not necessarily decreasing
in its price. Second, under price ladders between nests, the prices charged in
different nests interact with each other since the price for any product in a nest
corresponding to a higher quality level should be larger than the price for any
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product in a nest corresponding to a lower quality level. Due to the interactions
between the prices charged in different nests, finding the optimal combination of
price vectors to choose in each nest becomes difficult. We address this difficulty
by using the linear programming formulation of a dynamic program that finds the
best combination of the candidate price vectors for the different nests.
4.3 Price Ladders Inside Nests
In this section, we consider the case with price ladders inside nests. In this setting,
there is an intrinsic ordering between the qualities of the products in the same nest
and the prices for the products of higher quality should also be larger. There is no
intrinsic ordering between the qualities or the prices of the products in different
nests.
4.3.1 Problem Formulation
There are m nests and we index the nests by M = {1, . . . ,m}. In each nest, there
are n products and we index the products in each nest by N = {1, . . . , n}. For each
product, there are q possible prices. The possible prices for a product are given by
Θ = {θ1, . . . , θq}. Without loss of generality, we index the possible prices so that
0 < θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θq. We use pij ∈ Θ to denote the price that we charge for
product j in nest i. If we charge price pij for product j in nest i, then the preference
weight of this product is given by vij(pij). If we charge a larger price for a product,
then its preference weight becomes smaller, implying that vij(θ
1) > vij(θ
2) > . . . >
vij(θ
q) > 0. Our notation so far implies that the number of products in each nest
is the same and the set of possible prices that we can charge for each product is
the same. However, this assumption is only for notational brevity and our results
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in the paper continue to hold with straightforward modifications when there are
different numbers of products in different nests and the sets of possible prices for
the different products are different.
We use pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) ∈ Θn to capture the price vector charged in nest i.
As a function of the price vector pi charged in nest i, we use Vi(pi) to denote the
total preference weight of the products in nest i, so that Vi(pi) =
∑
j∈N vij(pij).
Under the nested logit model, if we charge the price vector pi in nest i, then a
customer that has already decided to make a purchase in nest i chooses product
j in this nest with probability vij(pij)/Vi(pi). In this case, if we charge the price
vector pi in nest i and a customer has already decided to make a purchase in this
nest, then the expected revenue obtained from this customer is given by
Ri(pi) =
∑
j∈N
pij
vij(pij)
Vi(pi)
=
∑
j∈N pij vij(pij)
Vi(pi)
. (4.1)
For each nest i, the nested logit model has a parameter γi ∈ [0, 1] characteriz-
ing the degree of dissimilarity between the products in this nest. We use v0 to
denote the preference weight of the no purchase option. Under the nested logit
model, if we charge the price vectors (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Θm×n over all nests, then a
customer decides to make a purchase in nest i with probability Qi(p1, . . . , pm) =
Vi(pi)
γi/(v0 +
∑
l∈M Vl(pl)
γl). The last expression provides the probability that
a customer chooses nest i as a function of the prices charged for all products in
all nests. The parameter γi magnifies or dampens the preference weights of the
products in nest i.
According to the nested logit model, if we charge the price vectors (p1, . . . , pm)
over all nests, then a customer decides to make a purchase in nest i with probability
Qi(p1, . . . , pm) = Vi(pi)
γi/(v0 +
∑
l∈M Vl(pl)
γl). If the customer decides to make a
purchase in nest i, then the expected revenue obtained from this customer is Ri(pi).
Thus, if we charge the price vectors (p1, . . . , pm) over all nests, then the expected
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revenue from a customer is given by
Π(p1, . . . , pm) =
∑
i∈M
Qi(p1, . . . , pm)Ri(pi) =
∑
i∈M Vi(pi)
γi Ri(pi)
v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(pi)
γi
. (4.2)
Our goal is to find the price vectors (p1, . . . , pm) to charge over all nests to max-
imize the expected revenue above subject to the constraint that the price vector
charged in each nest satisfies a price ladder constraint. To formulate the price
ladder constraint, without loss of generality, we index the products in each nest
such that products with larger indices are of higher quality. In other words,
the products N = {1, . . . , n} in each nest are indexed in the order of increas-
ing quality. The price ladder constraint ensures that the price for a product of
higher quality is larger. That is, the price ladder constraint in nest i ensures that
pi1 ≤ pi2 ≤ . . . ≤ pin. Thus, the set of feasible price vectors in nest i can be written
as Fi = {pi ∈ Θn : pij ≥ pi,j−1 ∀ j ∈ N \ {1}}. We want to find the price vectors
to charge over all nests to maximize the expected revenue from a customer while
satisfying the price ladder constraint, yielding the problem
z∗ = max
(p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Θm×n :
pi ∈ Fi ∀ i ∈M
{
Π(p1, . . . , pm)
}
. (4.3)
In the problem above, the price of each product takes values in the discrete set
Θ. Furthermore, the objective function depends on the prices of the products in
a nonlinear fashion. Thus, this problem is a nonlinear combinatorial optimization
problem.
We emphasize two useful advantages of our formulation of problem (4.3). First,
since the price for each product is chosen among a set of possible prices given by
Θ and we can design Θ in any way we want, our formulation allows choosing the
prices of the products among the prices that are commonly used in retail, such as
prices that end in 99 cents or prices that are in increments of 10 dollars. Second,
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the nested logit model commonly assumes a fixed functional relationship between
the price of a product and its preference weight. For example, as a function of the
price pij of product j in nest i, it is common to assume that the preference weight
vij(pij) of this product is given by vij(pij) = exp(αij−βij pij), where αij and βij are
fixed parameters. In contrast, our formulation of problem (4.3) does not rely on
such a fixed functional relationship and we allow the dependence between vij(pij)
and pij to be arbitrary, as long as vij(pij) is decreasing in pij.
4.3.2 Connection to a Fixed Point Representation
In this section, we answer a question that becomes critical when developing a
tractable solution approach for problem (4.3). Assume that we have a collection
of candidate price vectors Pi = {pti : t ∈ Ti} to charge in nest i and all of the price
vectors in the collection Pi satisfy the price ladder constraint in the sense that
pti ∈ Fi for all t ∈ Ti. We know that we can stitch together an optimal solution
to problem (4.3) by picking one price vector from each one of the candidate col-
lections P1, . . . ,Pm. In other words, we know that there exists an optimal solution
(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) to problem (4.3) that satisfies p
∗
i ∈ Pi for all i ∈M . The question that
we want to answer is how we can pick a price vector p∗i from the collection Pi for
each nest i such that the solution (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is indeed optimal to problem (4.3).
It is difficult to answer this question through complete enumeration since complete
enumeration requires checking the expected revenues from |P1|×. . .×|Pm| possible
solutions, which quickly gets intractable when the number of nests is large. To an-
swer this question, we relate problem (4.3) to the problem of computing the fixed
point of an appropriately defined function. In particular, for z ∈ <+, we define
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f(z) as
f(z) =
∑
i∈M
max
pi∈Pi
{
Vi(pi)
γi (Ri(pi)− z)
}
. (4.4)
The value of zˆ satisfying v0 zˆ = f(zˆ) is the fixed point of the function f(·)/v0.
Since v0 z is increasing and f(z) is decreasing in z with f(0) ≥ 0, there exists zˆ
satisfying v0 zˆ = f(zˆ). In the next theorem, we show that we can use this value
of zˆ to construct an optimal solution to problem (4.3). In this theorem, we recall
that z∗ corresponds to the optimal objective value of problem (4.3).
Theorem 4.3.1. Assume that we have a collection of candidate price vectors Pi
for each nest i such that we can stitch together an optimal solution to problem (4.3)
by picking one price vector from each one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm. Let the
value of zˆ be such that v0 zˆ = f(zˆ) and pˆi be an optimal solution to the problem
max
pi∈Pi
{
Vi(pi)
γi (Ri(pi)− zˆ)
}
. (4.5)
Then, we have Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) ≥ z∗.
Proof. We use (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) to denote an optimal solution to problem (4.3). By our
assumption, we can stitch together an optimal solution to problem (4.3) by picking
one price vector from each one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm. Thus, we can assume
that p∗i ∈ Pi for all i ∈M , which implies that solution p∗i is feasible to the problem
on the right side of (4.4) and we get f(zˆ) ≥ ∑i∈M Vi(p∗i )γi (Ri(p∗i ) − zˆ). In this
case, noting the fact that v0 zˆ = f(zˆ), we have v0 zˆ ≥
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi (Ri(p
∗
i ) − zˆ).
Solving for zˆ in the last inequality, we obtain zˆ ≥ ∑i∈M Vi(p∗i )γi Ri(p∗i )/(v0 +∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi). Noting that z∗ = Π(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) =
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi Ri(p
∗
i )/(v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi)
by the definition of Π(p1, . . . , pm) in (4.2), the last inequality implies that zˆ ≥ z∗.
Thus, to finish the proof, it is enough to show that Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) = zˆ. Since pˆi is an
optimal solution to problem (4.5), by the definition of f(z) in (4.4) and the fact that
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v0 zˆ = f(zˆ), we have v0 zˆ = f(zˆ) =
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi (Ri(pˆi)−zˆ). In this case, focusing
on the first and last expressions in the last chain of equalities and solving for zˆ, we
obtain zˆ =
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi Ri(pˆi)/(v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi) and the desired result follows
by noting that Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) =
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi Ri(pˆi)/(v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi).
Theorem 4.3.1 suggests the following approach to obtain an optimal solution
to problem (4.3). Assume that we have a collection of candidate price vectors
Pi = {pti : t ∈ Ti} for each nest i such that we can stitch together an optimal
solution to problem (4.3) by picking one price vector from each one of the col-
lections P1, . . . ,Pm. Furthermore, assume that each one of the price vectors in
the candidate collection Pi = {pti : t ∈ Ti} satisfies the price ladder constraint
in the sense that pti ∈ Fi for all pti ∈ Pi. To obtain an optimal solution to prob-
lem (4.3), we find the value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ = f(zˆ). In this case, if we let
pˆi be an optimal solution to problem (4.5), then it follows from Theorem 4.3.1
that Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) ≥ z∗. Furthermore, since pti ∈ Fi for all pti ∈ Pi, the solution
(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is feasible to problem (4.3). Therefore, (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is a feasible solu-
tion to problem (4.3) and provides an objective value to problem (4.3) that is at
least as large as the optimal objective value of this problem, which implies that
(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is an optimal solution to problem (4.3), as desired. We observe that
the discussion in this paragraph also provides an answer to the question that we
ask at the beginning of this section. In particular, if we know that we can stitch
together an optimal solution to problem (4.3) by picking one price vector from
each one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm, then we can use Theorem 4.3.1 to obtain
an optimal solution to problem (4.3).
One remaining question is how we can find the value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ =
f(zˆ) in a tractable fashion. Noting that v0 z is increasing and f(z) is decreasing
in z, we can find the value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ = f(zˆ) by solving the problem
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min{z : v0 z ≥
∑
i∈M maxpi∈Pi Vi(pi)
γi (Ri(pi)− z)}, where the decision variable is
z. The constraint in this problem is nonlinear in z, but we can linearize the
constraint by using the additional decision variables y = (y1, . . . , ym) with the
interpretation that yi = maxpi∈Pi Vi(pi)
γi (Ri(pi)− z). In this case, we can find the
value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ = f(zˆ) by solving the problem
min
{
z : v0 z ≥
∑
i∈M
yi, yi ≥ Vi(pi)γi (Ri(pi)− z) ∀ pi ∈ Pi, i ∈M
}
, (4.6)
where the decision variables are (z, y). The problem above is a linear program with
O(m) decision variables and
∑
i∈M O(|Pi|) constraints, which is tractable as long
as the numbers of price vectors in the collections P1, . . . ,Pm are relatively small.
In the rest of our discussion, we focus on how to construct a small collection of
candidate price vectors Pi for each nest i such that we can stitch together an
optimal solution to problem (4.3) by picking one price vector from each one of the
collections P1, . . . ,Pm. Once we have these collections, we can solve problem (4.6)
to find zˆ satisfying v0 zˆ = f(zˆ) and we can use Theorem 4.3.1 to obtain an optimal
solution to problem (4.3).
4.3.3 Characterizing Candidate Price Vectors
In this section, we give a characterization of the optimal price vector to charge in
each nest. This characterization ultimately becomes useful to construct a collection
of candidate price vectors Pi for each nest i such that we can stitch together an
optimal solution to problem (4.3) by picking one price vector from each one of the
collections P1, . . . ,Pm. In the next lemma, we begin by giving a simple condition
for a solution to provide an objective value for problem (4.3) that is at least as
large as the optimal objective value. Subsequent to this lemma, we build on this
condition to give a characterization of the optimal price vector to charge in each
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nest.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) be an optimal solution to problem (4.3) providing
the objective value z∗. If (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) satisfies
Vi(pˆi)
γi (Ri(pˆi)− z∗) ≥ Vi(p∗i )γi (Ri(p∗i )− z∗)
for all i ∈M , then we have Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) ≥ z∗.
Proof. Adding the inequality in the lemma over all i ∈M yields∑i∈M Vi(pˆi)γi (Ri(pˆi)−
z∗) ≥ ∑i∈M Vi(p∗i )γi (Ri(p∗i )− z∗). Since (p∗1, . . . , p∗m) is an optimal solution to
problem (4.3), we have z∗ =
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γiRi(p
∗
i )/(v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi). Arranging
the terms in this equality, we obtain v0 z
∗ =
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi (Ri(p
∗
i )− z∗), in which
case, it follows that
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi (Ri(pˆi) − z∗) ≥
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi (Ri(p
∗
i ) − z∗) =
v0 z
∗. Focusing on the first and last terms in this chain of inequalities and solv-
ing for z∗, we get
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γiRi(pˆi)/(v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi) ≥ z∗ and the de-
sired result follows by noting that Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) =
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γiRi(pˆi)/(v0 +∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi).
In the next theorem, we build on the condition given in Lemma 4.3.2 to give a
characterization of the optimal price vector to charge in each nest.
Theorem 4.3.3. Let (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) be an optimal solution to problem (4.3) providing
the objective value z∗ and set u∗i = max{γi z∗ + (1 − γi)Ri(p∗i ), z∗}. If pˆi is an
optimal solution to the problem
max
pi∈Fi
{
Vi(pi) (Ri(pi)− u∗i )
}
, (4.7)
then (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is an optimal solution to problem (4.3).
Proof. For notational brevity, we let R∗i = Ri(p
∗
i ), V
∗
i = Vi(p
∗
i ), Rˆi = Ri(pˆi)
and Vˆi = Vi(pˆi). We claim that Vˆ
γi
i (Rˆi − z∗) ≥ (V ∗i )γi (R∗i − z∗) for all i ∈
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M . To see this claim, we consider a nest i that satisfies R∗i ≥ z∗. Since p∗i
is a feasible but not necessarily an optimal solution to problem (4.7), we have
Vˆi (Rˆi − u∗i ) ≥ V ∗i (R∗i − u∗i ). Since R∗i ≥ z∗, we have u∗i = γi z∗ + (1 − γi)R∗i by
the definition of u∗i and plugging this value of u
∗
i into the last inequality yields
Vˆi (Rˆi − z∗) − (1 − γi) Vˆi (R∗i − z∗) ≥ γi V ∗i (R∗i − z∗). Arranging the terms in the
last inequality, we obtain
Rˆi − z∗ ≥
[
γi
V ∗i
Vˆi
+ (1− γi)
]
(R∗i − z∗). (4.8)
Noting that the dissimilarity parameter for nest i satisfies γi ∈ [0, 1], the function
xγi is concave in x and its derivative at point 1 is γi. Therefore, the subgradient
inequality at point 1 yields xγi ≤ 1+γi (x−1) = γi x+(1−γi) for all x ∈ <+. Using
the subgradient inequality with x = V ∗i /Vˆi, it follows that (V
∗
i /Vˆi)
γi ≤ γi (V ∗i /Vˆi)+
1− γi. In this case, since R∗i ≥ z∗, (4.8) implies that Rˆi− z∗ ≥ (V ∗i /Vˆi)γi (R∗i − z∗)
and arranging the terms in this inequality yields Vˆ γii (Rˆi − z∗) ≥ (V ∗i )γi (R∗i − z∗).
Therefore, the claim holds for each nest i that satisfies R∗i ≥ z∗.
We consider a nest i that satisfies R∗i < z
∗. Since θq is the largest possible price
for a product, the optimal expected revenue in problem (4.3) does not exceed θq
and we obtain z∗ ≤ θq. We define the solution p˜i = (p˜i1, . . . , p˜in) to problem (4.7) as
p˜ij = θ
q for all j ∈ N , which is feasible to this problem. Furthermore, (4.1) implies
that Ri(p˜i) =
∑
j∈N θ
q vij(p˜ij)/
∑
j∈N vij(p˜ij) = θ
q. Since R∗i < z
∗, we have u∗i = z
∗
by the definition of u∗i and we obtain Vˆi (Rˆi− z∗) = Vˆi (Rˆi− u∗i ) ≥ Vi(p˜i) (Ri(p˜i)−
u∗i ) = Vi(p˜i) (Ri(p˜i) − z∗) ≥ 0 > V ∗i (R∗i − z∗), where the first inequality uses the
fact that p˜i is a feasible but not necessarily an optimal solution to problem (4.7),
the second inequality uses the fact that Ri(p˜i) = θ
q ≥ z∗ and the third inequality
uses the fact that R∗i < z
∗. Thus, we have Vˆi (Rˆi − z∗) ≥ 0 > V ∗i (R∗i − z∗), which
implies that Vˆ γii (Rˆi − z∗) ≥ 0 > (V ∗i )γi (R∗i − z∗), establishing the claim for each
nest i that satisfies R∗i < z
∗.
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The discussion in the previous two paragraphs shows that our claim holds
and we obtain Vˆ γii (Rˆi − z∗) ≥ (V ∗i )γi (R∗i − z∗) for all i ∈ M . In this case, the
solution (pˆ1, . . . , , pˆm) satisfies the assumption of Lemma 4.3.2 and it follows from
this lemma that Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) ≥ z∗. On the other hand, noting that pˆi is a feasible
solution to problem (4.7), we have pˆi ∈ Fi for all i ∈ M , which indicates that
(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is a feasible solution to problem (4.3). The solution (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is
feasible to problem (4.3) and it provides an objective value for problem (4.3) that
is at least as large as the optimal objective value of this problem. Therefore, we
conclude that (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is an optimal solution to problem (4.3), as desired.
By Theorem 4.3.3, we can recover an optimal solution to problem (4.3) by solv-
ing problem (4.7) for all i ∈M . Thus, if we let pˆi be an optimal solution to problem
(4.7) and use the singleton Pi = {pˆi} as the collection of candidate price vectors to
charge in nest i, then we can stitch together an optimal solution to problem (4.3)
by picking one price vector from each one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm. However,
this approach is not immediately useful for constructing a collection of candidate
price vectors, since solving problem (4.7) requires the knowledge of u∗i , which,
in turn, requires the knowledge of an optimal solution to problem (4.3). To get
around this difficulty, as a function of ui ∈ <+, we use pˆi(ui) to denote an optimal
solution to the problem
max
pi∈Fi
{
Vi(pi) (Ri(pi)− ui)
}
. (4.9)
In this case, we observe that if we use the collection of price vectors Pi = {pˆi(ui) :
ui ∈ <+} as the collection of candidate price vectors for nest i, then we can stitch
together an optimal solution to problem (4.3) by picking one price vector from each
one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm. To see this result, letting u∗i be as defined in The-
orem 4.3.3, we note that pˆi(u
∗
i ) ∈ {pˆi(ui) : ui ∈ <+} for all i ∈ M . Furthermore,
since problem (4.9) with ui = u
∗
i is identical to problem (4.7), by Theorem 4.3.3,
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the solution (pˆ1(u
∗
1), . . . , pˆm(u
∗
m)) is optimal to problem (4.3). Therefore, for each
nest i, the solution (pˆ1(u
∗
1), . . . , pˆm(u
∗
m)) uses one price vector from the collection
of candidate price vectors Pi = {pˆi(ui) : ui ∈ <+} and this solution is optimal to
problem (4.3).
We propose using {pˆi(ui) : ui ∈ <+} as the collection of candidate price vectors
for nest i, which is the collection of optimal solutions to problem (4.9) for any value
of ui ∈ <+. In the subsequent sections, we show that the collection {pˆi(ui) : ui ∈
<+} includes a reasonably small number of price vectors and we can find these
price vectors in a tractable fashion.
4.3.4 Counting Candidate Price Vectors
In this section, we show that there exists a collection of price vectors Pi = {pti : t ∈
Ti} such that this collection includes an optimal solution to problem (4.9) for any
value of ui ∈ <+ and there are at most nq price vectors in this collection, where
n is the number of products in a nest and q is the number of possible price levels.
The fact that the objective function of problem (4.9) has a simple form plays an
especially important role in this result. In particular, using the definitions of Vi(pi)
and Ri(pi), we can write problem (4.9) equivalently as
max
pi∈Fi
{∑
j∈N
vij(pij)
[∑
j∈N pij vij(pij)∑
j∈N vij(pij)
− ui
]}
= max
pi∈Fi
{∑
j∈N
(pij − ui) vij(pij)
}
.
(4.10)
In the next lemma, we begin by showing that as the value of ui in problem (4.10)
gets larger, then the optimal price for each product also gets larger.
Lemma 4.3.4. Using pˆi(ui) = (pˆi1(ui), . . . , pˆin(ui)) to denote an optimal solution
to problem (4.10) as a function of ui, if we have u
−
i < u
+
i , then it holds that
pˆij(u
−
i ) ≤ pˆij(u+i ) for all j ∈ N .
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Proof. To get a contradiction, assume that u−i < u
+
i but we have pˆij(u
−
i ) > pˆij(u
+
i )
for some j ∈ N . For notational brevity, we let pˆ−i = pˆi(u−i ) and pˆ+i = pˆi(u+i ). Since
the solutions pˆ−i and pˆ
+
i are optimal to problem (4.10) when this problem is solved
at particular values of ui, we have pˆ
−
i ∈ Fi and pˆ+i ∈ Fi, which is to say that
pˆ−i1 ≤ pˆ−i2 ≤ . . . ≤ pˆ−in and pˆ+i1 ≤ pˆ+i2 ≤ . . . ≤ pˆ+in. We let J = {j ∈ N : pˆ−ij > pˆ+ij},
which in nonempty by the assumption that pˆ−ij > pˆ
+
ij for some j ∈ N .
We define the solution p˜i = (p˜i1, . . . , p˜in) to problem (4.10) as p˜ij = pˆ
−
ij ∨ pˆ+ij for
all j ∈ N , where we use a ∨ b = max{a, b}. If f(j) and g(j) are both increasing
functions of j ∈ N , then f(j) ∨ g(j) is also an increasing function of j ∈ N . By
the discussion at the end of the previous paragraph, pˆ−ij and pˆ
+
ij are both increasing
functions of j ∈ N . Thus, p˜ij = pˆ−ij ∨ pˆ+ij is also an increasing function of j ∈ N ,
which implies that p˜i1 ≤ p˜i2 ≤ . . . ≤ p˜in. Therefore, we have p˜i ∈ Fi, indicating
that p˜i is a feasible solution to problem (4.10). In this case, since pˆ
+
i is an optimal
solution to problem (4.10) when we solve this problem with ui = u
+
i , we have∑
j∈N(pˆ
+
ij − u+i ) vij(pˆ+ij) ≥
∑
j∈N(p˜ij − u+i ) vij(p˜ij). By the definitions of J and
p˜i, we have p˜ij = pˆ
−
ij for all j ∈ J and p˜ij = pˆ+ij for all j 6∈ J . Thus, the last
inequality can be written as
∑
j∈N(pˆ
+
ij − u+i ) vij(pˆ+ij) ≥
∑
j∈J (pˆ
−
ij − u+i ) vij(pˆ−ij) +∑
j 6∈J(pˆ
+
ij − u+i ) vij(pˆ+ij), in which case, canceling the common terms on the two
sides of the inequality, we have
∑
j∈J(pˆ
+
ij − u+i ) vij(pˆ+ij) ≥
∑
j∈J(pˆ
−
ij − u+i ) vij(pˆ−ij).
We define the solution p¯i = (p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) to problem (4.10) as p¯ij = pˆ
+
ij ∧ pˆ−ij
for all j ∈ N , where we use a ∧ b = min{a, b}. We note that if f(j) and g(j) are
both increasing functions of j ∈ N , then f(j) ∧ g(j) is also an increasing function
of j ∈ N . In this case, using the same approach in the previous paragraph, we
can show that p¯i ∈ Fi. Thus, since pˆ−i is an optimal solution to problem (4.10)
when we solve this problem with ui = u
−
i , we have
∑
j∈N(pˆ
−
ij − u−i ) vij(pˆ−ij) ≥∑
j∈N(p¯ij − u−i ) vij(p¯ij). Noting the definitions of J and p¯i, the last inequality
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can equivalently be written as
∑
j∈N(pˆ
−
ij − u−i ) vij(pˆ−ij) ≥
∑
j∈J(pˆ
+
ij − u−i ) vij(pˆ+ij) +∑
j 6∈J(pˆ
−
ij − u−i ) vij(pˆ−ij), in which case, canceling the common terms on the two
sides of the inequality yields
∑
j∈J(pˆ
−
ij − u−i ) vij(pˆ−ij) ≥
∑
j∈J(pˆ
+
ij − u−i ) vij(pˆ+ij).
From the previous paragraph, we also have
∑
j∈J(pˆ
+
ij − u+i ) vij(pˆ+ij) ≥
∑
j∈J(pˆ
−
ij −
u+i ) vij(pˆ
−
ij). Adding the last two inequalities and canceling the common terms
yield u−i
∑
j∈J(vij(pˆ
+
ij)− vij(pˆ−ij)) ≥ u+i
∑
j∈J(vij(pˆ
+
ij)− vij(pˆ−ij)).
By the definition of J , we have pˆ−ij > pˆ
+
ij for all j ∈ J . Noting that the preference
weight of a product gets larger as we charge a smaller price for the product, we
have vij(pˆ
−
ij) < vij(pˆ
+
ij) for all j ∈ J . Thus, we have
∑
j∈J(vij(pˆ
+
ij) − vij(pˆ−ij)) > 0,
in which case, by the inequality at the end of the previous paragraph, we obtain
u−i ≥ u+i , which is a contradiction.
We observe that the last step in the proof of Lemma 4.3.4 critically depends on
the assumption that vij(pij) is a decreasing function of pij. Also, it is worthwhile
to note that Lemma 4.3.4 holds even when there are multiple optimal solutions
to problem (4.10) and we choose pˆi(ui) as any one of these solutions. In the next
theorem, we use Lemma 4.3.4 to show that there exists a collection of at most
nq price vectors such that this collection includes an optimal solution to problem
(4.10) for any value of ui ∈ <+. The intuition behind this result is that if we
increase the value of ui in problem (4.10), then Lemma 4.3.4 implies that the price
of a product in an optimal solution either does not change or becomes larger. Since
there are q possible prices for a product, the price of a product will no longer change
after a small number of price changes.
Theorem 4.3.5. There exists a collection of at most nq price vectors such that this
collection includes an optimal solution to problem (4.10) for any value of ui ∈ <+.
Proof. Assume that there are K distinct values of ui ∈ <+ such that if we solve
problem (4.10) with each one of these values, then we obtain a distinct optimal
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solution. We use {uˆki : k = 1, . . . , K} to denote these values of ui ∈ <+ and use
pˆki to denote an optimal solution to problem (4.10) when we solve this problem
with ui = uˆ
k
i . By our assumption, none of price vectors in {pˆki : k = 1, . . . , K} are
equal to each other. To get a contradiction, assume that K > nq. Without loss of
generality, we index the values {uˆki : k = 1, . . . , K} such that uˆ1i < uˆ2i < . . . < uˆKi ,
in which case, Lemma 4.3.4 implies that pˆ1ij ≤ pˆ2ij ≤ . . . ≤ pˆKij for all j ∈ N . Since
the price vectors {pˆki : k = 1, . . . , K} are distinct, using 1(·) to denote the indicator
function, we have
∑
j∈N 1(pˆ
k
ij < pˆ
k+1
ij ) > 1, indicating that there is at least one
different price in the price vectors pˆki and pˆ
k+1
i . Adding the last inequality over all
k = 1, . . . , K − 1 and noting that K > nq, we obtain ∑j∈N∑K−1k=1 1(pˆkij < pˆk+1ij ) >
K − 1 ≥ nq. Focusing on the first and last terms in the last chain of inequalities,
since |N | = n, it must be the case that ∑K−1k=1 1(pˆkij < pˆk+1ij ) > q for some j ∈ N ,
which implies that more than q of the inequalities pˆ1ij ≤ pˆ2ij ≤ . . . ≤ pˆKij are strict,
but since there are q possible values for the price of a product, more than q of
these inequalities cannot be strict and we obtain a contradiction.
Thus, there exists a reasonably small collection of price vectors that includes
an optimal solution to problem (4.10) for any ui ∈ <+. In the next section, we
show how to construct this collection.
4.3.5 Constructing Candidate Price Vectors
In the previous section, we show that there exists a collection of price vectors with
at most nq price vectors in it such that this collection includes an optimal solution
to problem (4.10) for any value of ui ∈ <+. In this section, we show how to come
up with this collection in a tractable fashion. In problem (4.10), if we charge the
price pij for product j in nest i, then we obtain a contribution of (pij −ui) vij(pij).
By the constraint pi ∈ Fi, the price charged for product j should be at least as
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large as the price charged for product j − 1. Problem (4.10) finds the prices to
charge for the products in nest i to maximize the total contribution. So, we can
solve problem (4.10) by using a dynamic program. The decision epochs are the
products in nest i. When making the decision for product j in nest i, the state
variable is the price for product j − 1. Thus, for a fixed value of ui ∈ <+, we can
solve problem (4.10) by using the dynamic program
Φij(pi,j−1 |ui) = max
pij ∈ Θ :
pij ≥ pi,j−1
{
(pij − ui) vij(pij) + Φi,j+1(pij |ui)
}
, (4.11)
with the boundary condition that Φi,n+1(· |ui) = 0. The optimal objective value of
problem (4.10) is given by Φi1(θ
1 |ui), where the value functions {Φij(pi,j−1 |ui) :
pi,j−1 ∈ Θ, j ∈ N} are obtained through the dynamic program in (4.11). By
Theorem 4.3.5, there are most nq solutions from the dynamic program in (4.11)
such that the solution from this dynamic program for any value of ui ∈ <+ is one
of these nq solutions. The question is how to come up with these solutions.
To answer this question, we use the linear programming formulation of the dy-
namic program in (4.11). Dynamic programs with finite state and action spaces
have equivalent linear programming formulations; see [46]. In these linear pro-
grams, there is one decision variable for each state and decision epoch and there
is one constraint for each state, action and decision epoch. The linear program
corresponding to the dynamic program in (4.11) is given by
min φi1(θ
1) (4.12)
s.t. φij(pi,j−1) ≥ (pij − ui) vij(pij) + φi,j+1(pij) ∀ pi,j−1 ∈ Θ, pij ∈ L(pi,j−1),
where the decision variables are {φij(pi,j−1) : pi,j−1 ∈ Θ, j ∈ N} and we follow
the convention that φi,n+1(pin) = 0 for all pin ∈ Θ. The set L(pi,j−1) is the set of
feasible prices for product j given that the price for product j − 1 is pi,j−1, which
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is given by L(pi,j−1) = {pij ∈ Θ : pij ≥ pi,j−1}. If we solve the linear program in
(4.12), then the optimal value of the decision variable φi1(θ
1) is equal to Φi1(θ
1 |ui)
obtained through the dynamic program in (4.11), which is, in turn, equal to the
optimal objective value of problem (4.10). The critical observation is that the
value of ui ∈ <+ only affects the right hand side coefficients of the constraints in
problem (4.12). Therefore, we can vary ui ∈ <+ parametrically and solve problem
(4.12) by using the parametric simplex method to generate the possible optimal
solutions to this problem for all values of ui ∈ <+. These solutions provide the
solutions to the dynamic program in (4.11) for all values of ui ∈ <+.
Since there are q possible prices for a product and there are n products in a nest,
the linear program in (4.12) has O(nq) decision variables and O(nq2) constraints.
Putting all of the discussion so far together, we solve problem (4.12) by using the
parametric simplex method to generate the optimal solutions to this problem for all
values of ui ∈ <+. These solutions correspond to the optimal solutions to problem
(4.10) for all values of ui ∈ <+. By the discussion that follows Theorem 4.3.3, we
can use the optimal solutions to problem (4.10) for all values of ui ∈ <+ as the
collection of candidate price vectors Pi for nest i. Once we have the collection of
candidate price vectors for each nest, we can solve the linear program in (4.6) to
obtain the value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ = f(zˆ). Since there are at most nq price
vectors in each one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm, there are O(m) decision variables
and O(mnq) constraints in the linear program in (4.6). In this case, by Theorem
4.3.1, we can solve problem (4.5) for all i ∈ M to obtain an optimal solution to
problem (4.3).
In Section 4, we provide numerical experiments and demonstrate that the ap-
proach described above can obtain an optimal solution to problem (4.3) quite fast.
For problem instances with six nests, 30 products in each nest and 30 possible
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prices for each product, we can obtain an optimal solution to problem (4.3) in no
more than two seconds.
4.4 Price Ladders Between Nests
In this section, we consider the case with price ladders between nests. In this
setting, there is an intrinsic ordering between the qualities of the nests and the
prices charged in a nest corresponding to a higher quality level should also be
larger. There is no intrinsic ordering between the qualities or the prices of the
products in the same nest.
4.4.1 Problem Formulation
Our problem formulation is similar to the one in Section 4.3.1. There are m nests
indexed by M = {1, . . . ,m}. In each nest, there are n products indexed by N =
{1, . . . , n}. For each product, there are q possible prices given by Θ = {θ1, . . . , θq}.
The possible prices for a product are indexed such that 0 < θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θq. We
use pij ∈ Θ to denote the price that we charge for product j in nest i. If we charge
the price pij for product j in nest i, then the preference weight of this product
is given by vij(pij). If we charge a larger price for a product, then its preference
weight becomes smaller, implying that vij(θ
1) > vij(θ
2) > . . . > vij(θ
q) > 0.
Customers follow the same choice process described in Section 4.3.1. Thus, if we
use pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) ∈ Θn to denote the price vector charged in nest i, then the
expected revenue obtained from a customer that has already decided to make a
purchase in nest i is given by Ri(pi), where Ri(pi) is as in (4.1). If we charge
the price vectors (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Θm×n over all nests, then the expected revenue
obtained from a customer is given by Π(p1, . . . , pm), where Π(p1, . . . , pm) is as in
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(4.2).
Our goal is to find the price vectors (p1, . . . , pm) to maximize the expected
revenue Π(p1, . . . , pm) subject to the constraint that the price vectors charged in
the different nests are consistent with the quality level that each nest represents.
In other words, if nest i corresponds to a higher quality level than nest l, then the
prices of the products in nest i should be larger than the prices of the products in
nest l. This constraint can be interpreted as a price ladder constraint between the
nests. To formulate the price ladder constraint, without loss of generality, we index
the nests such that a nests with a larger index represents a higher quality level. In
other words, the nests M = {1, . . . ,m} are indexed in the order of increasing
quality levels. Thus, the price ladder constraint ensures that the price vectors
(p1, . . . , pm) charged over all nests satisfy maxj∈N p1j ≤ minj∈N p2j, maxj∈N p2j ≤
minj∈N p3j, . . . ,maxj∈N pm−1,j ≤ minj∈N pmj. As a function of the price vector
pi−1 charged in nest i − 1, the set of feasible price vectors in nest i is Gi(pi−1) =
{pi ∈ Θn : minj∈N pij ≥ maxj∈N pi−1,j}. We want to find the price vectors to charge
over all nests to maximize the expected revenue from a customer, yielding the
problem
z∗ = max
(p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Θm×n :
pi ∈ Gi(pi−1) ∀ i ∈M \ {1}
{
Π(p1, . . . , pm)
}
. (4.13)
Problem (4.13) is significantly more difficult than problem (4.3) since the con-
straints link the price vectors charged in different nests. The broad outline of our
approach for problem (4.13) is similar to the one for problem (4.3). We relate
problem (4.13) to the problem of computing the fixed point of a function. Assum-
ing that we have a collection of candidate price vectors for each nest such that
we can stitch together an optimal solution to problem (4.13) by picking one price
vector from each one of the collections, we show how to obtain an optimal solution
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to problem (4.13). Finally, we show how to come up with the collections of candi-
date price vectors. Although the broad outline of our approach for problem (4.13)
is similar to the one for problem (4.3), the details are quite different as problem
(4.13) is significantly more difficult than problem (4.3).
4.4.2 Connection to a Fixed Point Representation
Assume that we have a collection of candidate price vectors Pi = {pti : t ∈ Ti} for
each nest i such that we can stitch together an optimal solution to problem (4.13)
by picking one price vector from each one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm. In other
words, there exists an optimal solution (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) to problem (4.13) such that
p∗i ∈ Pi for all i ∈M . The question is how we can pick a price vector p∗i from the
collection Pi for each nest i such that the solution (p∗1, . . . , p∗m) is indeed optimal
to problem (4.13). To answer this question, for any z ∈ <+, we define g(z) as
g(z) = max
(p1, . . . , pm) ∈ P1 × . . .× Pm :
pi ∈ Gi(pi−1) ∀ i ∈M \ {1}
{∑
i∈M
Vi(pi)
γi (Ri(pi)− z)
}
. (4.14)
Since v0 z is increasing and g(z) is decreasing in z with g(0) ≥ 0, there exists a
value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ = g(zˆ), which corresponds to the fixed point of the
function g(·)/v0. In the next theorem, we show that the value of zˆ that satisfies
v0 zˆ = g(zˆ) can be used to construct an optimal solution to problem (4.13). The
proof of this theorem follows from an outline that is similar to the proof of Theorem
4.3.1 and we omit the proof. In the theorem, we recall that z∗ corresponds to the
optimal objective value of problem (4.13).
Theorem 4.4.1. Assume that we have a collection of candidate price vectors Pi
for each nest i such that we can stitch together an optimal solution to problem
(4.13) by picking one price vector from each one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm. Let
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zˆ be such that v0 zˆ = g(zˆ) and (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) be an optimal solution to problem (4.14)
when we solve this problem with z = zˆ. Then, we have Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) ≥ z∗.
Building on Theorem 4.4.1, we can obtain an optimal solution to problem
(4.13) as follows. Assume that we have a collection of candidate price vectors Pi =
{pti : t ∈ Ti} for each nest i such that we can stitch together an optimal solution
to problem (4.13) by picking one price vector from each one of the collections
P1, . . . ,Pm. We find the value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ = g(zˆ). If we let (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm)
be an optimal solution to problem (4.14) when we solve this problem with z = zˆ,
then by Theorem 4.4.1, we have Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) ≥ z∗. Since (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is a feasible
solution to problem (4.14), we also have pˆi ∈ Gi(pi−1) for all i ∈M \{1}. Thus, the
solution (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is feasible to problem (4.13) and provides an objective value
for problem (4.13) that is at least as large as the optimal objective value of this
problem, indicating that (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is an optimal solution to problem (4.13).
One important question is how we can find the value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ =
g(zˆ). In problem (4.14), we observe that if we charge the price vector pi in nest
i, then we obtain a contribution of Vi(pi)
γi (Ri(pi)− z). By the constraints pˆi ∈
Gi(pi−1) for all i ∈ M \ {1}, the smallest price charged in nest i should be at
least as large as the largest price charged in nest i − 1. Problem (4.14) finds the
price vectors to charge for the nests to maximize the total contribution. So, for a
fixed value of z ∈ <+, we can solve problem (4.14) by using a dynamic program.
The decision epochs are the nests. When making the decision for nest i, the state
variable is the largest price charged for the products in nest i−1. Thus, for a fixed
value of z ∈ <+, we can obtain an optimal solution to problem (4.14) by solving
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the dynamic program
Ψi(wi−1 | z) = max
pi ∈ Pi :
pij ≥ wi−1 ∀ j ∈ N
{
Vi(pi)
γi (Ri(pi)− z) + Ψi+1(maxj∈N pij | z)
}
,
(4.15)
with the boundary condition that Ψm+1(· | z) = 0. The optimal objective value
of problem (4.14) is given by Ψ1(θ
1 | z), where the value functions {Ψi(wi−1 | z) :
wi−1 ∈ Θ, i ∈ M} are obtained through the dynamic program in (4.15). Since
there are q possible prices for a product, we can solve the dynamic program above
in O(q
∑
i∈M |Pi|) operations, which is reasonable as long as the numbers of price
vectors in the collections P1, . . . ,Pm are not too large. In Section 4.3.2, we recall
that we find the value of zˆ satisfying v0 zˆ = f(zˆ) by using the linear program
in (4.6), but this linear program is not useful to find the value of zˆ satisfying
v0 zˆ = g(zˆ) since problem (4.14) does not decompose by the nests due to the
constraints pi ∈ Gi(pi−1) for all i ∈M \{1}. Instead, we show how to use the linear
programming formulation of the dynamic program in (4.15) to find the value of zˆ
that satisfies v0 zˆ = g(zˆ).
As mentioned in Section 4.3.5, dynamic programs with finite state and action
spaces have equivalent linear programming formulations. In these linear programs,
there is one decision variable for each state and decision epoch and there is one
constraint for each state, action and decision epoch. Therefore, building on the
linear programming formulation corresponding to the dynamic program in (4.15),
we propose solving the linear program
min ψ1(θ
1) (4.16)
s.t. ψi(wi−1) ≥ Vi(pi)γi (Ri(pi)− z) + ψi+1(maxj∈N pij) ∀wi−1 ∈ Θ, pi ∈Mi(wi−1)
v0 z = ψ1(θ
1)
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to find the value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ = g(zˆ). In the linear program above,
the decision variables are z and ψ = {ψi(wi−1) : wi−1 ∈ Θ, i ∈ M}. We follow
the convention that ψm+1(wm) = 0 for all wm ∈ Θ. The set Mi(wi−1) is the
set of feasible price vectors in nest i given that the largest price charged in nest
i − 1 is wi−1, which is given by Mi(wi−1) = {pi ∈ Pi : pij ≥ wi−1 ∀ j ∈ N}. If
we drop the second constraint in problem (4.16) and solve this problem for a
fixed value of z ∈ <+, then this problem corresponds to the linear programming
formulation for the dynamic program in (4.15). Therefore, the optimal value of
the decision variable ψ1(θ
1) would correspond to Ψ1(θ
1 | z) obtained through the
dynamic program in (4.15), which is equal to the optimal objective value of problem
(4.14) for a fixed value of z. On the other hand, it turns out that if we solve problem
(4.16) as formulated, then the optimal value of the decision variable z corresponds
to the value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ = g(zˆ). We show this result in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.4.2. Using (zˆ, ψˆ) to denote an optimal solution to problem (4.16), we
have v0 zˆ = g(zˆ).
Proof. Let z˜ satisfy v0 z˜ = g(z˜). We want to show that z˜ = zˆ. We solve the
dynamic program in (4.15) with z = z˜ to obtain the value functions Ψ(z˜) =
{Ψi(wi−1 | z˜) : wi−1 ∈ Θ, i ∈M}. Due to the way these value functions are com-
puted in the dynamic program in (4.15), we have Ψi(wi−1 | z˜) ≥ Vi(pi)γi (Ri(pi)−
z˜) + Ψi+1(maxj∈N pij | z˜) for all wi−1 ∈ Θ, pi ∈ M(wi−1) and i ∈ M . Thus, the
solution (zˆ,Ψ(zˆ)) satisfies the first set of constraints in problem (4.16). By the
discussion that follows the dynamic program in (4.15), Ψ1(θ
1 | z˜) provides the op-
timal objective value of problem (4.14) when we solve this problem with z = z˜,
yielding Ψ1(θ
1 | z˜) = g(z˜) = v0 z˜. Thus, the solution (zˆ,Ψ(zˆ)) satisfies the second
constraint in problem (4.16) as well. Since the solution (zˆ,Ψ(zˆ)) is feasible to
problem (4.16), the objective value provided by this solution is at least as large
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as the optimal objective value, yielding Ψ1(θ
1 | z˜) ≥ ψˆ1(θ1). Thus, we obtain
v0 z˜ = g(z˜) = Ψ1(θ
1 | z˜) ≥ ψˆ1(θ1) = v0 zˆ, where the last equality holds since (zˆ, ψˆ)
is a feasible solution to problem (4.16).
The last chain of inequalities in the previous paragraph shows that z˜ ≥ zˆ.
To show that z˜ = zˆ, we solve problem (4.14) with z = zˆ to obtain an optimal
solution (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm). Therefore, we have g(zˆ) =
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi (Ri(pˆi)− zˆ). For all
i ∈M , we let wˆi = maxj∈N pˆij with the convention that wˆ0 = θ1. Since the solution
(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is feasible to problem (4.14), we have pˆi ∈ Gi(pˆi−1) for all i ∈M \ {1}
and pˆi ∈ Pi for all i ∈ M , which is equivalent to having pˆi ∈ M(wˆi−1) for all
i ∈ M . In this case, using the fact that the solution (zˆ, ψˆ) is feasible to problem
(4.16), we have ψˆi(wˆi−1) ≥ Vi(pˆi)γi (Ri(pˆi)− z)ˆ + ψˆi+1(wˆi) for all i ∈ M . Adding
these inequalities over all i ∈ M and noting that wˆ0 = θ1, we obtain ψˆ1(θ1) ≥∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi (Ri(pˆi) − zˆ) = g(zˆ), where the last equality uses the definition of
(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm). This chain of inequalities shows that ψˆ1(θ
1) ≥ g(zˆ). As mentioned at
the beginning of this paragraph, we have z˜ ≥ zˆ. Noting that g(z) is decreasing in z,
we obtain g(zˆ) ≥ g(z˜). In this case, we have ψˆ1(θ1) ≥ g(zˆ) ≥ g(z˜) = v0 z˜ ≥ v0 zˆ =
ψˆ1(θ
1), where the first equality uses the definition of z˜, the third inequality is by
the fact that z˜ ≥ zˆ and the second equality uses the fact that the solution (zˆ, ψˆ) is
feasible to problem (4.16) so that it satisfies the second constraint in this problem.
Thus, all of the inequalities in the last chain of inequalities hold as equality and
we obtain g(zˆ) = g(z˜) = v0 z˜ = v0 zˆ, establishing that z˜ = zˆ.
By Theorem 4.4.2, we can solve problem (4.16) to find the value of zˆ that
satisfies v0 zˆ = g(zˆ). Problem (4.16) is a linear program with O(mq) decision
variables and
∑
i∈M O(q|Pi|) constraints, which is tractable as long as the numbers
of price vectors in the collections P1, . . . ,Pm are reasonably small. In the rest of our
discussion, we focus on how to construct a reasonably small collection of candidate
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price vectors Pi for each nest i such that we can stitch together an optimal solution
to problem (4.13) by picking one price vector from each one of the collections
P1, . . . ,Pm. Once we have these collections, we can solve problem (4.16) to find zˆ
satisfying v0 zˆ = g(zˆ) and we can use Theorem 4.4.1 to obtain an optimal solution
to problem (4.13).
4.4.3 Characterizing Candidate Price Vectors
In this section, we provide an alternative characterization of the optimal price
vector to charge in each nest. This characterization ultimately becomes useful when
we construct a collection of candidate price vectors Pi for each nest i such that
we can stitch together an optimal solution to problem (4.13) by picking one price
vector from each one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm. In the next theorem, we provide
our alternative characterization of the optimal price vector to charge in each nest.
This theorem is analogous to Theorem 4.3.3, but its proof is substantially more
involved due to the constraints in problem (4.13) that link the price vectors charged
in different nests. We defer the proof to the appendix.
Theorem 4.4.3. Let (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) be an optimal solution to problem (4.13) pro-
viding the objective value z∗ and set u∗i = max{γi z∗ + (1 − γi)Ri(p∗i ), z∗}, `∗i =
minj∈N p∗ij and w
∗
i = maxj∈N p
∗
ij. If pˆi is an optimal solution to the problem
max
pi ∈ Θ :
`∗i ≤ pij ≤ w∗i ∀ j ∈ N
{
Vi(pi) (Ri(pi)− u∗i )
}
, (4.17)
then (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is an optimal solution to problem (4.13).
Theorem 4.4.3 implies that we can recover an optimal solution to problem
(4.13) by solving problem (4.17) for all i ∈ M . Therefore, if we let pˆi be an
optimal solution to problem (4.17) and use Pi = {pˆi} as the collection of candidate
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price vectors to charge in nest i, then we can stitch together an optimal solution
to problem (4.13) by picking one price vector from each one of the collections
P1, . . . ,Pm. However, this approach is not immediately useful for constructing
a collection of candidate price vectors, since solving problem (4.17) requires the
knowledge of u∗i , `
∗
i and w
∗
i , all of which, in turn, require the knowledge of an
optimal solution to problem (4.13). To deal with this difficulty, as a function of
ui ∈ <+, `i ∈ Θ and wi ∈ Θ, we use pˆi(ui, `i, wi) to denote an optimal solution to
the problem
max
pi ∈ Θ :
`i ≤ pij ≤ wi ∀ j ∈ N
{
Vi(pi) (Ri(pi)− ui)
}
. (4.18)
In this case, if we use the collection Pi = {pˆi(ui, `i, wi) : ui ∈ <+, `i ∈ Θ, wi ∈ Θ}
as the collection of candidate price vectors for nest i, then we can stitch together
an optimal solution to problem (4.13) by picking one price vector from each one of
the collections P1, . . . ,Pm. To see this result, letting u∗i , `∗i and w∗i be as defined in
Theorem 4.4.3, we have pˆi(u
∗
i , `
∗
i , w
∗
i ) ∈ {pˆi(ui, `i, wi) : ui ∈ <+, `i ∈ Θ, wi ∈ Θ}
for all i ∈ M . Furthermore, since problem (4.18) with ui = u∗i , `i = `∗i and wi =
w∗i is identical to problem (4.17), Theorem 4.4.3 implies that (pˆ1(u
∗
1, `
∗
1, w
∗
1), . . . ,
pˆm(u
∗
m, `
∗
m, w
∗
m)) is an optimal solution to problem (4.13). Therefore, if we use the
collection Pi = {pˆi(ui, `i, wi) : ui ∈ <+, `i ∈ Θ, wi ∈ Θ} as the collection of
candidate price vectors for nest i, then we can stitch together an optimal solution
to problem (4.13) by picking one price vector from each one of the collections
P1, . . . ,Pm.
Noting the discussion above, we can use {pˆi(ui, `i, wi) : ui ∈ <+, `i ∈ Θ, wi ∈ Θ}
as the collection of candidate price vectors to charge in nest i. In the subse-
quent sections, we show that for a given `i ∈ Θ and wi ∈ Θ, the collection
{pˆi(ui, `i, wi) : ui ∈ <+} includes at most nq price vectors and we can find these
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price vectors in a tractable fashion. Therefore, since there are q possible values for
each of `i and wi, the collection {pˆi(ui, `i, wi) : ui ∈ <+, `i ∈ Θ, wi ∈ Θ} includes
at most nq3 price vectors.
4.4.4 Counting Candidate Price Vectors
In this section, we consider problem (4.18) for fixed values of `i ∈ Θ and wi ∈ Θ.
We show that there exists a collection of price vectors Pi = {pti : t ∈ Ti} such
that this collection includes an optimal solution to problem (4.18) for any value
of ui ∈ <+ and there are at most nq price vectors in this collection. To show this
result, we write problem (4.18) as
max
pi ∈ Θ :
`i ≤ pij ≤ wi ∀j ∈ N
{∑
j∈N
vij(pij)
[∑
j∈N pij vij(pij)∑
j∈N vij(pij)
− ui
]}
= max
pi ∈ Θ :
`i ≤ pij ≤ wi ∀j ∈ N
{∑
j∈N
(pij − ui) vij(pij)
}
. (4.19)
In the next lemma, we begin by showing that as the value of ui in problem (4.19)
gets larger, then the optimal price for each product also gets larger. This lemma
is similar to Lemma 4.3.4 but its proof is significantly simpler than that of Lemma
4.3.4 since the prices in problem (4.19) has only upper and lower bound constraints,
rather than a price ladder constraint.
Lemma 4.4.4. Using pˆi(ui) = (pˆi1(ui), . . . , pˆin(ui)) to denote an optimal solution
to problem (4.19) as a function of ui, if we have u
−
i < u
+
i , then it holds that
pˆij(u
−
i ) ≤ pˆij(u+i ) for all j ∈ N .
Proof. To get a contradiction, assume that u−i < u
+
i , but we have pˆij(u
−
i ) > pˆij(u
+
i )
for some j ∈ N . For notational brevity, we let pˆ−i = pˆi(u−i ) and pˆ+i = pˆi(u+i ). Noting
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that pˆ−ij > pˆ
+
ij and using the fact that the preference weight of a product gets
larger as we charge a smaller price for the product, we obtain vij(pˆ
−
ij) < vij(pˆ
+
ij).
In problem (4.19), if we charge the price pij for product j, then this product
makes a contribution of (pij − ui) vij(pij) to the objective function. We note that
pˆ+i is an optimal solution to problem (4.19) when we solve this problem with
ui = u
+
i . Therefore, if we solve problem (4.19) with ui = u
+
i , then the contribution
of product j when we charge the price p+ij for this product should be at least as
large as the contribution when we charge the price p−ij. Otherwise, it would not be
optimal to charge the price p+ij for product j when we solve problem (4.19) with
ui = u
+
i . Thus, we obtain (p
+
ij − u+i ) vij(p+ij) ≥ (p−ij − u+i ) vij(p−ij). Similarly, pˆ−i is
an optimal solution to problem (4.19) when we solve this problem with ui = u
−
i .
Therefore, following an argument similar to the preceding one, it holds that (p−ij −
u−i ) vij(p
−
ij) ≥ (p+ij−u−i ) vij(p+ij). Adding the last two inequalities and canceling the
common terms, we obtain u−i (vij(pˆ
+
ij)− vij(pˆ−ij)) ≥ u+i (vij(pˆ+ij)− vij(pˆ−ij)). Noting
that vij(pˆ
−
ij) < vij(pˆ
+
ij) by the discussion at the beginning of the proof, the last
inequality implies that u−i ≥ u+i , which is a contradiction.
In the next theorem, we build on the lemma above show that there exists a
collection of at most nq price vectors such that this collection includes an optimal
solution to problem (4.19) for any value of ui ∈ <+. The proof of this theorem uses
Lemma 4.4.4 and it follows from an outline that is identical to that of Theorem
4.3.5. Thus, we omit the proof.
Theorem 4.4.5. There exists a collection of at most nq price vectors such that this
collection includes an optimal solution to problem (4.19) for any value of ui ∈ <+.
By Theorem 4.4.5, for fixed values of `i ∈ Θ and wi ∈ Θ, there exists a collection
of at most nq price vectors such that this collection includes an optimal solution
to problem (4.19) for any value of ui ∈ <+. In the next section, we show how to
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construct this collection. Since there are q possible values for each of `i and wi,
repeating our approach for all possible values of `i and wi, it follows that there
exists a collection of at most nq3 price vectors such that this collection includes an
optimal solution to problem (4.19) for any value of ui ∈ <+, `i ∈ Θ and wi ∈ Θ.
4.4.5 Constructing Candidate Price Vectors
In the previous section, we consider problem (4.19) for fixed values of `i ∈ Θ and
wi ∈ Θ. We show that there exists a collection of at most nq price vectors such
that this collection includes an optimal solution to problem (4.19) for any value
of ui ∈ <+. In this section, we show how to come up with this collection in a
tractable fashion. Our approach builds on a linear programming formulation of
problem (4.19). To give this linear programming formulation, we use the decision
variables {xij(pij) : pij ∈ Θ, j ∈ N}, where xij(pij) = 1 if we charge price pij for
product j in nest i, otherwise xij(pij) = 0. In this case, problem (4.19) can be
written as
max
∑
j∈N
∑
pij∈Θ
(pij − ui) vij(pij)xij(pij) (4.20)
s.t.
∑
pij∈Θ
xij(pij) = 1 ∀ j ∈ N
xij(pij) = 0 ∀ pij 6∈ {`i, . . . , wi}, j ∈ N
xij(pij) ∈ {0, 1} ∀ pij ∈ Θ, j ∈ N.
In the problem above, the first set of constraints ensures that we choose one price
for each product, whereas the second set of constraints ensures that the price of
each product is between `i and wi. Using the second set of constraints, we can
set the values of the decision variables {xij(pij) : pij 6∈ {`i, . . . , wi}, j ∈ N} to zero
and drop these decision variables from problem (4.20). On the other hand, each
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row of the constraint matrix corresponding to the first set of constraints includes
consecutive ones. Such a matrix is called an interval matrix and interval matrices
are totally unimodular; see [44]. Therefore, we can obtain an optimal solution
to problem (4.20) by solving its linear programming relaxation. Also, we observe
that the value of ui ∈ <+ only affects the objective function coefficients in problem
(4.20). Thus, we can vary ui ∈ <+ parametrically and solve problem (4.20) by using
the parametric simplex method to generate the optimal solutions to this problem
for all values of ui ∈ <+. These solutions correspond to the optimal solutions to
problem (4.19) for all values of ui ∈ <+.
Therefore, for fixed values of `i ∈ Θ and wi ∈ Θ, we solve problem (4.20) by
using the parametric simplex method to generate the optimal solutions to this
problem for all values of ui ∈ <+. Repeating this approach for all possible values
of `i and wi, we obtain the optimal solutions to problem (4.20) for all values of
ui ∈ <+, `i ∈ Θ and wi ∈ Θ. By the discussion that follows Theorem 4.4.3, we
can use the optimal solutions to problem (4.20) for all values of ui ∈ <+, `i ∈ Θ
and wi ∈ Θ as the collection of candidate price vectors Pi in nest i. Once we
have the collection of candidate price vectors in each nest, we can solve the linear
program in (4.16) to find the value of zˆ that satisfies v0 zˆ = g(zˆ). Since there
are at most nq3 price vectors in each one of the collections P1, . . . ,Pm, we have
|M(wi−1)| = O(nq3), which implies that the linear program in (4.16) has O(mq)
decision variables and O(mnq4) constraints. In this case, by Theorem 4.4.1, we can
solve problem (4.14) with z = zˆ to obtain an optimal solution to problem (4.13).
To solve problem (4.14) with z = zˆ, we can simply solve the dynamic program in
(4.15) with z = zˆ.
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4.5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we provide numerical experiments to show that the approaches in
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 can obtain the optimal solutions to problems (4.3) and (4.13)
reasonably fast. We also investigate the number of candidate price vectors that we
construct to obtain the optimal solutions.
4.5.1 Price Ladders Inside Nests
In this section, we consider problem instances with price ladders inside nests. In our
numerical experiments, we vary the number of nests over m ∈ {2, 4, 6}, the number
of products in each nest over n ∈ {10, 20, 30} and the number of possible prices for
each product over q ∈ {10, 20, 30}. This setup provides 27 parameter combinations
for (m,n, q). In each parameter combination, we generate 10 individual problem
instances by using the following approach. The possible prices for each product
take values over the interval [1, 10] and we obtain the prices {θ1, . . . , θq} by dividing
the interval [1, 10] into q equal pieces. To come up with the preference weights,
we sample αij and βij from the uniform distribution over the interval [0, 2] for all
i ∈ M , j ∈ N . The preference weight of product j in nest i corresponding to the
price pij is given by exp(αij−βij pij). The nested logit model has a random utility
maximization interpretation, where a customer associates random utilities with the
products and the no purchase option, choosing the option with the largest utility. In
the random utility maximization setup, αij captures the nominal mean utility of
product j in nest i and βij captures how the mean utility of product j in nest i
changes as a function of its price; see [38]. We sample the dissimilarity parameter
γi for each nest i from the uniform distribution over the interval [0.25, 1]. For each
problem instance, we use the approach described at the end of Section 4.3.5 to
obtain an optimal solution to problem (4.3).
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We summarize our numerical results in Table 4.1. The first column in this
table shows the parameter configurations for our test problems. We recall that
we generate 10 individual problem instances in each parameter configuration. The
second column shows the average CPU seconds to obtain an optimal solution to
problem (4.3), where the average is computed over 10 problem instances that we
generate for a particular parameter combination. The third and fourth columns
respectively show the maximum and minimum CPU seconds over 10 problem in-
stances. Similar to the average, the maximum and minimum are computed over 10
problem instances that we generate for a particular parameter combination. There
are two main steps in obtaining an optimal solution to problem (4.3). First, we
construct the collections of candidate price vectors for each nest, which requires
solving problem (4.12) by using the parametric simplex method to generate the
possible optimal solutions to this problem for all values of ui ∈ <+. Second, we
solve problem (4.6) to stitch together an optimal solution by using the collection
of candidate price vectors for each nest. The fifth column in Table 4.1 shows what
percent of the CPU seconds is spent on generating the collections of candidate price
vectors. The remaining portion of the CPU seconds is spent on stitching together
an optimal solution. The sixth column shows the average number of price vectors
in the collection that we generate for each nest, where the average is computed over
all nests in a problem instance and over 10 problem instances that we generate for
a particular parameter combination. The seventh and eighth columns respectively
show the maximum and minimum number of price vectors in the collection that
we generate for each nest.
To demonstrate the potential importance of generating the collections of can-
didate price vectors carefully, we also find the best solution to problem (4.3) that
charges a constant price in each nest. Letting e ∈ <n be the vector of all ones,
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this solution can be obtained by using the collection Pi = {θ1 e, . . . , θq e} as the
collection of candidate price vectors for each nest i and solving problem (4.6) by
using this collection for each nest i. ([34] show that if βij = βik for all j, k ∈ N
and i ∈ M , then it is optimal to charge a constant price in each nest.) The ninth
column in Table 4.1 shows the average percent gap between the optimal objective
value of problem (4.3) and the best expected revenue obtained by charging a con-
stant price in each nest, where the average is computed over 10 problem instances
that we generate for a particular parameter combination. In other words, using
Optk to denote the optimal expected revenue for problem instance k that we gener-
ate for a particular parameter combination and ConPk to denote the best expected
revenue obtained by charging a constant price in each nest, the ninth column shows
the average of the data {100× (Optk − ConPk)/Optk : k = 1, . . . , 10}. The tenth
and eleventh columns show the maximum and minimum percent gaps between the
optimal objective value of problem (4.3) and the best expected revenue obtained
by charging a constant price in each nest.
Our computational results indicate that we can obtain an optimal solution to
problem (4.3) rather fast. For the largest problem instances with m = 6, n = 30
and q = 30, we can obtain an optimal solution in less than two seconds and the
average CPU seconds for these problem instances is about 1.4. Naturally, the CPU
seconds have an increasing trend as the number of nests, products or possible prices
increases. We observe that almost all of the CPU seconds are spent on constructing
the collections of candidate price vectors. In Section 4.3.4, we show that we need
to construct at most nq candidate price vectors in each nest, but our numerical
results demonstrate that the number of candidate price vectors that we actually
end up constructing can be substantially smaller than the upper bound of nq. For
example, for the problem instances with n = 30 and q = 30, we have nq = 900, but
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Perc.
Param. Time No. of Cand. Price Perc. Opt. Gap of
Comb. Total CPU Secs. Const. Vectors per Nest Const. Price in Nests
(m,n, q) Avg. Max. Min. Cand. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. Max. Min.
(2, 10, 10) 0.01 0.01 0.00 91.89 23 34 10 9.05 22.98 0.01
(2, 10, 20) 0.05 0.06 0.03 96.92 52 64 34 9.24 19.45 0.01
(2, 10, 30) 0.12 0.18 0.06 98.00 73 97 35 11.40 18.90 0.00
(2, 20, 10) 0.02 0.02 0.01 95.35 29 40 12 10.62 20.04 0.01
(2, 20, 20) 0.10 0.13 0.03 98.64 55 74 14 12.38 20.84 0.01
(2, 20, 30) 0.26 0.38 0.14 99.17 78 117 41 11.17 20.65 0.01
(2, 30, 10) 0.03 0.04 0.01 96.50 30 41 13 8.72 18.37 0.02
(2, 30, 20) 0.14 0.24 0.06 98.89 52 98 22 6.33 16.28 0.01
(2, 30, 30) 0.49 0.78 0.26 99.47 98 163 48 8.71 17.45 0.03
(4, 10, 10) 0.01 0.02 0.01 92.48 22 30 11 6.86 12.87 0.00
(4, 10, 20) 0.08 0.09 0.06 97.10 43 55 34 7.01 11.57 0.04
(4, 10, 30) 0.23 0.32 0.17 98.58 66 95 48 7.20 13.43 0.02
(4, 20, 10) 0.03 0.04 0.02 96.31 25 31 15 5.24 11.19 0.01
(4, 20, 20) 0.17 0.23 0.10 98.36 50 69 29 4.18 10.51 0.02
(4, 20, 30) 0.53 0.77 0.30 99.24 77 115 43 5.65 10.85 0.01
(4, 30, 10) 0.05 0.07 0.04 97.12 30 41 22 6.88 10.46 0.01
(4, 30, 20) 0.26 0.31 0.20 98.90 51 62 38 5.97 10.19 0.02
(4, 30, 30) 0.85 1.03 0.50 99.48 84 103 47 6.99 11.00 0.02
(6, 10, 10) 0.02 0.03 0.01 91.71 21 31 10 5.17 10.93 0.00
(6, 10, 20) 0.12 0.15 0.05 97.39 42 59 20 6.27 9.88 0.00
(6, 10, 30) 0.34 0.43 0.23 98.32 65 84 45 5.90 10.79 0.02
(6, 20, 10) 0.05 0.07 0.04 95.51 28 40 19 5.96 10.11 0.01
(6, 20, 20) 0.28 0.38 0.15 98.58 53 74 29 5.55 9.40 0.00
(6, 20, 30) 0.79 1.12 0.49 99.29 78 113 45 5.11 9.64 0.01
(6, 30, 10) 0.07 0.10 0.05 97.41 27 35 21 3.98 10.83 0.01
(6, 30, 20) 0.47 0.61 0.38 99.04 59 80 47 5.81 10.74 0.00
(6, 30, 30) 1.40 1.89 1.12 99.51 89 118 72 7.26 10.93 0.02
Table 4.1: Computational results for test problems with price ladders inside nests.
the average number of candidate price vectors that we construct for each nest is
about 90 and the number of candidate price vectors that we construct for each nest
does not exceed 163. Charging a constant price in each nest can provide a good
solution for some problem instances, but it is not too surprising to see that this
approach is generally not reliable. There are numerous problem instances in Table
4.1 where the optimal objective value exceeds the best expected revenue obtained
by charging a constant price in each nest by more than 20%.
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4.5.2 Price Ladders Between Nests
In this section, we consider problem instances with price ladders between nests.
We generate our problem instances by using the same approach that we use for
generating the problem instances with price ladders inside nests. For each problem
instance, we use the approach described at the end of Section 4.4.5 to obtain an
optimal solution to problem (4.13). In particular, to construct the collection of
candidate price vectors for each nest, we solve problem (4.20) through the para-
metric simplex method to generate the possible optimal solutions to this problem
for all values of ui ∈ <+. In this case, we solve problem (4.16) to find the value
of zˆ satisfying v0 zˆ = g(zˆ) and to stitch together an optimal solution by using the
collection of candidate price vectors for each nest.
We summarize our numerical results in Table 4.2. The layout of this table is
identical to that of Table 4.1. For the problem instances with 10 possible prices
for each product, we can obtain an optimal solution in 1.34 seconds. For the
largest problem instances with m = 6, n = 30 and q = 30, the CPU seconds
are below two minutes. On average, about half of the CPU seconds is spent on
constructing the collections of candidate price vectors. In Section 4.4.4, we show
that we need to construct at most nq3 price vectors in each nest, but we actually
end up generating substantially fewer candidate price vectors. For example, for
the problem instances with n = 30 and q = 30, we have nq3 = 810,000, but the
average number of candidate price vectors that we construct for each nest is about
25,000. Finally, the best expected revenue obtained by charging a constant price in
each nest can deviate significantly from the optimal expected revenue and there are
problem instances where this approach suffers optimality gaps that exceed 20%.
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Perc.
Param. Time No. of Cand. Price Perc. Opt. Gap of
Comb. Total CPU Secs. Const. Vectors per Nest Const. Price in Nests
(m,n, q) Avg. Max. Min. Cand. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. Max. Min.
(2, 10, 10) 0.06 0.08 0.05 42.90 357 463 262 9.01 22.79 0.01
(2, 10, 20) 0.77 1.00 0.59 58.00 1,798 2,447 882 9.35 19.59 0.02
(2, 10, 30) 3.60 4.43 3.03 69.65 5,845 8,191 3,914 11.37 19.19 0.01
(2, 20, 10) 0.19 0.20 0.18 47.24 924 1,030 674 9.97 18.84 0.01
(2, 20, 20) 2.75 2.99 2.54 58.24 4,833 6,276 3,481 11.54 18.93 0.01
(2, 20, 30) 14.05 15.76 11.56 69.99 15,797 21,829 12,189 10.54 19.87 0.01
(2, 30, 10) 0.37 0.40 0.33 53.34 1,332 1,476 1,061 10.52 22.18 0.02
(2, 30, 20) 5.55 5.90 5.09 65.54 8,432 9,921 6,873 7.65 19.69 0.01
(2, 30, 30) 32.01 35.95 29.40 72.53 21,821 26,983 14,980 10.53 21.42 0.02
(4, 10, 10) 0.15 0.16 0.13 40.00 284 374 206 7.50 13.97 0.00
(4, 10, 20) 1.87 2.57 1.37 49.60 1,981 2,980 899 7.69 13.22 0.02
(4, 10, 30) 9.52 12.54 6.71 56.84 5,246 7,580 3,373 7.95 15.14 0.02
(4, 20, 10) 0.46 0.54 0.40 41.59 853 954 688 5.89 12.60 0.01
(4, 20, 20) 6.28 7.45 5.25 52.35 5,233 6,390 4,451 4.61 11.82 0.02
(4, 20, 30) 30.65 33.15 28.63 60.86 15,433 19,105 13,145 6.33 12.12 0.02
(4, 30, 10) 0.81 0.83 0.75 46.37 1,368 1,450 1,219 7.97 12.12 0.01
(4, 30, 20) 11.62 12.34 10.38 60.00 7,753 9,109 5,289 6.92 11.82 0.02
(4, 30, 30) 68.79 71.38 64.05 63.61 24,193 27,144 21,519 8.18 12.89 0.02
(6, 10, 10) 0.20 0.25 0.18 36.71 301 365 223 4.85 10.23 0.00
(6, 10, 20) 2.54 2.90 2.08 49.89 1,733 2,202 1,070 5.93 9.39 0.00
(6, 10, 30) 13.86 16.93 11.86 52.79 5,928 8,913 4,201 5.50 10.05 0.01
(6, 20, 10) 0.66 0.74 0.59 39.98 863 984 737 5.39 9.33 0.01
(6, 20, 20) 8.92 9.48 7.81 52.88 4,899 5,513 3,992 5.02 8.52 0.00
(6, 20, 30) 48.62 51.89 44.69 57.91 15,677 18,043 12,110 4.58 8.64 0.00
(6, 30, 10) 1.25 1.34 1.23 44.98 1,335 1,446 1,259 3.72 9.91 0.01
(6, 30, 20) 18.31 19.17 17.29 56.94 8,049 9,222 7,078 5.54 10.78 0.00
(6, 30, 30) 108.72 116.77 102.09 60.95 24,930 27,364 21,331 6.92 10.93 0.01
Table 4.2: Computational results for test problems with price ladders between
nests.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.4.3
In this section, we show Theorem 4.4.3. We need the two intermediate lemmas to
show Theorem 4.4.3. In the next lemma, we show an ordering between the optimal
expected revenues from a customer that has already decided to make a purchase
in different nests.
Lemma 4.5.1. If (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is an optimal solution to problem (4.13), then we
have R1(p
∗
1) ≤ R2(p∗2) ≤ . . . ≤ Rm(p∗m).
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Proof. Since (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is a feasible solution to problem (4.13), we have pi ∈
Gi(pi−1), which implies that maxj∈N p∗i−1,j ≤ minj∈N p∗ij. Therefore, the largest
price in the price vector p∗i−1 is smaller than the smallest price in the price vector
p∗i . By (4.1), we observe that Ri−1(p
∗
i−1) is a convex combination of the prices in
the price vector p∗i−1, whereas Ri(p
∗
i ) is a convex combination of the prices in the
price vector p∗i . Since the largest price in the price vector p
∗
i−1 is smaller than the
smallest price in the price vector p∗i , we obtain Ri−1(p
∗
i−1) ≤ Ri(p∗i ).
In the next lemma, we show that if the optimal expected revenue from a cus-
tomer that has already decided to make a purchase in a particular nest does not
exceed the optimal expected revenue, then the smallest price in the next nest does
not exceed the optimal expected revenue.
Lemma 4.5.2. If (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is an optimal solution to problem (4.13) providing
the objective value z∗ and Ri(p∗i ) < z
∗ for some i ∈M , then we have i ∈M \ {m}
and minj∈N p∗i+1,j < z
∗.
Proof. First, we show that if Ri(p
∗
i ) < z
∗ for some i ∈M , then we have i ∈M\{m}.
To get a contradiction, assume that Rm(p
∗
m) < z
∗. By Lemma 4.5.1, we have
R1(p
∗
1) ≤ R2(p∗2) ≤ . . . ≤ Rm(p∗m) < z∗. Thus, we obtain Π(p∗1, . . . , p∗m) =∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi Ri(p
∗
i )/(v0+
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi) <
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi z∗/(v0+
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi) <
z∗, which contradicts the fact that (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is an optimal solution to problem
(4.13).
Second, we show that if Ri(p
∗
i ) < z
∗ for some i ∈ M , then minj∈N p∗i+1,j < z∗.
To get a contradiction assume that there exists a nest k such that Rk(p
∗
k) < z
∗
and minj∈N p∗k+1,j ≥ z∗. For notational brevity, we let `∗k+1 = minj∈N p∗k+1,j.
By our assumption, we have `∗k+1 ≥ z∗. We define a solution (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) to
problem (4.13) as pˆi = p
∗
i for all i ∈ M \ {k} and pˆkj = `∗k+1 for all j ∈
N . Since the solutions (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) and (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) charge the same prices in
180
all nests other than nest k, we have Vi(p
∗
i )
γi (Ri(p
∗
i ) − z∗) = Vi(pˆi)γi (Ri(pˆi) −
z∗) for all i ∈ M \ {k}. For nest k, we have Rk(p∗k) < z∗, but Rk(pˆk) =∑
j∈N pˆkj vkj(pˆkj)/
∑
j∈N vkj(pˆkj) =
∑
j∈N `
∗
k+1 vkj(pˆkj)/
∑
j∈N vkj(pˆkj) = `
∗
k+1 ≥
z∗. Thus, we obtain Vk(p∗k)
γk (Rk(p
∗
k)− z∗) < 0 ≤ Vk(pˆk)γk (Rk(pˆk)− z∗). The dis-
cussion so far in this paragraph shows that Vi(p
∗
i )
γi (Ri(p
∗
i )−z∗) ≤ Vi(pˆi)γi (Ri(pˆi)−
z∗) for all i ∈M and the inequality holds as strict inequality for nest k. Adding this
inequality over all i ∈M , we have∑i∈M Vi(p∗i )γi (Ri(p∗i )−z∗) <∑i∈M Vi(pˆi)γi (Ri(pˆi)−
z∗). On the other hand, since (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is an optimal solution to problem (4.13),
we have z∗ =
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )Ri(p
∗
i )/(v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi) and arranging the terms
in this equality yields v0 z
∗ =
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi (Ri(p
∗
i ) − z∗). In this case, having∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi (Ri(p
∗
i )− z∗) <
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi (Ri(pˆi)− z∗) and
v0 z
∗ =
∑
i∈M Vi(p
∗
i )
γi (Ri(p
∗
i )− z∗) yields v0 z∗ <
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi (Ri(pˆi)−z∗). Solv-
ing for z∗ in this inequality, we obtain z∗ <
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)Ri(pˆi)/(v0+
∑
i∈M Vi(pˆi)
γi) =
Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm). Thus, the solution (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) provides an objective value for prob-
lem (4.13) that is strictly larger than the optimal objective value. In the rest of
the proof, we show that (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is a feasible solution to problem (4.13), which
yields a contradiction and the desired result follows.
We have minj∈N pˆkj = `∗k+1 = minj∈N p
∗
k+1,j ≥ maxj∈N p∗kj ≥ minj∈N p∗kj ≥
maxj∈N p∗k−1,j = maxj∈N pˆk−1,j, where the first equality uses the definition of pˆk,
the second equality uses the definition of `∗k+1, the first and third inequalities use the
fact that (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is a feasible solution to problem (4.13) so that p
∗
k+1 ∈ Gk+1(pk)
and p∗k ∈ Gk(p∗k−1) and the last equality is by the definition of pˆk−1. Thus, this
chain of inequalities shows that pˆk ∈ Gk(pˆk−1). Similarly, we have minj∈N pˆk+1,j =
minj∈N p∗k+1,j = `
∗
k+1 = maxj∈N pˆkj, where the first and third equalities use the
definitions of pˆk+1 and pˆk, whereas the second equality uses the definition of `
∗
k+1.
Thus, this chain of equalities shows that pˆk+1 ∈ Gk+1(pˆk). Since the solutions
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(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) and (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) charge the same prices in all nests other than nest k
and (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is a feasible solution to problem (4.13), we have pˆi ∈ Gi(pˆi−1) for
all i ∈M \{1, k, k+1} as well. Therefore, we have pˆi ∈ Gi(pˆi−1) for all i ∈M \{1},
which indicates that (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is a feasible solution to problem (4.13).
In the rest of this section, we show Theorem 4.4.3.
For notational brevity, we let R∗i = Ri(p
∗
i ), V
∗
i = Vi(p
∗
i ), Rˆi = Ri(pˆi) and
Vˆi = Vi(pˆi). First, we consider a nest i that satisfies R
∗
i < z
∗. By Lemma 4.5.2, we
observe that i ∈M \{m}. Since pˆi is a feasible solution to problem (4.17), we have
pˆij ≤ w∗i for all j ∈ N , where w∗i is as defined in Theorem 4.4.3. We claim that pˆij =
w∗i for all j ∈ N . To get a contradiction, assume that pˆij < w∗i for some j ∈ N .
Since (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is a feasible solution to problem (4.13), we have p
∗
i+1 ∈ Gi+1(p∗i ),
which implies that minj∈N p∗i+1,j ≥ maxj∈N p∗ij = w∗i , where the equality is by the
definition of w∗i given in Theorem 4.4.3. On the other hand, since R
∗
i < z
∗, Lemma
4.5.2 implies that minj∈N p∗i+1,j < z
∗. Therefore, we obtain w∗i = maxj∈N p
∗
ij ≤
minj∈N p∗i+1,j < z
∗. We define a solution p˜i = (p˜i1, . . . , p˜in) to problem (4.17) as
p˜ij = w
∗
i for all j ∈ N . This solution is clearly feasible to problem (4.17) and
satisfies Ri(p˜i) =
∑
j∈N w
∗
i vij(p
∗
ij)/
∑
j∈N vij(p
∗
ij) = w
∗
i < z
∗. Furthermore, we
have Ri(pˆi) =
∑
j∈N pˆij vij(pˆij)/
∑
j∈N vij(pˆij) ≤
∑
j∈N w
∗
i vij(pˆij)/
∑
j∈N vij(pˆij) =
w∗i = Ri(p˜i). By the last two chains of inequalities, we get z
∗ − Ri(pˆi) ≥ z∗ −
Ri(p˜i) = z
∗ − w∗i > 0. Noting that the preference weight of a product becomes
smaller as we charge a larger price, since pˆij ≤ w∗i = p˜ij for all j ∈ N and the
inequality is strict for some j ∈ N , it holds that vij(pˆij) ≥ vij(p˜ij) for all j ∈ N and
the inequality is strict for some j ∈ N . Thus, adding the last inequality over all
j ∈ N , we obtain Vi(pˆi) > Vi(p˜i). In this case, having z∗−Ri(pˆi) ≥ z∗−Ri(p˜i) > 0
and Vi(pˆi) > Vi(p˜i) implies that Vi(pˆi) (z
∗ − Ri(pˆi)) > Vi(p˜i) (z∗ − Ri(p˜i)). Since
R∗i < z
∗, we have u∗i = z
∗ by the definition of u∗i , in which case, the last inequality
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can equivalently be written as Vi(pˆi) (Ri(pˆi) − u∗i ) < Vi(p˜i) (Ri(p˜i) − u∗i ), which
contradicts the fact that pˆi is an optimal solution to problem (4.17). Thus, our
claim holds and we have pˆij = w
∗
i for all j ∈ N .
By the claim established in the previous paragraph, we have pˆij = w
∗
i for all j ∈
N . Noting that w∗i = maxj∈N p
∗
ij by the definition of w
∗
i , we have pˆij = w
∗
i ≥ p∗ij for
all j ∈ N . Since the preference weight of a product becomes smaller as we charge a
larger price, the last inequality implies that vij(pˆij) ≤ vij(p∗ij) for all j ∈ N . Adding
this inequality over all j ∈ N , we obtain Vi(pˆi) ≤ Vi(p∗i ). Furthermore, we have
Ri(pˆi) =
∑
j∈N w
∗
i vij(pˆij)/
∑
j∈N vij(pˆij) = w
∗
i = maxj∈N p
∗
ij ≤ minj∈N p∗i+1,j < z∗,
where the first inequality is by the fact that (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m) is a feasible solution to
problem (4.13) so that p∗i+1 ∈ Gi+1(p∗i ) and the second inequality follows by noting
thatR∗i < z
∗ and using Lemma 4.5.2. Since w∗i ≥ p∗ij for all j ∈ N , we haveRi(p∗i ) ≤∑
j∈N w
∗
i vij(pˆij)/
∑
j∈N vij(pˆij) = w
∗
i = Ri(pˆi) as well. The last two chains of
inequalities show that z∗−Ri(p∗i ) ≥ z∗−Ri(pˆi) = z∗−w∗i > 0. In this case, having
Vi(pˆi) ≤ Vi(p∗i ) and z∗ − Ri(p∗i ) > z∗ − Ri(pˆi) > 0 yields Vi(p∗i )γi (z∗ − Ri(p∗i )) >
Vi(pˆi)
γi (z∗−Ri(pˆi)). The last inequality shows that (V ∗i )γi (R∗i −z∗) < Vˆ γii (Rˆi−z∗)
for each nest i that satisfies R∗i < z
∗.
Second, we consider a nest i that satisfies R∗i ≥ z∗. In this case, we can follow
the same argument at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 4.3.3 to show that
(V ∗i )
γi (R∗i −z∗) ≤ Vˆ γii (Rˆi−z∗) for each nest i that satisfies R∗i ≥ z∗. Therefore, we
obtain (V ∗i )
γi (R∗i − z∗) ≤ Vˆ γii (Rˆi−z∗) for all i ∈M . Adding this inequality over all
i ∈M , we have ∑i∈M(V ∗i )γi (R∗i − z∗) ≤∑i∈M Vˆ γii (Rˆi − z∗). Since (p∗1, . . . , p∗m) is
an optimal solution to problem (4.13), we have z∗ =
∑
i∈M(V
∗
i )
γiR∗i /(v0 +
∑
i∈M(V
∗
i )
γi).
Arranging the terms in this equality, it follows that v0 z
∗ =
∑
i∈M(V
∗
i )
γi (R∗i − z∗),
in which case, we have v0 z
∗ =
∑
i∈M(V
∗
i )
γi (R∗i − z∗) ≤
∑
i∈M Vˆ
γi
i (Rˆi − z∗). Fo-
cusing on the first and last terms in this chain of inequalities and solving for z∗,
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we get z∗ ≤ ∑i∈M Vˆ γii Rˆi/(v0 + ∑i∈M Vˆ γii ) = Π(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm). Thus, the solution
(pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) provides an expected revenue that is at least as large as the optimal
objective value of problem (4.13). In the rest of the proof, we show that (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm)
is a feasible solution to problem (4.13), which establishes that (pˆ1, . . . , pˆm) is an
optimal solution to problem (4.13).
Consider nest i ∈M\{1}. Noting that pˆi is a feasible solution to problem (4.17),
we obtain pˆij ≥ `∗i and pˆi−1,j ≤ w∗i−1 for all j ∈ N , which imply that minj∈N pˆij ≥ `∗i
and maxj∈N pˆi−1,j ≤ w∗i−1. Since (p∗1, . . . , p∗m) is a feasible solution to problem
(4.13), we also have p∗i ∈ Gi(p∗i−1), which implies that w∗i−1 = maxj∈N p∗i−1,j ≤
minj∈N p∗ij = `
∗
i . Therefore, we obtain maxj∈N pˆi−1,j ≤ w∗i−1 ≤ `∗i ≤ minj∈N pˆij.
The last inequality shows that pˆi ∈ Gi(pˆi−1). Since our choice of nest i is arbitrary,
we have pˆi ∈ Gi(pˆi−1) for all i ∈M \ {1}.
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CHAPTER 5
ASSORTMENT OPTIMIZATION OVER TIME
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we introduce the problem of assortment planning over time. In
this problem, we have a sequence of time periods and can only introduce one
new product per time step, and we are not allowed to remove products from our
assortment that have already been introduced. The goal is to determine which
products to introduce, and in what order, so as to maximize the total revenue
realized over all the time steps under some choice model.
We show how to give a 1/2-approximation algorithm for this problem under
a general choice model, for which the multinomial logit choice model is a special
case. We further show a (1−1/e)-approximation algorithm if the revenue function
is monotone and submodular. Finally, we show that the problem is NP-hard to
compute for a natural special case of the general choice model whose revenue
function is monotone and submodular.
5.2 Literature Review
In dynamic assortment problems, the offered assortment is adjusted over time, pos-
sibly due to depleted product inventories, better understanding of customer choice
processes or changes in customer tastes. [28] and [37] study the problem of finding
an assortment to offer and the corresponding stocking quantities with the under-
standing that customers choose only among the products that are still in stock. [3]
and [24] consider the problem of dynamically customizing the assortment offerings
based on the preferences of each customer and remaining product inventories. [6]
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and [9] study assortment problems where the attractiveness of the products dimin-
ishes over time and they seek optimal policies to replace such products. [7] and
[62] develop models where the assortment offering needs to be adjusted over time
in response to a better understanding of the customer choice process.
The rest of the note is organized as follows. §5.3 describes our assortment prob-
lem, where the firm needs to gradually build its product portfolio. §5.4 analyzes
approximation algorithms for the problem. §5.5 discusses the complexity of the
problem.
5.3 Preliminaries
Let I be the set of items that can be offered for sale, and let n = |I|. We let rj
be the revenue earned when item j is sold. Let Pj(S) be the probability that item
j is purchased if S ⊆ I is offered for sale; then Pj(S) = 0 if j /∈ S. We consider
choice models where the following two properties hold. First,
Pj(S) ≥ Pj(T ) ∀T ∀j ∈ S ⊂ T ;
that is, the probability of purchasing item j cannot increase if we offer a larger
set of items. This holds for utility maximization models, for example. Second,∑
j∈S Pj(S) ≤ 1 for any non-empty set of items S. If an assortment S is offered for
sale, then with probability 1 −∑j∈S Pj(S), no item is purchased. The expected
revenue for a set S of items is R(S) =
∑
j∈S rjPj(S). For lack of a better term, let
us call such choice models monotone choice models. The multinomial logit choice
model is one example of a monotone choice model.
Additionally, we will also consider the case in which we only know that the
revenue function R(S) is monotone (that is, R(S) ≤ R(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ I)
and submodular (that is, for any j /∈ S ⊆ T ⊆ I, then R(S ∪ {j}) − R(S) ≥
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R(T ∪{j})−R(T )), without knowing anything about the underlying choice model.
We will consider variants of the assortment planning problem in which there
is a capacity c on the number of items that can be offered for sale; that is, we
wish to find a set S∗c with |S∗c | ≤ c that maximizes R(S∗c ). We call this the
capacitated assortment planning problem. For an optimal solution S∗c , let OPTc be
the expected revenue obtained; that is, OPTc = R(S
∗
c ). For our first result, we will
suppose that we have a polynomial-time algorithm for the capacitated assortment
planning problem under the given monotone choice model. For example, there is
an optimal algorithm for the problem for the multinomial logit and nested logit
choice models (see [16] and [51]). For our second result, we will use a well-known
greedy (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for finding a maximum valued set S
with |S| ≤ c for any monotone, submodular set function due to [45]. The greedy
algorithm repeatedly chooses an element to add to the set S until |S| = c, and
each time adds the element in I − S that maximizes the marginal gain; that is, it
selects j ∈ I − S that maximizes R(S ∪ {j})−R(S) and adds it to S.
We wish to study the assortment planning problem over time. Intuitively, we
would like to find a sequence of items in which we can offer at most one new
item for sale at each of T time steps that maximizes the overall expected revenue
achieved over the given time horizon. Once an item is offered for sale, it remains
available to purchase for the remainder of the time horizon. More precisely, we
would like to find sets S1, S2, . . . , ST such that |St| ≤ t for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and
S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ ST that maximizes
∑T
t=1R(St).
5.4 Algorithm
In this section, we first give an 1/2-approximation algorithm for the assortment
planning problem over time for monotone choice models, given a polynomial-time
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algorithm for the capacitated assortment planning problem under the choice model.
We then give a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for the assortment planning
problem over time for monotone submodular revenue functions.
The first algorithm works as follows. We initially use the polynomial-time
algorithm to find an optimal assortment of at most capacity t for all t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Let τ be the capacity for which we get the largest revenue assortment and let
Sτ be the assortment. We then order the items of Sτ by nonincreasing value of
rjPj(Sτ ); we will offer items for sale in this order. Without loss of generality,
assume that items of Sτ are indexed by 1, 2, . . . , τ so that r1P1(Sτ ) ≥ r2P2(Sτ ) ≥
· · · ≥ rτPτ (Sτ ). Then we set S1 = {1}, S2 = {1, 2}, . . ., Sτ−1 = {1, . . . , τ − 1}, and
St = Sτ for all τ ≤ t ≤ T .
We now analyze the algorithm. Let OPT be the overall expected revenue of an
optimal assortment over time. We observe the following.
Observation 5.4.1.
OPT ≤
T∑
t=1
OPTt ≤ T ·OPTτ = T ·R(S∗τ ),
where OPTt = R(S
∗
t ) is the optimal expected revenue for the capacitated assortment
planning problem with capacity t, S∗t is the optimal solution to this capacitated
problem, and τ is such that OPTτ ≥ OPTt for 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
We then get the following easy lemma bounding the value of the algorithm’s
solution in terms of the overall optimum.
Lemma 5.4.2. Given a monotone choice model, for any of the sets St constructed
above, 1 ≤ t ≤ τ , we have that
R(St) ≥ t
τ
OPTτ .
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Proof. Consider the following inequalities:
OPTτ =
∑
j∈Sτ
rjPj(Sτ )
=
∑
j∈St
rjPj(Sτ ) +
∑
j∈Sτ/St
rjPj(Sτ )
≤
∑
j∈St
rjPj(St) +
∑
j∈Sτ/St
rjPj(Sτ )
≤
∑
j∈St
rjPj(St) +
τ − t
τ
∑
j∈Sτ
rjPj(Sτ )
= R(St) +
τ − t
τ
OPTτ ,
where the final inequality follows by our choice of the highest revenue items in Sτ .
Rearranging terms gives the claimed inequality.
Theorem 5.4.3. The algorithm is a 1/2-approximation algorithm for the assort-
ment planning problem over time for any monotone choice model such that there
is a polynomial-time algorithm for the capacitated assortment planning problem.
Proof. The expected value of our solution is
∑
1≤t≤τ R(St) +
∑
τ<t≤T R(S
∗
τ ). Then∑
1≤t≤τ
R(St) +
∑
τ<t≤T
R(S∗τ ) ≥
∑
1≤t≤τ
t
τ
R(S∗τ ) +
∑
τ<t≤T
R(S∗τ )
= R(S∗τ )
(
T − τ + 1 +
∑
1≤t≤τ
t
τ
)
= R(S∗τ )
(
T − τ + τ(τ + 1)
2τ
)
= R(S∗τ )
(
T − τ + τ + 1
2
)
= R(S∗τ )
(
T − τ
2
+
1
2
)
≥ T
2
·R(S∗τ ) ≥
1
2
OPT,
where the final inequality uses Observation 5.4.1.
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We now show that we can obtain a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for
assortment planning over time given that the revenue function R is monotone and
submodular. We simply run the greedy algorithm, and let S1 be the first item
selected by the greedy algorithm, S2 be the first two elements selected by the
greedy algorithm, and so on. If T ≥ |I|, then for time steps t ≥ T , we let St = I.
We can now show the following.
Theorem 5.4.4. This algorithm gives a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for
assortment planning over time when the revenue function is monotone and sub-
modular.
Proof. Let S∗t be the optimal assortment of t items for revenue function, where
S∗t = I for t ≥ T . Then because the greedy algorithm is a (1−1/e)-approximation
algorithm for the capacitated assortment planning problem when the revenue func-
tion is monotone and submodular, we know that for any t ≥ 1,
R(St) ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
R(S∗t ).
Therefore, we have a revenue of
T∑
t=1
R(St) ≥
(
1− 1
e
) T∑
t=1
R(S∗t ) ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
OPT,
since by Observation 5.4.1
∑T
t=1 OPTt =
∑T
t=1 R(S
∗
t ) must be an upper bound on
the optimal revenue.
5.5 Hardness
We now show that assortment planning over time is NP-hard under a particular
monotone choice model whose revenue function is monotone and submodular. Our
reduction is from the min-sum set cover problem. In this problem, we are given a
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hypergraph H = (V,E) as input, and the output is a sequence of the elements of
V ; we can think of the output as a bijective function f : V → {1, . . . , n}, where
n = |V |. We extend the function f to the hyperedges so that f(e) = minv∈e f(v).
Then the goal of the min-sum set cover problem is to find a bijection f so as to
minimize
∑
e∈E f(e). [15] show that this is an NP-hard problem; in particular,
they show that there is no (2− )-approximation algorithm for the problem, even
for r-uniform d-regular hypergraphs, unless P = NP . A hypergraph is r-uniform
if |e| = r for all e ∈ E, and is d-regular if each vertex v ∈ V is in exactly d of the
hyperedges. We will need the d-regularity for our reduction.
Theorem 5.5.1. It is NP-complete to decide whether the expected revenue of an
assortment planning over time instance is at least C for a choice model that is
monotone, or a revenue function that is monotone and submodular.
Proof. Given an instance of the min-sum set cover problem in which we have an
d-regular hypergraph, we create an instance of assortment planning over time as
follows. We create an item j of revenue rj = |E| for each vertex j ∈ V . We set
Pj(S) = 0 if j /∈ S, and otherwise
Pj(S) =
1
|E|
∑
e∈E
|e ∩ {j}|
|e ∩ S| ,
where we assume 0/0 = 0 in the case that e ∩ S = ∅.
We now show that this choice model is monotone. Since there are exactly d
hyperedges that contain j and |E| ≥ d, then 0 ≤ Pj(S) ≤ 1 for all j and all S, and
furthermore Pj(S) ≥ Pj(T ) when j ∈ S ⊂ T , since for any edge e ∈ E, if j /∈ e,
then |e ∩ {j}|/|e ∩ S| = |e ∩ {j}|/|e ∩ T | = 0, while if j ∈ e, 1/|e ∩ S| ≥ 1/|e ∩ T |.
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Furthermore, for any nonempty set S,
∑
j∈S
Pj(S) =
1
|E|
∑
j∈S
∑
e∈E
|e ∩ {j}|
|e ∩ S|
=
1
|E|
∑
e∈E
∑
j∈S
|e ∩ {j}|
|e ∩ S|
=
1
|E|
∑
e∈E
|e ∩ S|
|e ∩ S|
=
1
|E|
∑
e∈E
I(e ∩ S),
where I(e ∩ S) is the indicator function that is 1 if e ∩ S 6= ∅ and is 0 otherwise.
Thus
∑
j∈S Pj(S) ≤ 1.
We now show that the revenue function R(S) is monotone and submodular.
From the above, we have that
R(S) = |E|
∑
j∈S
Pj(S) =
∑
e∈E
I(e ∩ S)
so the revenue for a set S is simply the number of hyperedges with which S has a
nonempty intersection. Clearly this function is monotone. It is also submodular
since the number of additional hyperedges intersected by adding a new element
j to S is at least as large as the number of additional hyperedges intersected by
adding j to T ⊇ S; that is, for T ⊇ S,
R(S ∪ {j})−R(S) =
∑
e∈E
I(e ∩ (S ∪ {j}))−
∑
e∈E
I(e ∩ S)
≥
∑
e∈E
I(e ∩ (T ∪ {j}))−
∑
e∈E
I(e ∩ T ) = R(T ∪ {j})−R(T ).
Now suppose we are given some ordering of the vertices given by a func-
tion f . Consider the sets S1 = {f−1(1)}, S2 = {f−1(1), f−1(2)}, . . ., Sn =
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{f−1(1), . . . , f−1(n)}. Then the same ordering of the items gives a revenue of
|E|
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si
Pj(Si) =
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si
∑
e∈E
|e ∩ {j}|
|e ∩ Si|
=
∑
e∈E
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si
|e ∩ {j}|
|e ∩ Si|
=
∑
e∈E
n∑
i=1
|e ∩ Si|
|e ∩ Si|
=
∑
e∈E
n∑
i=1
I(e ∩ Si).
We now observe that
∑n
i=1 I(e ∩ Si) + f(e) = n + 1, since f(e) is the smallest
j for which e ∩ Sj 6= ∅, while I(e ∩ Si) is 1 for j ≤ i ≤ n and 0 for i < j.
Thus for any ordering of the vertices, the sum of the expected revenue plus the
sum
∑
e∈E f(e) is
|E|
∑
j∈V
n∑
i=1
Pj(Si) +
∑
e∈E
f(e) =
∑
e∈E
n∑
i=1
(I(e ∩ Si) + f(e)) = (n+ 1)|E|.
Hence maximizing revenue for this instance is equivalent to minimizing the min-
sum set cover objective function. Therefore, given an instance of the min-sum
set cover problem in which we must check if the objective is at most B, we can
reduce it to this instance of assortment planning over time and check if the expected
revenue is at least (n+1)|E|−B. Therefore, the decision version of our incremental
assortment planning problem is also NP-complete.
We now say a few words about the particular choice model implied by the
probabilities Pj(S) given above. We can view each edge e ∈ E as representing a
particular customer type who is solely interested in the items in e but is indifferent
between them. Given a set S of products, a uniformly random customer type e
arrives, and selects uniformly at random amongst any of the e∩S items offered (if
there are any). Consider now the capacitated version of this problem: suppose we
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want to choose S ⊆ V , |S| ≤ k, to maximize |E|∑j∈S Pj(S). From the above, we
have that
R(S) = |E|
∑
j∈S
Pj(S) =
∑
e∈E
I(e ∩ S),
so we need to pick S, |S| ≤ k, so as to maximize the number of hyperedges e with
which S has some intersection (we say that S covers a hyperedge e if S ∩ e 6= ∅).
This problem is known as the maximum coverage problem, and it is well-known to
be an NP-hard problem (see [14]).
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